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A Comprehensive Security Framework for Wireless Mesh Networks
Abstract: Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) represent one of the key technologies
that are used to cope with the increasing demand of ubiquitous connectivity and the
accompanying hunger for bandwidth. Due to their wireless nature WMNs are very
flexible in their deployment. However, flexibility often comes at the price of security.
WMNs have to be secured against external, as well as against internal attackers.
Special attention has to be paid to all communication patterns in the network, since
otherwise no comprehensive security can be achieved.
This thesis proposes a comprehensive security architecture for WMNs that ex-
tends standardized mechanisms such as the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP),
the Remote Dial-in User Service (RADIUS), IEEE 802.11i, and the Internet Protocol
Security (IPsec) suite. We compose an architecture that allows to bootstrap secu-
rity associations based on an extensible key hierarchy. Besides enabling secure
communication between authenticated devices, our architecture is generalized to
support multi-operator scenarios. This also includes completely new concepts such
as mixed-networks in which network operators cooperate in running a converged
network. Our comprehensive security architecture is augmented by handover pro-
tocols that enable network clients, but also the network infrastructure, to hand over
from one point of network attachment to the next. The complete architecture has
also been evaluated using a live, custom-built WMN testbed based on off-the-shelf
hardware. This underlines the feasibility and practicality of the work put forth in
this thesis.
Keywords: Wireless Mesh Networks, Security, Multi-Operator, Handover, Roam-
ing, Testbed.
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C H A P T E R 1
Introduction
Nowadays, mobile telecommunication networks (e.g. 3G networks) and Wireless
LANs (WLANs) co-exist and compete to provide Internet access to mobile users.
Over time the number of users with data subscription plans to mobile operators has
constantly increased. This has already begun to spark business models aiming to
off-load traffic to WLANs. The available bandwidth and speed of a 3G connections
is often too slow to enable multimedia applications such as video streaming. This
is mostly related to the varying coverage quality in such networks and the large
user base in cells. On the one hand operators must heavily invest in expensive
hardware to increase network quality. But on the other hand, the immediate Return
of Investment (ROI) is far from being clearly defined. Thus, operators usually
cap the tariffs in terms of amount of data, e.g., significant speed reduction after
consuming 500MB.
IEEE 802.11 WLAN coverage on the other hand is widely available in many
places: private individuals operate WLAN Access Points (APs) at their homes, uni-
versities and companies provide wireless access to their students and employees,
commercial operators provide access at hotels, airports, coffee shops, and other
public places. Even to a point of WLAN pollution where the amount of APs de-
creases the network quality for all users. Usually these networks are either operated
by private individuals with a very limited user group, or they are operated by
a commercial entity that requires user registration. This results in a collection of
connectivity bubbles, each of different quality and administrative domain.
In order to address these issues many so-called community WLAN networks
have been initiated, e.g., Freifunk or Fon1. The point being, a community offers
their collective WLAN access to their members. Each member must contribute their
private WLAN to be able to profit from access elsewhere. However, this approach
has some downsides. Usually private individuals are responsible for the traffic that
is transmitted from their network to other networks, e.g., the Internet. As such, they
can also be held accountable in a legal sense for any illegitimate or malicious traffic
generated by their users. Also, it is non-trivial to enable WLAN access to community
members while protecting traffic from being eavesdropped on or manipulated by
1http://www.freifunk.net, http://www.fon.com
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formed using one type of radios on devices. Thus, a Client
WMN is actually the same as a conventional ad hoc network.
However, the requirements on end-user devices is increased
when compared to infrastructure meshing, since in Client
WMNs the end-users must perform additional functions such
as routing and self-configuration.
Hybrid WMNs. This architecture is the combination of
infrastructure and client meshing, as shown in Fig. 2. Mesh
clients can access the network through mesh routers as well as
directly meshing with other mesh clients. While the infra-
structure provides connectivity to other networks such as the
Internet, Wi-Fi, WiMAX, cellular, and sensor networks, the
routing capabilities of clients provide improved connectivity
and coverage inside WMNs.
The characteristics of WMNs are outlined below, where
the hybrid architecture is considered for WMNs, since it com-
prises all the advantages of WMNs:
• WMNs support ad hoc networking, and have the capability
of self-forming, self-healing, and self-organization.
• WMNs are multi-hop wireless networks, but with a wireless
infrastructure/backbone provided by mesh routers.
• Mesh routers have minimal mobility and perform dedicated
routing and configuration, which significantly decreases the
load of mesh clients and other end nodes.
• Mobility of end nodes is supported easily through the wire-
less infrastructure.
• Mesh routers integrate heterogeneous networks, including
both wired and wireless. Thus, multiple types of network
access exist in WMNs. 
• Power-consumption constraints are different for mesh
routers and mesh clients.
• WMNs are not stand-alone and need to be compatible and
interoperable with other wireless networks.
Therefore, WMNs diversify the capabilities of ad-hoc net-
works instead of simply being another type of ad hoc network.
These additional capabilities necessitate new algorithms and
design principles for the realization of WMNs.
Critical Design Factors
The critical factors influencing the performance of WMNs are
summarized as follows.
Radio Techniques. Many approaches have been proposed
to increase capacity and flexibility of wireless systems in
recent years. Typical examples include directional and smart
antennas, multiple input multiple output (MIMO) systems,
and multi-radio/multi-channel systems.
To further improve the performance of a wireless radio
and control by higher layer protocols, more advanced radio
technologies, such as reconfigurable radios, frequency
agile/cognitive radios, and even software radios, have been
used for wireless communication. Although these radio tech-
nologies are still in their infancy, they are expected to be the
future platform for wireless networks due to their dynamic
control capability. These advanced wireless radio technologies
all require a revolutionary design in higher-layer protocols,
especially MAC and routing protocols.
Scalability. Scalability is a critical requirement of WMNs.
Without support of this feature, the network performance
degrades significantly as the network size increases. For
example, routing protocols may not be able to find a reliable
routing path, transport protocols may loose connections, and
MAC protocols may experience significant throughput
reduction. To ensure the scalability in WMNs, all protocols
from the MAC layer to the application layer need to be scal-
able.
Mesh Connectivity. Many advantages of WMNs originate
from mesh connectivity. To ensure reliable mesh connectivity,
network self-organization and topology control algorithms are
needed. Topology-aware MAC and routing protocols can sig-
nificantly improve the performance of WMNs.
Broadband and QoS. Different from classical ad hoc net-
works, most applications of WMNs are broadband services
with heterogeneous QoS requirements. Thus, in addition to
end-to-end transmission delay and fairness, more performance
metrics, such as delay jitter, aggregate and per-node through-
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Figure 1.1: Wireless Mesh Network Architecture [AW05]
other community members. In o sequence the acc pt nce f uch appr aches
usually suffers.
In terms of commercial operator it i typically equired for users to r gister sep-
arately with each operator. Additionally, adding n w infrastructure to a commercial
WLAN can be quite cumbersome and expensive as a wired connection from the
backbone to the new access point is required and communication pr toc ls may
not be standa dized.
It would be straightforwardly beneficial for all involved entities to increase the
connectivity by leveraging a greater cov rage area. A flexible, easy, and on-demand
extensi n of the infrastructure can be achieved by so-called Wireless Mesh Networks
(WMNs). Parts of this technology have also been standardized by the IEEE based
on WLAN [IEE99] a d other n two king technologies such as WiMAX [IEE12]. In
general, a WMN consists of a hierarchy of odes that are wirel ssly connected with
each other (see Figure 1.1). On top of the hierarchy, Mesh Gateways (MGs) provide
access to oth r networks, typically the Internet, and rou traffic from the mesh to
the Internet and vice versa. On a second hierarchy level, Mesh Routers (MRs) route
traffic within the wireless mesh. On a third level, Mesh Clients (MCs) are connected to
the network via MRs that serve the clients as points of network attachment. Finally,
in WMNs, some MCs are able to route traffic for other MCs and thus act as MCs
and MRs simultaneously. Within a wireless mesh network different communication
patterns exist. MCs communicate directly with MRs, and with MGs and other MCs;
MRs communicate with each other and with MGs. All the communication patters
originating from MCs, MRs, and MGs have to be authenticated and adequately
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protected against eavesdropping and manipulation.
Today, WMNs are mostly considered to be operated by a single operator which
is also reflected by standardization efforts. For the future, however, we do not only
envision WMNs operated by different commercial operators to inter-operate, but
also a convergence of commercial and community networks. In such a converged
mesh network multiple commercial operators cooperate, such that MCs can obtain
network access via MRs operated by any of the commercial operators and yet obtain
a single bill (roaming). Private individuals contribute their access points to the
converged WMN. In contrast to community networks individuals are compensated
for the use of their access points by other participants. MCs can be configured to
act as MR for other MC in the converged network and be compensated. Thus, in
our envisioned converged mesh networks an oligarchy of operators ranging from
commercial operators to private individuals with their mobile equipment will be
supported. In addition, we envision such converged networks to support mobility
of MCs (seamless handover) as well as mobility of infrastructure components.
Seamless mobility for MCs is crucial for real-time applications such voice or video
conferencing, and video streaming. Supporting MR mobility allows, e.g., for easy
re-connection on relocation of a private individual contributing its WLAN AP, or
on setup and tear-down of APs contributed by commercial or public entities in case
of temporary events.
In order for all participants to accept and profit from the envisioned converged
mesh, it is crucial to ensure that it does not lead to financial losses to the involved
commercial and private entities, and that it meets the functional requirements
even in the presence of malicious and selfish MCs, MRs or MGs. Within this thesis
we develop new security mechanisms that address security for WMNs as whole.
We propose mechanisms for bootstrapping security associations, multi-operator
networks including infrastructure sharing, roaming, and handover services. Finally,
to demonstrate their practicality, all developed mechanisms have been implemented
and evaluated using current off-the-shelf hardware.
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1.1 Contributions
This thesis addresses the security issues of WMNs on a general level by proposing
a comprehensive multi-operator enabled security architecture including bootstrap-
ping, key management, and handover capabilities. In the following we summarize
our main contributions.
At first, we contribute significantly to analyzing the security issues of WMNs
on a general level in Chapter 3. While there is consensus on the importance of the
main security challenges of WMNs, prior work has not yet led to generally accepted
security requirements. In particular, existing proposals for security architectures
for WMNs tend not to address WMNs as a whole, but rather concentrate on one
or two specific characteristics and design security mechanisms that meet the se-
curity requirements for these specific characteristics. We step back to classify and
characterize WMNs as a whole. This high-level vantage point helps us to define
general security requirements and identify unique challenges to meet these require-
ments with respect to the characteristics of WMNs. We then use this framework of
requirements and characteristics to evaluate state of the art proposals ranging from
standardization efforts of the IEEE to results from academia.
André Egners and Ulrike Meyer: Wireless Mesh Network Security: State of Affairs,
35th IEEE LCN 2010, Denver, USA [EM10]
In recent years many testbeds for WMNs have been implemented to testing and
evaluating different aspects of WMNs, however, none of these have been designed
with testing and evaluating security mechanisms for WMNs in mind. In Chapter 4
we share from the experience of designing a testbed dedicated to test and evaluate
security protocols in a realistic setting. We detail the hardware and software setup
of our testbed, the management tools we developed to facilitate maintenance of our
testbed, along with several pitfalls we encountered during the setup. This testbed
is used in all subsequent chapters to evaluate the developed security mechanisms.
The testbed is also continued to be used for further research activities. As such,
our testbed significantly contributes to enabling practical research and feasibility
evaluations.
André Egners, Patrick Herrmann, Tobias Jarmuzek and Ulrike Meyer: Experiences
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From Security Research Using a Wireless Mesh Network Testbed, 38th IEEE LCN 2013,
Sydney, Australia [EHJM13]
A number of security architectures have been proposed for WMNs, however,
none is a comprehensive solution. We propose a comprehensive security framework
based on open standards and well scrutinized security protocols in Chapter 5
solving the well known bootstrapping problem. In particular, our framework allows
for mutual authentication between any node and the AAA server based on any
desired type of AAA credentials; supports the removal of any network node (e.g.,
a compromised MR); solves the problem of bootstrapping security associations
required for the end-to-end protection of the different traffic types within a WMN in
a highly efficient way; supports end-to-end protection with the help of standardized,
well-scrutinized protocols, namely EAP for node authentication, 802.11i CCMP for
link layer protection and IPsec ESP for network layer multi-hop traffic and supports
secure proactive handovers of moving MCs (or MRs) from one point of network
attachment to another. Additionally, we introduce a new component that allows
to split an administrative WMN domain into logical sub-domains. This has the
potential to significantly speed up handover protocols.
André Egners, Hendrik Fabelje and Ulrike Meyer: FSASD: A Framework for
establishing Security Associations for Sequentially Deployed WMN, 13th IEEE
WoWMoM 2012, San Francisco, USA [EFM12]
While previous security research of WMNs mainly focused on single-operator
networks, we propose an extension of our comprehensive security architecture for
multi-operator WMNs. Our proposal (cf. Chapter 6) allows for a secure deploy-
ment of infrastructure components (routers and gateways) as well as MCs. The
multi-operator support of our architecture does not only cover MC roaming, but
also the deployment of infrastructure components of one operator in the adminis-
trative domain of the other operator. Our architecture is the first to support secure
infrastructure sharing between operators. Additionally, our solution is based on
open standards and protects traffic generated by mesh clients from insider attackers
such as compromised MRs, MRs operated by malicious operators, and curious or
malicious routing MCs.
André Egners and Ulrike Meyer: Secure Roaming and Infrastructure Sharing for
Multi-Operator WMNs, 28th ACM SAC 2012, Coimbra, Portugal [EM13]
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The main contributions of Chapter 7 are three complementary secure and effi-
cient handover protocols for WMNs that can be used by all devices, including the
network infrastructure. One of these protocols allows to pro-actively supply candi-
date Target Mesh Routers (TMRs) with keying material as part of the initial Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) authentication of a device joining the WMN. The other
two protocols can be run at any point in time after successful authentication. The
first of these protocols allows several TMRs to be pro-actively supplied with keying
material, but the device requiring handover cannot be sure that these TMRs have
already received the keying material at the end of the protocol run. The second
protocol has the advantage that a device initiating the protocol can be certain that
the TMR has received the keying material when the protocol finishes. Additionally,
we extend the protocols to be usable in a multi-operator contexts. We implemented
and evaluated our protocols using our testbed and integrated them into the de-facto
standard WLAN software hostapd and wpa_supplicant.
André Egners, Patrick Herrmann and Ulrike Meyer: Secure and Efficient Handover
Protocols for WMNs, 14th IEEE WoWMoM 2013, Madrid, Spain [EHM13]
Previous proposals on WMN security mainly focus on mesh networks operated
by a single operator and rarely support mobility of MCs with the help of secure
roaming and handover procedures. While these approaches protect the communi-
cation of MCs against external attackers, they do not take internal attackers into
account. In our previous publications we proposed a security architecture for single-
operator WMNs, extended this architecture to the multi-operator case to support
roaming between operators and secure infrastructure sharing and proposed secure
handover procedures within the domain of a single operator. In this paper we
merge the different aspects of our prior proposals together to form a comprehensive
security architecture for multi-operator WMNs. Our solution is based on open
standards and explicitly addresses internal attackers. In addition, we propose pro-
active handover services between different operators and show how dedicated MRs
can take over authentication services in time critical situations such as handover
procedures.
André Egners, Patrick Herrmann, Ulrike Meyer: Multi-operator Wireless Mesh
Networks secured by an all-encompassing Security Architecture, International Journal of
Information Security, Springer Berlin Heidelberg [EHM14]
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After summarizing the contributions of this thesis we continue with the roadmap
stating how we detail the individual concepts.
1.1. Contributions 19
20 Chapter 1. Introduction
1.2 Roadmap
This thesis continues with Chapter 2 which introduces basic concepts, building
blocks and technologies that are of importance for this work. We start by detailing
EAP as the standard mechanism for authentication in wireless networks, specifi-
cally in IEEE 802.11 WLAN networks. EAP is an extensible protocol framework
including authentication methods and message transport. We further discuss the
EAP-Tunneled Transport Layer Security (EAP-TTLS) as the authentication method
which is subsequently leveraged by our security architecture. EAP-TTLS tunnels an
additional inner authentication method inside of an end-to-end encrypted Transport
Layer Security (TLS) tunnel from the EAP peer to the EAP server.
After discussing EAP, we continue with the Remote Dial-in User Service (RADIUS)
protocol which encapsulates EAP on the network layer between the Network Access
Server (NAS) and the Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) server. The
RADIUS/AAA/EAP server is responsible for authentication and authorization of
network devices and users. It stores the necessary credentials, generates keys and
transports them to the NAS a device is authenticating from. The originally intended
setup uses a wired backbone, thus, the traffic between NAS and AAA server cannot
be easily eavesdropped on. However, the key transport messages themselves are
only barely secured.
We then introduce the IEEE 802.11 WLAN standard and how both, EAP and
RADIUS are used to authenticate wireless devices. This also includes the discussion
of the 4-way handshake which is used to establish a link layer security association
between the Station (STA) and the AP. We also include a section on the IEEE
802.11u [IEE04b] amendment. It intends to improve interworking with external
networks, such as the mobile communication networks. However, it also introduces
very useful features for network discovery and AP selection. It allows to include so-
called vendor specific Information Elements (IEs) in the IEEE 802.11 wireless beacon.
This is a particularly interesting feature which is used in this thesis during handover
(cf. Chapter 7) and to announce node types used for optimizing the key distribution
(cf. Section 5.3).
Chapter 2 closes by elaborating on Internet Protocol Security (IPsec), a mechanism
to secure multi-hop communication on the network layer between two endpoints
or networks. We detail the most important features of IPsec such as its tunneling
and transport modes.
After having set the necessary technical foundations, this thesis continues by
discussing the security challenges of wireless mesh networks in Chapter 3. We start
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by introducing the general terms of WMNs such as the different architecture and
node types. We then turn to the security challenges of WMNs.
Once we have briefly discussed the related work in researching the security
challenges in WMNs, we follow by defining an attacker model for the works subse-
quently presented in this thesis. Attackers are defined with respect to being external
and internal, as well as to their respective capabilities.
Next, the security requirements of WMNs are defined by considering all pos-
sible communication patterns, e.g., MC to MG communication. All patterns are
analyzed with respect to the security requirements ranging from confidentiality
to non-repudiation. Additionally, we broaden these requirements by considering
specific challenges and scenarios in WMNs, e.g., single- and multi-operator WMNs,
heterogeneity of wireless links and mobility of network clients as well as mobility
of the network infrastructure.
Subsequent to having the security requirements and communication patterns
for WMNs exemplified, we use them as a framework to evaluate a selection of
prominent related work which claims to address security of WMNs in a compre-
hensive way. This includes the IEEE 802.11s mesh networking amendment, as well
as proposals from the research community.
In Chapter 4 we introduce a WMN testbed developed for the purpose of the
security research put forth in this thesis. We discuss the requirements that we
have towards the testbed and detail the overall architecture, the hardware, the
software that we use and mechanism for node management. Additionally, we
elaborate on pitfalls that we discovered during setting up the testbed and using it
for evaluating our research. Besides shortly discussing other WMN testbeds, we
also include a general performance evaluation of the testbed, i.e., Round Trip Time
(RTT), throughput, latency and also the performance impact of using cryptographic
acceleration cards.
Chapter 5 proposes a framework to bootstrap security associations for WMNs. It
represents the foundation of the architecture extensions detailed in the subsequent
chapters and addresses all the requirements deduced in the previous chapters. By
using EAP-based authentication of all nodes in the network, we are able to extend
the EAP security framework by leveraging the presence of the Extended Master
Session Key (EMSK). This key serves as the root in an extensible key hierarchy which
both node and authentication server share after successful authentication. Based on
this key hierarchy we bootstrap various security associations, e.g., for the purpose
of secure key transport using EAP/RADIUS in a wireless multi-hop domain. Our
framework also allows to split a WMN domain into multiple logical sub-domains
for the purpose of speeding up key management protocols and handover (cf. Chap-
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ter 7). This extension is similar to the multi-operator architecture we propose in
Chapter 6. The key management framework is also thoroughly evaluated with
respect to performance and is implemented using our WMN testbed.
After detailing our security architecture in a single-operator context, we extend
our concept to a multi-operator scenario in Chapter 6. We use the notion of so called
domain specific keys to extend our key hierarchy. By exporting a copy of the key
hierarchy, which is specific to the respective domain, all the security associations that
are valid in the single operator concept, can also be used in a multi-operator scenario.
Additionally, we introduce the previously unknown notion of mixed networks, in
which different operators contribute their devices collaboratively forming a single
network.
In Chapter 7 we continue by extending our security architecture even further.
The context of WMNs and oblivious network coverage implicates the capability of
seamless handover from one wireless access point to the next. We propose three
proactive handover protocols for WMNs that leverage the security architecture of
Chapter 5 and the multi-operator extension presented in Chapter 6. Our protocols
allow to bootstrap handover keys, i.e., Pairwise Master Keys (PMKs) used during the
IEEE 802.11i 4-way handshake. This allows us to reduce the overall handover delay
to a minimal level as the keys are deployed before initiating the actual handover.
We also evaluate the handover protocols using our WMN testbed described in
Chapter 4.
Last, Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 conclude this thesis by summarizing the prior
chapters and providing an outlook to future research in this area.
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Part I
Fundamentals



C H A P T E R 2
Ingredients
This chapter introduces the basics concepts and techniques that are required for
this thesis. After generally introducing the operation of the Extensible Authentication
Protocol (EAP) and specifically EAP-Tunneled Transport Layer Security (EAP-TTLS),
we continue with the Remote Dial-in User Service (RADIUS) protocol. Next, we
detail how the former mechanisms are used with the IEEE 802.11 [IEE99] Wireless
LAN (WLAN) standard to facilitate authentication, authorization, and accounting
for WLAN devices. Also we shortly introduce the secure Remote Procedure Call (RPC)
framework pwrcall. Last, we present Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) as a general
purpose mechanism to secure network layer traffic between two hosts or networks.
2.1 Extensible Authentication Protocol
EAP is specified in Request For Comments (RFC) 5247 [ASE08] as an extensible
framework supporting multiple different authentication methods. It is specified to
be network layer agnostic, thus, the RFC also defines the basic concept of the lower
layer. Typically, data link layers such as IEEE (IEEE) 802 are used. EAP is used
in IEEE 802.1X [IEE10] for Port-Based Network Access Control. As no transport
protocol such as Transport Control Protocol (TCP) is used, the protocol itself must
keep state of the ongoing sessions.
Figure 2.1 shows the EAP stack. The primary goal is to authenticate the peer
to the authentication server. The peer and the pass-through authenticator, typically
referred to as the authenticator, communicate using an EAP lower layer. In order to
EAP lower
EAP layer
EAP peer
EAP method
EAP lower
EAP layer
EAP peer/auth.
AAA/IP
EAP layer
EAP auth.
AAA/IP
EAP layer
EAP auth.
EAP method
Peer Pass-through Authenticator Auth. Server
Figure 2.1: The EAP communication stack.
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Figure 2.2: A generalized EAP message flow.
send the EAP messages from the pass-through authenticator to the authentication
server, the latter encapsulates the messages in Authentication, Authorization and Ac-
counting (AAA) messages. Communication between the pass-through authenticator
and the authentication server is IP-based.
The basic message flow of EAP is depicted in Figure 2.2. First, the authenti-
cator sends an EAP-Request-Identity frame to the peer which responds with an
EAP-Response-Identity containing peer’s identity. The authenticator forwards this
message to the authentication server. Next, the authentication server and the peer
agree upon which EAP authentication method is to be used.
If the chosen EAP method is key generating, two keys will be generated by the
peer and the authentication server: the Master Session Key (MSK) and the so-called
Extended Master Session Key (EMSK). The MSK is sent by the authentication server
in the EAP-Success message to the authenticator which may use it for further tasks.
In the context of IEEE 802.11i the first 256 bits of the MSK are used as the input key
for the 4-way handshake (cf. Section 2.3). This handshake is used to derive keys
which are used to protect the communication on the data link layer between the
Station (STA) (peer) and the Access Point (AP) (authenticator).
The second key is the EMSK which must neither leave the peer nor the au-
thentication server. It is reserved for future use as specified in RFC 5247 [ASE08].
If an EAP method is key generating it has to ensure that both the peer and the
authentication server are mutually authenticated.
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2.1.1 EAP-Tunneled-TLS
EAP-TTLS [PF08] is a key generating EAP authentication method which extends
the Transport Layer Security (TLS) [DR08] protocol. It provides authentication of
the AAA server using standard TLS procedures. As EAP-TTLS is tunneled, it may
encapsulate authentication protocols such as the Peer Authentication Protocol (PAP)
or another EAP method, called inner method for peer authentication. This is for
instance important to protect password based authentication methods against eaves-
dropping or man-in-the-middle attacks.
EAP-TTLS additionally allows to carry so called Attribute Value Pairs (AVPs).
Using such AVPs enables to send vendor specific information from the client to the
EAP-TTLS server in an end-to-end secured manner. The AVP format of EAP-TTLS
is equivalent to the AVPs used by Diameter [PJE+03] which is the logical succession
of the RADIUS protocol (cf. Section 2.2). However, while not using Diameter, it is
possible to map these AVPs to RADIUS attributes.
2.2 Remote Dial-in User Service
RADIUS is specified in RFC 2865 [RRSW97]. It is a protocol that carries information
to perform authentication, authorization, and accounting. In order to keep the
protocol and the implementation simple, RADIUS uses the User Datagram Protocol
(UDP). This means that RADIUS must handle retransmission of packets itself. In
case one server fails, the packet must be resent to another server.
Four types of packets are defined to be passed between RADIUS server and
Network Access Server (NAS): Access-Request, Access-Accept, Access-Reject, and Access-
Challenge. A NAS acts as the RADIUS client and communicates with the RADIUS
server. The packet format is depicted in Figure 2.3 and includes transport attributes
that provide specific information such as the NAS-IP-Address (typically an AP)
and attributes that allow authentication and authorization, e.g., the User-Name and
User-Password attributes. User information is transported within the Access-Request.
Multiple round trips for authentication are possible by having the server send
an Access-Challenge and the client answering with an Access-Request. At the end
of an authentication exchange, the RADIUS server replies with an Access-Reject or
Access-Accept to the NAS. RADIUS server and NAS share a secret which essentially
represents an ASCII string. Passwords in RADIUS packets are obfuscated using the
shared secret and MD5 [Riv92].
RADIUS packets have an 128 bit authenticator, such that the NAS is able to
verify whether it received the packet from the correct RADIUS server. For the
Access-Request this value is randomly chosen by the NAS and the reply contains the
32 Chapter 2. Ingredients
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
Code Identifier Length
Request/Response Authenticator
Attributes
hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh
hhhh
hhhh
hhhh
hhhh
hhhh
hhhh
hhhh
hh
Figure 2.3: The format of RADIUS packets.
respective authenticator (cf. Equation 2.1, “||“ denoting concatenation). The Request
Authenticator authenticates the packet the server replies to while the other fields of
the received packet (Code, ID, Length, and the Attributes) are protected in the same
manner. The parameter Secret is shared between the RADIUS server and the client
(NAS).
ResponseAuthenticator =MD5(Code||ID||Length
||RequestAuthenticator||Attributes||Secret)
(2.1)
Encapsulation of EAP-Messages in RADIUS messages is based on RADIUS
attributes (cf. Figure 2.3) [AC03]. In order to indicate the attribute type, the Type
field is used. If the attribute encapsulates an EAP message, the Type field is set to 79.
To indicate a vendor-specific attribute the type must be set to 26. The actual data is
contained in the Value field following the one byte long Length field which indicates
the size of the attribute. The length includes the Type, Length, and the Value field.
Thus, the payload that can be stored in a Value field is bound to 6 253 bytes
2.2.1 Attacking RADIUS
As already identified in the original RFC on RADIUS [RRSW97], the protocol is
vulnerable to a dictionary attack on the RADIUS secret. The vulnerability is of
special relevance in multi-hop wireless networks such as Wireless Mesh Networks
(WMNs). Opposed to infrastructure WLAN where APs are connected by wire to the
network’s backbone, WMNs have a wireless backbone. Therefore, RADIUS traffic
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may be eavesdropped on every wireless hop in between the AP and the RADIUS
server. In order to evaluate and demonstrate the practical relevance of this attack,
we implemented it and measured the performance of our implementation. Our
results corroborate the relevance of the dictionary attack on the RADIUS secret
when the RADIUS traffic is not additionally secured.
There are two weaknesses in how the RADIUS secret is used to protect RADIUS
communication. First, the same RADIUS secret is used to protect the confidential-
ity of sent Pairwise Master Keys (PMKs) in a RADIUS Access-Accept, as well as for
integrity protection, i.e., computing the Response-Authenticator of the RADIUS
packets. Second, the Response-Authenticator (Equation 2.1) is computed by replacing
the Authenticator Field with the Request-Authenticator, which is the nonce from a
RADIUS request, and appending the RADIUS secret, which is an ASCII passphrase
to this packet. The Response-Authenticator is then computed by applying MD5. Dic-
tionary attacks are possible by computing the Response-Authenticator by guessing
RADIUS secrets and comparing the results to the expected Response-Authenticator.
Since different possible passphrases can be tested in parallel, an offline distributed
dictionary attack against the RADIUS secret is possible. Because the RADIUS secret
is appended to this buffer and the beginning of the buffer containing the RADIUS
packet does not change, it is not necessary to recompute MD5 blocks containing
this data.
As MD5 operates on blocks of 64 bytes, the MD5 state can be computed once, and
only the last block of MD5 containing the RADIUS secret and the necessary padding
will have to be computed for each of the guessed passphrases. This construction of
the MD5 authenticator allows to improve the speed of a dictionary attack. Using an
Intel Core-i7 870 processor, the speedup of running this optimized attack in parallel
against the sequential unoptimized algorithm has been evaluated. A single thread
attack allowed a speedup of 3.42. Using two threads, a speedup of 6.92 has been
achieved, a speedup of 12.34 using four threads, and a speedup of 15.43 using eight
threads. The speed using eight threads is equivalent to testing 36, 428, 055 different
RADIUS secrets per second. Therefore, a network allowing unprotected RADIUS
traffic is potentially vulnerable to this attack. An attacker only needs to eavesdrop
two packets in order to allow the described attack.
2.3 Wireless LAN
The IEEE standard 802.11 [IEE99] specifies the Medium Access Control (MAC) and
the Physical Layer (PHY) for wireless Local Area Network (LAN). The standard adepts
the MAC and the PHY to the special requirements of WLANs. For example, the
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wireless medium is unprotected from other signals in the environment, so that
interference with other signals is likely. Also all signals can easily be eavesdropped
by an attacker in range. The latter is addressed by amendment 802.11i [IEE04a]
which specifies authentication, key management, and the link layer security between
client and access point.
The IEEE 802.11 allows for two operating modes, i.e., the ad hoc and the infras-
tructure mode. In the ad hoc mode two STAs recognize each other and establish
a peer-to-peer association to form an Independent Basic Service Set (IBSS). In the
infrastructure mode all STAs connect to a central entity, i.e., the AP. It is able to
bridge data between all STAs associated to it. An AP and its associated STAs form
a so called Basic Service Set (BSS). Extending, a collection of APs form the so called
Extended Service Set (ESS). An ESS uses the same Service Set ID (SSID) across all
BSSs. Also, a so called Portal, usually co-located with an AP, may be present. It
connects a BSS with other networks, e.g., to the Internet.
In order for a STA to connect to a BSS it has to discover available APs. This can
either be achieved by active or passive scanning. Active scanning involves the STA
sending out sequential probe requests on each channel. The AP replies with a probe
response frame which contains the SSID, Basic Service Set Identifier (BSSID), sup-
ported rates, and its security capabilities. The SSID represent the human readable
name of the BSS, whereas the BSSID typically relates to the AP’s MAC address.
Passively scanning results in the STA listening for beacons sent out by the APs.
A beacon is typically sent every 100 ms.
To associate with the AP the STA needs to initiate the Open System authentica-
tion [IEE04a]. The first of two messages is the Open System authentication request.
The AP replies with an Open System authentication response which may already
indicate success. Next, the STA issues an association request which includes the
desired SSID and the supported rates. Finally, the AP confirms the supported data
rates and the session ID.
802.11i Security. In pre-802.11i deployments the STA would now be able to fully
access the network. While private networks typically use pre-shared key mech-
anisms, enterprise network requires the STA to unlock the 802.1X [IEE10] port,
mapped to the newly created association. In order to unlock the port, the STA
has to perform an EAP authentication (cf. Section 2.1) using EAP Transport Over
LAN (EAPOL) which is a protocol that runs between STA and AP. EAP packets
are encapsulated by EAPOL in Layer 2 frames. The message flow is shown in
Figure 2.4.
First, the AP (authenticator) sends the EAPOL-Request Identity frame to the STA
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Figure 2.4: Message flow of the EAPOL protocol.
(peer). The STA replies with an EAPOL-Response frame which contains its identity.
Now, the AAA server and the STA execute an EAP method. An EAP method which
is key generating must be used to ensure that after its execution the STA and the
AAA server are in possession of the MSK. The AAA server then delivers the MSK to
the AP. Upon receipt of the AAA success message, the AP sends an EAPOL-Success
frame to the STA.
Now, the STA and the AP are in possession of the so called PMK which consists
of the first 256 bits of the MSK. It is subsequently used to create a link layer security
association between STA and AP by running the 4-way handshake. The purpose
of this handshake is to explicitly confirm that both parties are in possession of the
PMK. Also, the PMK is used to derive fresh Pairwise Transient Keys (PTKs) to protect
the communication between STA and AP on the link layer.
Figure 2.5 shows the message flow of the 4-way handshake. First, the AP picks
a random nonce ANonce and sends it to the STA. This frame is not yet protected by
any security mechanism. Now the STA picks a nonce, called SNonce and derives
the PTK using the Pseudo Random Function (PRF) shown in Equation 2.2.
PTK = PRF(PMK, ANonce||SNonce||AP MAC-Addr||STA MAC-Addr) (2.2)
First, the PRF is keyed with the PMK. The second parameter is a concatenation
of the exchanged nonces and the MAC addresses of the AP and the STA. After
generating the PTK, the STA sends its generated SNonce to the AP. This frame is
already integrity protected by a Message Integrity Code (MIC). Now, the AP derives
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Figure 2.5: Message flow of the IEEE 802.11i 4-Way handshake.
the PTK and checks if the MIC of the received frame is correct. Afterwards, the AP
instructs the STA to install the PTK. Finally the STA confirms the installation of the
PTK to the AP. Subsequent link layer traffic between the STA and the AP is now
protected by using the Traffic Integrity Key (TIK) and the Traffic Encryption Key (TEK)
which are derived from the PTK.
IEEE 802.11 Beacons. The IEEE 802.11 [IEE99] standard allows to define and
transport so-called vendor-specific Information Elements (IEs) which are transported
inside of the wireless beacons broadcast by the APs.
Parts of the IEEE 802.11 beacon frame body are shown in Table 2.1. It contains the
Robust Security Network (RSN) element which is used to provide information about
security features of a device. Last the beacon frame specifies the vendor-specific IEs
that are used to transport information that is not covered by the standard. The IE
format is shown in Table 2.2.
The IE needs to contain the Identification (ID) of the IE and is set to 221, identi-
fying it as a Vendor-Specific IE. A length field contains the length of the Vendor-
/Specific content including the Organizationally Unique Identifier (OUI). The OUI is
defined by the vendor to specify the content. A single frame can contain multiple
Vendor-Specific IEs which must have a different OUI to determine the subsequent
content.
IEEE 802.11u. The IEEE 802.11u [IEE04b] has been amended to the IEEE 802.11
standard in 2012 and intends to improve interworking with external networks, such
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Order Information Notes
1 Timestamp
2 Beacon interval
3 Capability
4 SSID
· · · · · ·
21 RSN RSN IE shall be present within Beacon frames gen-
erated by STAs that gave dot11RSNAEnabled set
to true.
· · · · · ·
Last Vendor/Specific
Table 2.1: The IEEE 802.11 beacon frame body. [IEE99]
as the mobile telecommunication networks. However, it also introduces interesting
features for network discovery and AP selection. These new features are to be used
in the pre-association phase, i.e., the STA is currently not connected, but scanning
for available APs in its surrounding. The APs are supposed to be advertising their
network type (private network, free public network, paid public network), roaming
consortium (e.g. eduroam [WF05] and so-called venue information. They also
provide a Generic Advertisement Service (GAS), which should indicate the offered
services using Layer 2 communication between the non-associated STA and the AP.
Additionally, IEEE 802.11u introduced the Access Network Query Protocol (ANQP).
This protocol can be used to allow the STA to discover additional information about
the network in its preassociation phase. They can for instance include:
. the name of the operator,
. available roaming partners at this AP,
. IP address (here the AP), including type and availability
and any other unspecified, but useful meta data which might be helpful to the
STA. The above data is to be distributed using the IEEE 802.11 wireless beacons
and vendor specific elements.
In the context of our handover protocols (cf. Chapter 7), we propose to use the
IEEE 802.11u amendment to distribute this kind of useful meta information to the
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1 1 3 Length − 3
Element ID Length OUI Vendor/specific content
Table 2.2: The IEEE 802.11 Vendor-Specific Information Element format.
Mesh Clients (MCs). Additionally, the concept of FSASD Authenticators (FAUs) (cf.
Chapter 5) leverages this beacon functionality.
2.4 Internet Protocol Security
The Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) suite has been originally proposed in 1995 in
RFC 1825 [Atk95]. Since then, many subsequent RFCs have followed updating the
standard [JLN11].
IPsec allows confidential, integrity protected, and authentic IP traffic between
two endpoints. This can either be network-to-network or host-to-host. For instance, it
is used to securely connect LANs at different branches of enterprises, secure remote
access from Internet to Intranet (Virtual Private Network (VPN)), secure connections
between individuals host, or routers.
Key security services provided by IPsec are:
. IP-packet-level origin authentication and integrity
. Protection against replay attacks
. IP-packet-level encryption
. Limited traffic flow confidentiality
For this thesis the most relevant parts of IPsec are:
. Authentication Header (AH): authenticity and integrity of IP packets
. Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP): confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity
of IP packets
. Security Association (SA): collection of key and cryptographic algorithms to be
used with AH and ESP, SA establishment, e.g., using Internet Key Exchange
Protocol (IKE)
An IPsec SAs defines how Internet Protocol (IP) packets are to be secured between
two endpoints. It consists of the destination IP, the Security Policy Identifier (SPI),
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Figure 2.6: Comparing the IPsec tunnel modes.
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Figure 2.7: Comparing the IPsec transport modes.
e.g., AH or ESP, and a SPI number to identify the SA. As this is an unidirectional
concept, an additional SA needs to be setup to secure bi-directional communication
between two endpoints.
IPsec can be used in transport and tunnel mode. Transport mode only protects
the IP packet payload. For example, AH in tunnel mode will encapsulate a packet
using the authentication header and IP header. The packet is now authenticated and
integrity protected. ESP in tunnel mode encapsulates the whole original packet in a
new IP packet. Both, header and payload are secured. In any case, the unencrypted
new tunnel headers are used to route packets from one endpoint to the other. The
differences in encapsulation and which parts of the packet are secured in which
manner are shown in Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7.
AH can be used in both modes and is used to authenticate source and destination
host of the communication. It protects the integrity of the IP packet payload and its
headers by using a keyed hash function. This Message Authentication Code (MAC) is
included in the Authentication Header of the new packet.
ESP can also be used in both modes. It achieves source authentication, integrity
and confidentiality, by adding a header, and a trailer including a MAC to the packet.
The original IP payload is fully encrypted. In tunnel mode, also the IP header of the
original packet is encrypted, thus, it provides some IP address privacy for traffic
that is tunneled through an IPsec gateway.
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Entity Authentication & Key Agreement. Since all mechanisms described above
need cryptographic material, IPsec provides several key agreement and manage-
ment protocols. For instance, one can install keys to be used with an SAs, i.e., inject
a preshared key. In addition, there are protocols such as IKE, Internet Key Exchange
Protocol v2 (IKEv2) [Kau10], Internet Security Association and Key Management Proto-
col (ISAKMP) [MSST98] to allow automated key agreement and management for
IPsec. The described protocols, message formats, and payloads for authenticated
key exchange are used to establish full-fledged IPsec SAs.
An often voiced annoyance of IPsec is its complicated usage and key establish-
ment which, additionally, is spread over multiple RFCs. This makes it particularly
hard to use and implement, thus, likely inducing misconfiguration and defective
implementations. For this purpose IKEv2 [Kau10] has been condensed into one
single RFC. It has also reduced the overall protocol complexity by reducing the
number of different phase one key exchanges. A directly usable SA is generated
during the initial phase one exchange. Phase two exchanges are reduced to two
messages with less complex parameters.
In this thesis, we use IPsec by injecting a shared secret key established during
authentication or a subsequent authentication and key agreement protocol.
2.5 The pwrcall RPC Framework
In this section we shortly discuss pwrcall, a framework for ”secure and lightweight
distributed function calls’‘ [Sch11]. It is built onto the foundations of [MYS03] and
[Spi07] using the simplicity of capabilities.
Capabilities Model
Capabilities have first been described in [DVH66] resembling an unforgeable token
which is used to authorize access to an object. Since then the concept has made its
way to operating systems and programming languages [Har85, SSF99, Mil06]. The
object capability model of [Mil06] does not differentiate between subjects and objects,
but rather defines so-called non-primitive objects as a (code, state)-tuple. This state
represents a set of references to certain other objects. Objects can send messages to
each other and exhibit a certain behavior which is defined by their programming
code. The messages between objects can carry references, thus, influence their
computations. The design of [FN79] merges this notion with the functionality
that objects know which type of access to it is allowed. This means that objects
themselves can expose certain functions as capabilities to other objects to access. In
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order to access a certain resource it is required to possess the respective capability
referencing the object.
Design Overview
In the following we describe the design of the pwrcall framework. The key features
of the pwrcall framework are:
. using object-capability model,
. capability generation is based on symmetric encryption,
. revocable capabilities,
. function calls to third-party objects via delegation.
Functionalities of pwrcall objects are exported as methods of the respective
objects. To access them remotely, other objects need to posses a capability to do
so. Pwrcall objects are registered withing the framework, making it possible that a
capability can be passed on to other entities. They can be used to obtain connectivity
by initial condition when passed out as so-called off-line URLs (below):
pwrcall://e7bcae69e9c79aad2f4b8fe1f14bcd52beb4faae@
137.226.161.211:10000,192.168.1.4:10000
/8ed767d925d54a19d0b4a4c4633d0028751eab43
Pwrcall specifies a minimum set of parameters needed to enable a remote func-
tion call. In oder to enable multiplexing the pwrcall messages use IDs. Additionally,
a function call must contain the capability designating the remote object, a function
name specifying the object’s method call and function call parameters. The response
carries an error description, or the function’s return value.
Pwrcall Capabilities
Pwrcall introduces a new way to define capabilities using symmetric encryption
techniques, i.e., AES with an 128-bit key size.
Capability = AES-128(nodesecret, nonce||designator||options) (2.3)
The capability itself is created as a cipher text of the parameters nonce, designator,
and options (cf. Equation 2.3). A designator is a reference use to look up the target
object in the pwrcall framework. As the encryption of the parameters uses a per-
node secret key the designator itself does not need to be unforgeable. A nonce
enables to set a lifetime of the capability, effectively bound to the node. The options
structure allows for automatic revocation after a period of time.
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Communication Design
Pwrcall exposes a Node as its central component being responsible to host objects in-
tended to be accessible from remote systems. It handles serialization, data structures,
method-calls, and provides connectivity to other nodes and objects.
It is important to note that pwrcall allows method calls in a bi-directional way.
There may not only be one server and several clients, but also multiple nodes
communicating with each other’s functions, using their respective objects.
Security Design of pwrcall
Pwrcall allows authenticating nodes and providing access control to objects in a
secure way. The TLS protocol is used to provide confidentiality and integrity of
communication between nodes and also for authenticating peers. Each peer must
present a certificate (in a generic sense) to its communication partner. It is possible
to use a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to validate certificates, or enable mutual
authentication by using known public key fingerprints. Although pwrcall is flexible
in this regard, its default usage pattern is the Off-line-URL modus. As access control
to objects is secured using object capabilities, access to functions of objects is only
possible by using a legitimate reference.
Pwrcall’s security architecture protects against common attacks on network
protocols. Using TLS can prevent man-in-the-middle attacks when at least one com-
munication party is correctly authenticated. In pwrcall this is enabled by verification
of peer certificates or the use of Off-line URLs verifying the node fingerprint.
In order to successfully forge function call requests, an attacker would need to
break the symmetric encryption used to generate the capability. Choosing a strong
scheme and large random numbers makes brute-force attacks infeasible as well.
The nonces of capabilities hinder replay attacks aiming to use previously valid
capabilities.
2.6 Summary
This chapter introduced the relevant technical means, protocols, and concepts which
this thesis is based on. After first presenting the most important part, the EAP (cf.
Section 2.1), we describe the backend technology, RADIUS (cf. Section 2.2), neces-
sary to fully use the protocol framework. We also discussed the most significant
security issues of RADIUS, i.e., the insufficiently strong cryptographic functions
and the insecure use of RADIUS secrets and message parameters. These security
challenges also motivate the subsequent attack on RADIUS traffic that can be eaves-
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dropped if the attacker is located in the correct network segment. Next, we showed
how both, EAP and RADIUS, are used in WLAN (cf. Section 2.3) today for entity
authentication. This also entailed the discussion of derived keys which are sub-
sequently used to secure the one-hop link layer connection between STA and AP.
In Section 2.5 we shortly discussed pwrcall, a secure RPC framework based on
the object-capability model. Last, we shortly introduced IPsec (cf. Section 2.4) as
a general multifaceted concept of securing host-to-host and network-to-network
traffic on the network layer.
All these techniques will play an important role on the comprehensive security
architecture for WMNs proposed in this thesis.
Next, Chapter 3 presents the network model, its entities and the application
scenarios this thesis assumes as well as the derived requirements a comprehensive
security architecture has to fulfill.
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C H A P T E R 3
Security Challenges of Wireless
Mesh Networks
Previous publications identified the most serious security challenges arising from
WMNs to be secure multi-hop routing, detection of corrupted nodes, and fairness
with respect to the distribution of network resources. While there is consensus on
the importance of these challenges, prior work has not yet led to generally accepted
security requirements. In particular, existing proposals for security architectures for
WMNs tend not to address them as a whole, but rather concentrate on one or two
specific characteristics and design mechanisms that meet the security requirements
for these specific characteristics (e.g. secure routing or client authentication).
In this chapter we introduce the necessary fundamentals which this thesis
is based on. We introduce IEEE 802.11-based [IEE99] WMNs in a general sense,
different scenarios and operator models, as well as the involved entities and node
types. Additionally, we define the communication patterns of such networks and
characteristics which we consider important in terms of security. Next, we define
the attacker model which is used in this thesis. We then use this framework of
requirements and characteristics to evaluate state of the art proposals ranging from
mesh standardization effort of the IEEE [IEE11] to results from academia.
Parts of this Chapter have been published in [EM10].
Outline: Section 3.1 summarizes previous work on security challenges and re-
quirements for WMNs. Section 3.4 highlights the relationship between the character-
istics and the security requirements by discussing the challenges arising from each
of the characteristics. In Section 3.6 we evaluate previous proposals with respect to
the scenarios and characteristics they support, as well as the security requirements
they meet and conclude our work with Section 3.7.
3.1 Security Architectures and Mechanisms for WMNs
With respect to exploring the unique characteristics, imposing security threats and
requirements some researchers provide an overview of the current state of the art
48 Chapter 3. Security Challenges of Wireless Mesh Networks
of WMN security.
The security challenges for WMNs were first investigated by Salem and
Hubaux [BSH06]. They identified three major security challenges, namely:
. the detection of corrupted nodes,
. secure multi-hop routing, and
. fairness with respect to the distribution of network resources.
These challenges were confirmed by Siddiqui et al. [SH07], Khan et al. [KMLS08],
and Glass et al. [GPM08]. The results of Siddiqui et al. [SH07] exceed Salem and
Hubaux [BSH06] in the sense that the authors also provide a notion of threats
WMNs face, e.g., Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. In addition, they discuss propos-
als to act on these threats on an abstract level. Kahn et al. shift their focus to
passive security threats for WMNs such as determining the gateways of a net-
work [KMLS08]. Glass et al. focus on threats related to the MAC layer and the
routing protocol [GPM08]. With respect to application scenarios only Salem and
Hubaux [BSH06] point out that WMNs may also be operated by multiple opera-
tors. They identify mutual authentication of devices from different administrative
domains as well as other charging policies of operators to be additional challenges.
In contrast to previous work we generally specify the core scenarios and charac-
teristics of real world applications of WMNs along their relevant communication
patterns. For the specification of these scenarios we take real world applications that
use hardware, e.g., provided by companies such as Cisco-Meraki 1, MeshDynamics 2,
and Tropos 3 into account. In addition, we consider the work of [MLR+02, SHJB07],
and [PP08], which prove valuable for identifying the characteristics of WMNs.
While the challenges pointed out by [BSH06, SH07, KMLS08], and [GPM08]
are broad consent in the literature, a more detailed, generally accepted list of high-
level security requirements for WMNs is still missing. As a consequence, it is hard
to evaluate the strengths, weaknesses, and open issues of existing proposals. We
specify a comprehensive set of high-level security requirements and discuss how
the potential characteristics of WMNs influence the design of security mechanisms
to meet these requirements.
The identified security requirements allow us to analyze previously suggested
security architectures for WMNs. While a large variety of such proposals exists (e.g.,
[CLMC06, MPC08, ZF06, RL08, IYHH08, KJ08, BD09, HA10, WMLW11, SZZF11]),
1http://meraki.cisco.com/
2http://www.meshdynamics.com/
3http://www.tropos.com/
3.2. Wireless Mesh Networks 49
Internet
MG
MR MR
MC
MG
MR
MR
MC MC
AAA
Figure 3.1: An exemplary WMN architecture.
here, we concentrate on the security features provided by the wireless mesh amend-
ment IEEE 802.11s [IEE11] as well as three academic proposals, namely [CLMC06,
MPC08], and [ZF06]. We selected these proposals as they aim to support several
WMN security requirements at once, while other proposals mostly concentrate on
solving one specific requirement such as key establishment or routing security (cf.
Section 3.6).
3.2 Wireless Mesh Networks
One of the most important technologies to provide connectivity, e.g., to the Internet,
is IEEE 802.11 [IEE99] which this thesis assumes to be the link layer technology.
However, all our proposed security mechanisms can easily be used in wireless net-
works with different PHY/MAC layer, e.g., WiMAX [IEE12]. IEEE 802.11 WLAN is
used in the public sector as well as in enterprises4. It typically involves an operator
providing infrastructure support, namely access points connected by wire to a back-
bone. Providing a wired infrastructure is a costly endeavor, needs careful planning,
and results in a static structure. WMNs enable wireless communication between
infrastructure components of the network. WMNs thus make an abundance of
wires obsolete, leading to a flexible and potentially dynamic network infrastructure.
Figure 3.1 illustrates a typical WMN infrastructure.
3.2.1 Node Types
We consider that the WMN consists of the following node types:
4http://www.tropos.com/
50 Chapter 3. Security Challenges of Wireless Mesh Networks
. Mesh Clients (MCs) are the users of the WMN. They are typically end-user
devices such as Laptops or Smartphones which connect to the network infras-
tructure such as Mesh Routers (MRs). In some cases, MCs may also be able to
route network traffic.
. Mesh Routers (MRs) are the most used infrastructure nodes of WMNs. MRs
connect to MRs, Mesh Gateways (MGs), and other possibly routing MCs. Within
the network all traffic is routed by MRs.
. Mesh Gateways (MGs) are part of the infrastructure which provide access to
other networks, typically the Internet.
. Authentication, Authorization and Accountings (AAAs) severs are responsible for
authenticating the nodes participating in the WMNs. Typically this is based
on a AAA protocol such as RADIUS [RRSW97].
. Network Access Servers (NASs) are a role any of the above nodes (except the
AAA server) can assume. It involves acting as authenticator services to other
nodes in conjunction with the AAA server.
3.2.2 Communication Patterns
WMNs have to support the following communication patterns between the nodes
in the network:
(1) MC↔MC communication between two clients (located in the same WMN).
(2) MC↔MR communication refers to that of clients and the associated access
point.
(3) MC↔MG communication refers to multi-hop traffic destined to leave the
WMN through the gateway. This may also include management traffic, e.g.,
when communicating with a AAA server located outside of the WMN.
(4) MR↔MR communication refers to all traffic between MRs.
(5) MR↔MG communication can be considered as special cases of the former. It
may include management traffic, but also forwarded user traffic.
While the aforementioned communication patterns assume unicast traffic, broad-
cast traffic also needs to be considered. Such traffic most likely emanates from central
network components, e.g., MGs or administrative entities such as key servers. In
context of IEEE 802.11s [IEE11] amendment, Root Announcements (RAANs) are prop-
agated through the network in order to provide link metrics to its routing protocol.
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Considering this example, there may be local as well as global broadcast traffic. For
instance, if the routing protocol relies on a global network map, it may need to
be broadcast through the network. Beacons of MRs can in contrast be considered
as local broadcast. Most of the assumable broadcast traffic will be related to the
routing protocol, but also other possibilities such as synchronization may exist.
3.3 Attacker Model
For this thesis we consider two types of attackers: external and internal attackers.
Before detailing both type of attackers, we define their common capabilities which
implicitly represent active and passive capabilities:
. Manipulation or malicious jamming of the physical medium;
. (Selectively) overhearing link layer traffic;
. Inability to break sufficiently strong cryptographic ciphers and hash func-
tions [DY83].
External attackers do not possess the necessary credentials to obtain legitimate
network access. Their goal is either to gain network access to mount subsequent
attacks (as an internal attacker), or to maliciously disrupt parts of the network. Thus,
they mount attacks from outside of the network, either on the physical layer, or the
network’s link layer. They are able to eavesdrop, inject and manipulate network
traffic on the link layer between legitimate network nodes. Also, the external attacker
can initiate a conversation on the link layer with any node in range of its current
position.
Internal attackers are legitimate, authenticated and authorized devices (MRs,
MGs and MCs) of the network. Additionally, external attackers may have succeeded
in compromising a legitimate node, thus becoming an internal attacker. The goal
of an internal attacker is to learn about the communication inside of the network,
that of a specific node, or that of communication partners. For instance, an attacker
using a compromised node is able to eavesdrop, manipulate and disrupt any com-
munication flowing through the node. More specifically, an internal attacker’s goal
involves compromising other nodes, e.g., by eavesdropping key transport.
Colluding Attackers. Collusion may happen between external, as well as internal
attackers. While the impact of cooperating external attackers is most likely restricted
to disrupting specific regions of the network, colluding internal attacker can pose a
significant threat. By increasing the amount of compromised nodes, the likelihood to
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successfully mount eavesdropping attacks which compromise confidentiality, rises.
Also, impersonation attacks can be more effective if, e.g., some nodes compromise
key material, while other nodes use this material to impersonate nodes.
3.4 Scenarios, Characteristics & Challenges
WMNs are mainly studied in the context of two distinct manifestations:
. single-operator scenarios in which a single operator provides and maintains
the infrastructure, and
. multi-operator scenarios in which multiple operators provide and maintain the
infrastructure.
The latter can further be characterized by the fact that they support roaming of
MCs between the networks operated by different providers and scenarios that may
additionally support infrastructure sharing. Infrastructure sharing allows different
operators (also private individuals) to contribute to a single network that consists
of their collective devices. In both scenarios, communication between all types of
nodes (MCs, MRs, and MGs) has to be supported. Additionally, in single-operator
as well as multi-operator scenarios WMNs may support routing MCs, mobility
of the infrastructure nodes, and heterogeneity in the technologies applied on the
different wireless communication links. In the rest of this section we discuss these
scenarios and characteristics in more detail.
3.4.1 Single-Operator Wireless Mesh Networks
In single-operator WMNs all infrastructure nodes are controlled and maintained by
a single operator. Typical applications include intelligent transportation systems,
public safety support, Internet access, smart metering, and building automation.
The operator is responsible for the deployment of the network infrastructure, but
not necessarily the MC hardware. MR and MG hardware provided by the operator
is typically homogeneous. The operator is able to influence the topology of the
network except for the mobile or stationary MCs. With respect to network access,
MCs are typically required to perform initial registration with the operator (e.g.,
obtain access credentials, disclose personal details and payment information, etc.).
This allows the network operator to restrict the access to the network. In order
to provide such access control the network operator can employ a AAA system,
e.g., based on protocols such as RADIUS [RRSW97] or Diameter [PJE+03]. If the
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network has an up-link to the Internet, the AAA server could also be located outside
of the WMN.
In single-operator scenarios the traffic within the WMN must secure all commu-
nication patterns mentioned in Section 3.2.2. Even though the devices are operated
by a single operator, they cannot by fully trusted as they may be compromised. This
is due also due to the fact that some devices might be placed in easily accessible
areas.
3.4.2 Multi-Operator Wireless Mesh Networks
In multi-operator WMNs, several operators provide and maintain infrastructure
components. In the simplest case, each operator maintains a separate network but
the clients registered with any of the operators may roam to WMNs provided
and maintained by other operators. Possible applications of WMNs interoperation
in such a way include the previously introduced single-operator scenarios, e.g.,
Internet access or building automation. Here, access control needs to ensure that
MCs of interworking operators are able to access a network without being registered
to the operator of the network they currently want to access.
In more evolved multi-operator scenarios, operators may want to share some
of their infrastructure components with each other. For example in building au-
tomation different companies may be responsible for their respective MRs while
sharing the Internet up-link through the same MG. Other examples are temporary
venues such as concerts and trade shows where the organizer of the event may
operate several MGs and all exhibitors run their own MRs for their own clients
while sharing the MGs. In addition, disaster recovery is an important area which is
mostly known to be an application area of ad-hoc and sensor networks [MLR+02].
However, WMNs can be used to converge multiple networks and provide improved
resilience, bandwidth and coverage.
In contrast to a single operator the different operators will typically have hetero-
geneous hardware components which they contribute to the network. Thus, there
needs to be a way to coordinate the initial setup of the network. With respect to the
backbone of the WMN, each operator may maintain its own, or offer it as a service to
other operators. If there is no prior trust relationship between the operators, mutual
authentication across multiple domains is challenging. In addition, operators can
have different policies for providing network access to visiting clients [PP08].
In the simplest multi-operator scenario, where only MCs are able to roam be-
tween operators, the main challenge for meeting the security requirements is en-
abling access to the WMN of an operator based on the registration with another
operator. However, this is a challenge well-known from other wireless technolo-
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gies such as WLANs and cellular networks. In addition, protecting the privacy of
roaming MCs is a challenge in a multi-operator environment. This is particularly
challenging if identity privacy of the MC in the Foreign Network (FN) is desired. En-
abling non-repudiation of service usage is also more challenging in multi-operator
scenarios.
When considering more evolved multi-operator scenarios where the operators
share part of their infrastructure, access control for newly connecting nodes becomes
challenging. Particularly, newly joining MRs, and MGs will now have to establish
keys with infrastructure nodes operated by different operators. Also, fairness be-
comes more of an issue as in addition to per-MC fairness, per-operator fairness
(potentially proportional to the infrastructure contributed by the operator) in the
distribution of bandwidth is required.
Chapter 6 proposes a framework specifically addressing the challenges of multi-
operator WMNs. It provides an extension of the comprehensive security architecture
for WMNs proposed in Chapter 5.
3.4.3 Heterogeneity of the Wireless Links
WMNs do not necessarily have to use a specific or the same technology between all
network entities. MCs could for example use wireless technologies such as IEEE
802.11 [IEE99], 802.15.4 [IEE07], or 802.16 [IEE12] depending on the properties of
the WMN’s MRs and different wireless technologies could be used between MCs
and MRs and between MRs.
Heterogeneity of the wireless links can make the protection of the communica-
tion between non-neighboring nodes more challenging as it will require the use of
integrity and/or encryption on a higher protocol layer than the data link layer. In
addition, as not all wireless technologies typically support the same cryptographic
algorithms, heterogeneity may lead to links that provide a different level of pro-
tection. This again leads to the requirement that MC-generated traffic destined to
other MCs or to external nodes should not only be protected hop-by-hop.
The security architecture and mechanisms proposed in this thesis is PHY and
MAC layer agnostic. As such, the technologies to secure the single hop link com-
munication between, e.g., MC and MR may differ, but the key management does
not.
3.4.4 Routing Clients
In single- as well as multi-operator scenarios MCs can act as legacy clients only
or may additionally take the role of a MR as well. As such, other MCs or parts of
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the infrastructure may associate with the MC which then relays their traffic. The
operator’s gain to allow MCs to act as MRs is that of increasing the coverage of the
network without deploying more hardware himself.
Apart from the challenge to provide incentives for MCs routing traffic for other
MCs, the main security challenge arising from routing MCs is that from another
MC’s perspective, they cannot be trusted. Unfair behavior can be induced by routing
clients. This is due to the fact that the routing client could try to mask his traffic as
originating from other clients communicating via his link. However, this challenge
is already captured in our security requirements by the fact that we do not require
an MC to trust its MR with respect to the adequate protection of the traffic it
generates. As we assume MRs to be untrusted, a routing MC does not impose new
requirements.
This thesis does not specifically focus on routing clients or secure routing for
WMNs. However, the comprehensive security architecture for WMNs proposed in
Chapter 5 automatically supports routing MCs by treating them equivalently to un-
trusted MRs. Regulatory and accounting issues introduced by such a functionality
are not in the scope of this thesis.
3.4.5 Mobility
The infrastructure nodes (i.e., MRs, MGs) can be static, i.e., deployed and thereby
added to the network in one location and then operated for a longer period. How-
ever, in some applications enabling mobility of the infrastructure nodes may be of
interest as well. In particular, this includes industrial application scenarios, e.g., un-
derground mining [ATOF04], where MRs and MCs may move together or even MCs
are static while MRs move, or resilient networks for first responder units [PSBM11].
Enabling infrastructure mobility imposes several challenges for the security
mechanisms. The access control for MRs, and MGs has to be flexible (e.g., not
involve interaction with the operator) and more efficient as they need to be executed
more often than only during the initial network attachment. Also, any mechanism
used to ensure fairness (e.g., bandwidth and latency) has to cope with infrastructure
mobility.
In this thesis we consider both mobility of end-users and that of parts of the
networks’ infrastructure. Chapter 7 specifically deals with secure, efficient, and
practical proactive handover protocols that can be used by any node of the network,
regardless of it being a client or part of the network infrastructure.
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Security Requirement
Communication
Confidentiality Integrity & Replay Protection
Unicast
MC↔MR optional required
MC↔MC optional optional
MC↔MG required required
MR↔MG optional required
MR↔MR optional required
*↔AAA required required
Broadcast
MC→ ∗ optional required
MR→ ∗ optional required
MG→ ∗ optional required
Table 3.1: An overview on the security requirements for the different communication
patterns in WMNs.
3.5 General Security Requirements
In this section we describe the general security requirements for WMNs with respect
to confidentiality, integrity protection, replay protection, access control, privacy,
availability, fairness, and non-repudiation. All of these general requirements are
relevant in WMNs independently of the characteristics discussed in Section 3.4.
However, as we will show in Section 3.4 the difficulty of designing mechanisms
that meet the requirements depends on the characteristics of the WMN in question.
Protecting the Communication
The communication over wireless links in WMNs has to be protected against eaves-
droppers as well as against replay and manipulation. Due to the multi-hop nature of
WMNs and the fact that infrastructure nodes may be easy to compromise, a simple
hop-by-hop protection is not sufficient. In the following we provide a detailed
analysis of the communication patterns in WMNs and argue for each of them which
type of protection should be required or optionally provided for them. Table 3.1
summarizes the results of our analysis with respect to confidentiality, integrity, and
replay protection for all communication patterns.
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Definition 1 (Confidentiality) “Confidentiality is the concealment of information or
resources. ” [Bis04]
Confidentiality is considered optional between two MCs to prevent intermediate
MRs, MCs and outsiders from eavesdropping on the communication. While en-
cryption between MC and MR would prevent eavesdropping on the initial wireless
connection, it does not safeguard against eavesdropping by other MRs, MCs and out-
siders located on the multi-hop path segment after the initial hop. Communication
of any node with the AAA server must be confidential as network access credentials
or keying material might be exchanged. We require MC↔MG communication to be
confidential. This counters eavesdropping threats originating from intermediate
MRs, and other MCs. Additionally MR↔MR communication may also be confiden-
tial. For example, if user traffic is confidential between MC↔MG, information who
communicates with whom can still be leaked by the routing protocol. With respect
to broadcast traffic, not all the traffic needs to be kept confidential. However, some
traffic will require confidentiality of broadcast messages. For instance, broadcasting
network maps and link metrics in plaintext can be considered a threat. An attacker
could gain insight of the network topology and the available routes to facilitate a
subsequent attack on the network. The attacker could for example try to disable
specific MGs.
Definition 2 (Integrity) “Integrity refers to the trustworthiness of data and resources,
and it is usually phrased in terms of preventing improper or unauthorized change. Integrity
includes data integrity (the content of information) and origin integrity (the source of the
data, often called authentication).” [Bis04]
Definition 3 (Replay) (Message) Replay refers to the process of using a previously cap-
tured message and replaying it to the receiver.
Integrity- and replay-protection are both important for all the introduced com-
munication patterns. Just as confidentiality, integrity and replay protection are
both required between two MCs, MC↔MR, MC↔MG, and any node and the AAA
server to prevent unnoticed manipulation. However, integrity and replay protec-
tion are also required for MR↔MR as well as MR↔MG communication. Note that
one can argue that assuming confidentiality of MC↔MG communication, integrity
without additional confidentiality is sufficient on the first hop between MC↔MR.
The MR can simply check whether the MC’s traffic is allowed to pass. Within the
WMN integrity can be attained between MRs in a hop-by-hop fashion and the MRs
checking the traffic for its legitimacy. Integrity and replay protection are also of im-
portance when considering broadcast traffic in order to prevent manipulation or the
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distribution of outdated information. If for example outdated routing information
would be distributed, the MRs could not provide valid routes.
Definition 4 (Access Control) “When a system mechanism controls access to an object
and an individual user cannot alter that access, the control is mandatory access control
(MAC), occasionally called a rule-based access control.” [Bis04]
Access Control entails authentication and authorization of network entities. It
is required to control which entities are allowed to access the network. Entity au-
thentication should be combined with key establishment to bootstrap integrity and
encryption mechanisms and thereby also ensure ongoing access control. Authen-
tication is equally important for users and operators, since users need to ensure
that the network is the one it claims to be, as well as vice versa. Access control is
required for all network entities, such as MCs, as well as newly joining MRs, and
MGs.
Definition 5 (Privacy) “The right to privacy is our right to keep a domain around us,
which includes all those things that are part of us, such as our body, home, property, thoughts,
feelings, secrets and identity. The right to privacy gives us the ability to choose which parts
in this domain can be accessed by others, and to control the extent, manner and timing of
the use of those parts we choose to disclose.” [Onn05]
Privacy is often falsely thought of as a goal that is automatically achieved alongside
confidentiality. However, privacy issues can for example arise when authenticating
an MC to an MR. Although the communication can be kept confidential between
MR and MC, the MR could still learn identity attributes of the MC. In context of
mobility and repeated authentication, tracking also becomes an issue that cannot
solely be solved by keeping the communication between MC and MR confidential.
3.6 Security Architectures for WMNs
In this section we evaluate prominent security architectures proposed for WMNs
with respect to their characteristics, the scenarios they support, and which security
requirements they meet. This includes a detailed discussion of the mechanisms
they apply to meet the requirements. We concentrate on four major proposals
which try to be of a comprehensive nature, the IEEE 802.11s [IEE11] standard
and three more research driven proposals, such as the Attack Resilient Security
Architecture for Multi-hop WMNs (ARSA) [ZF06], the MobiSEC [MPC08], and a
PANA-based5 architecture [CLMC06]. These four proposals are evaluated in detail
5Protocol for Carrying Authentication and Network Access
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and compared at the end of this section. A summary of our findings is provided
in Table 3.2. In addition to these four more comprehensive proposals for WMN
security architectures, we briefly summarize proposals that concentrate on solving
one particular security challenge such as key establishment.
3.6.1 IEEE 802.11s - Mesh Networking
When discussing proposed security architectures for WMNs, it is of course im-
portant to consider upcoming standards such as the IEEE 802.11s. After being
successfully passed, network equipment vendors will implement it and roll out
their hardware with wireless mesh networking support at the time of writing. It
supports access control for all types of nodes (MCs, MRs, MGs) based on two pro-
tocols: the Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE) protocol and the Abbreviated
Handshake protocol. The former is a password-based authentication protocol that
allows two arbitrary types of nodes to simultaneously authenticate each other and
establish a PMK. SAE thus assumes a pre-shared secret, namely a password, to be
known to all legitimate network nodes. The Abbreviated Handshake is used for au-
thentication and key agreement between peers that already share a PMK, i.e., a pair
of peers that have already successfully run SAE before. The Abbreviated Handshake
protocol requires fewer messages to be exchanged between the nodes than the SAE
protocol, which explains its name. Keying material generated during the Abbreviated
Handshake protocol is subsequently used to encrypt, integrity protect and replay
protect the communication between the nodes. In the following we detail both
authentication and key agreement protocols and discuss their shortcoming.
Simultaneous Authentication of Equals
The computations used by SAE are either based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) [HMV03] or prime modulus finite cyclic groups. In the following we use the
notation of ECC-based SAE in which P(x,y) represents a point on a publicly known
elliptic curve of the form
y2 = x3 + ax+ b. (3.1)
By inv we refer to the additive inverse of a point on the elliptic curve. SAE uses
four messages to authenticate two peers in a simultaneous fashion. The message
flow of SAE between parties A and B is depicted in Figure 3.2. In the first step the
initiating peer generates a Password Element (PWE) which represents a point on an
elliptic curve. The PWE is combined with a hash m containing a combination of
MAC addresses of the respective two peers by scalar multiplication to
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N = PWE×m. (3.2)
The initiating peer A constructs a commit scalar csA (cf. Equation 3.3) and a
commit element ceA (cf. Equation 3.4).
csA = (randA +maskA) mod r (3.3)
ceA = inv(maskA ×N) (3.4)
Here, randA refers to a random number which is used to create the commit
scalar csA.maskA is a temporary secret value used to blind the transferral of the
random number. Upon reception of a peer’s commit, both peers are able to compute
the same secret k using a pre-defined key derivation function F. k is derived by
each peer based on the other peer’s commit message, its own random number, and
N such that A computes Equation 3.5 and B computes Equation 3.5.
k = F((randA × (csB ×N+ ceB)) (3.5)
k = F((randB × (csA ×N+ ceA)) (3.6)
The computation effectively represents a password-authenticated ECC Diffie-
Hellman key exchange [DH06]. Both peers will build a confirmation message,
namely a hash of the secret k, a replay-protection counter (ctr) and the previously
exchanged cs and ce values. If the received confirmation message equals the ex-
pected result, authentication is considered successful. After the authentication was
successful, both peers will generate a pairwise master key as:
PMK = H(k||ctr||(csA + csB)mod r||F(ceA + ceB)) (3.7)
If a PMK has been successfully established, it can be used during the Abbrevi-
ated Handshake. The PMK is used to construct a key hierarchy in which a 128-bit
Abbreviated Handshake Key Confirmation Key (AKCK), a 256-bit Abbreviated Handshake
Key Encryption Key (AKEK), and a 128-bit Mesh Temporal Key (MTK) are computed.
The key derivation is based on an exchangeable PRF which produces 256 bits of
key material. The keys AKCK and AKEK are static in the sense that they can be
used to provide origin authenticity and data confidentiality in multiple runs of the
Abbreviated Handshake and Group Key Handshake. AKEK is used to encrypt the
Group Transient Key (GTK) during the Abbreviated Handshake. The MTK is used to
protect the communication between two peers and is derived in a more dynamic
manner by using freshly generated random numbers of both peers as input to the
3.6. Security Architectures for WMNs 61
A B
N = PWE×m
csA = (randA + maskA) mod r
ceA = inverse(maskA × N)
N = PWE×m
csB = (randB + maskB) mod r
ceB = inverse(maskB × N)
compute k
H(k||ctr||csB||ceB||csA||ceA)
verify hash
H(k||ctr||csA||ceA||csB||ceB)
verify hash
PMK = H(k||ctr||(csA + csB)mod r||F(ceA + ceB))
Figure 3.2: The message flow of the ECC-based SAE Protocol used in the IEEE 802.11s
amendment.
key derivation function. The PMK, AKCK and AKEK’s lifetime is limited by the
password’s lifetime, whereas the MTK should be regenerated each time the session
between two nodes times out.
Abbreviated Handshake
The goal of the protocol is to generate a fresh MTK between two peers that already
share a PMK due to having been connected to each other before. The MTK key
generation using the PMK is randomized by using two fresh random numbers
selected by the peers. Since the peers share a PMK and therefore AKCK and also
AKEK, the exchange of the nonces can be integrity protected. The protocol consists
of two messages, i.e., a Peering Open Frame which also contains the random number
and a Peering Confirm Frame containing the nonce of the respective other peer.
Analysis
IEEE 802.11s provides access control to the WMN for all types of nodes which is
combined with mutual authentication and key agreement. The keying material gen-
erated can be used to meet all security requirements with respect to confidentiality,
integrity, and replay protection in WMNs. However, access control is based on a
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single password shared between all legitimate nodes. This leads to a number of
shortcomings:
. The compromise of one single node in the WMN enables other unauthorized
nodes to join the network. This is due to the fact that the lifetime of the PMK
is bound to the lifetime of the password. And the PMK itself is used as the
root of the key hierarchy.
. Since the only identity attribute used in the protocols is the MAC address of
a peer, impersonation of arbitrary peers by others is possible. For instance,
legitimate nodes can impersonate other legitimate nodes.
. As routers are also considered to be peers, just as clients, an attacker in pos-
session of the password can impersonate the network to a client.
. Finally, excluding a specific client or router from the network is not possible
as the operator would have to change the network access control password
and restart the network.
In addition, due to the use of passwords as the main access credentials, the
standard neither supports roaming of MCs between multiple operators, nor sharing
of network nodes between different operators. Mobility of infrastructure nodes
could be supported with the help of SAE and the Abbreviated Handshake protocol.
3.6.2 Attack Resilient Security Architecture for WMNs
Zhang et al. proposed an Attack Resilient Security Architecture for Multi-hop
Wireless Networks (ARSA) that aims at providing secure roaming in multi-domain
WMNs based on so-called passes that are linked to trusted brokers [ZF06]. They
employ Identity-based Cryptography (IBC) [BF01] in order to circumvent broadcasting
lengthy X.509 [AF99] certificates. IBC also enables self-authenticating public keys
since they can be reproduced by anyone knowing the identity, e.g., based on the
Network Access Identifier (NAI) [ABE05], of the entity and the domain parameters.
Brokers issue signed passes to MCs. If a MC accesses a WMN, the operator must
have an agreement with the broker in order to support the MC, i.e., for billing.
Once the MC provides the pass issued by his broker, the included public key is
used to encrypt a temporary network access pass issued by the respective operator.
The client checks network legitimacy by verifying the signature on the operator’s
domain parameters. Domain parameters are much like certificates in context of
IBC, since they provide means to gather the cryptographic parameters necessary to
perform validity checks. MC to MC authentication (in the same operator’s network)
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is based on temporary passes issued by the operator. The possession of such a
pass is assumed to be sufficient to trust the MC as both MCs have been previously
authenticated by the operator.
Analysis
ARSA explicitly supports access control of roaming and non-roaming MCs to
WMNs. However, ARSA does not address the protection of MC↔MR, MC↔MG,
MR ↔MG, and MR ↔MR communication. In addition, ARSA does not address
access control for MRs and MGs, and consequently does also not support infras-
tructure mobility. Also, routing MCs are not supported by ARSA.
An additional specific shortcoming of ARSA lies in the fact that in order to
function properly the MRs need to be pre-loaded with router passes (to prove
affiliation to the operator), as well as passes of trusted brokers. If broker passes are
missing, they are supposed to be provided by the MCs. The authors, however, fail
to mention how to decide whether to trust the broker or not. Domain parameters
of operators are signed by Trusted Third Partys (TTPs). This does, however, involve
MCs having the necessary parameters to verify the signature.
The most serious problem stems from the broker passes themselves. If a client
looses his pass, he is supposed to report this to the broker. But since it can be
considered hard to notice that a pass has been stolen, reporting will most likely not
take place. Attackers may use this fact to impersonate a MC since authentication is
solely based on this pass. Since the broker passes are fixed for each MC, tracking
issues arise because of passes being used each time network access takes place.
3.6.3 MobiSEC
The MobiSEC proposal of Martignon et al. features access control to a WMN for
MCs as well as for MRs [MPC08]. The key idea is to use IEEE 802.11i [IEE04a]
for authentication and key agreement between any node (MC or MR ) in the role
of the supplicant and the MR it attaches to as authenticator. In a second stage
authentication, the node can use a protocol based on TLS and a Certification Authority
(CA) signed certificate with the AAA server to additionally authenticate as a router
and obtain the keying material required for this role in the WMN. Note that the
authors suggest that all infrastructure nodes use the same network-wide backbone
key to protect their communication in order to facilitate seamless mobility for MRs
without re-authentication. The authors also propose two options for a re-keying
mechanism for the backbone key: re-authentication with the key server and an
option where each infrastructure node obtains a seed value from the key server to
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generate the new key locally.
Analysis
While MobiSEC addresses access control to the WMN including authentication
and key establishment for MCs as well as MRs, confidentiality and integrity and
replay protection are not explicitly addressed in the architecture. In particular, the
proposal only supports the protection of MC↔MR and MR↔MR communication
and none of the other communication patterns. Multiple operators are not explicitly
addressed such that the support of roaming MCs and infrastructure sharing is
unclear. Infrastructure mobility and routing MCs, however, are addressed.
A more detailed analysis of the author’s concepts reveals various security threats.
Using a network wide key for the protection of all backbone communication is the
most serious one. The compromise of a single MR is sufficient to be able to derive
this key. As user traffic seems to be protected in a user-specific way only on the
first hop between MC and MR the compromise of the backbone key renders the
attacker able to eavesdrop on all user and management traffic. Also, an attacker
in possession of the backbone key can insert bogus traffic into the network and
thereby congest the network.
In addition, an attacker can make use of the simplified mobility support in Mo-
biSEC and clone a compromised MR and add it to the network in several positions.
Finally, the multi-hop property of WMNs is not considered during the authentica-
tion protocol. Using the MR as authenticator however means that the key server
in IEEE 802.11i will transfer keying material to the MR during authentication. As
the MR and the key server do not share a key for this purpose, this key transfer can
only be protected with the backbone key and is therefore accessible by any MR in
between the MR and the key server.
With respect to MRs joining the backbone a problem will arise if the MR’s cer-
tificate is lost and implanted on an attacker’s MR since it is not bound to additional
identification attributes.
Multiple operators are not explicitly addressed. Considering the possible com-
munication patterns, Table 3.2 provides an overview with respect to the security
requirements that are met by this proposal. The author’s focus is on network ac-
cess control for MCs along with an additional secondary step for MRs joining the
backbone.
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3.6.4 A PANA-based Security Architecture for WMNs
Cheikhrouhou et al. propose the use of the Protocol for Carrying Authentication and
Network Access (PANA) [Par05] in the WMN context to carry authentication and
key establishment messages during access control of MCs to the WMN [CLMC06].
PANA is an IP-based, medium independent protocol used for carrying other au-
thentication protocols such as EAP. It distinguishes between PANA clients (PaC),
agents (PAA), enforcement points (EP), and authentication servers (AS). The authors
of [CLMC06] map these PANA entities to the WMN context by considering MCs to
be PaCs, EPs to be MRs, PAAs to be MGs, and AS to be a AAA server reachable via
each MGs.
Upon a PaC (MC) acquiring an IP address, it receives PAA-Discover messages,
which point to the reachable PAAs (MGs). EPs (suggested to be collocated with MRs)
are responsible for blocking all non-PANA traffic generated by yet unauthenticated
MCs. The authentication phase involves the PaC communicating with the PAA
(suggested to be collocated with the MGs) instead of the AS directly. EAP messages
are encapsulated in PANA messages exchanged with the PAA. The PAA forwards
the de-capsulated EAP messages to the AS which in return provides the material to
derive IKE [Kau10] credentials that will be used between PaC (MC) and MR.
Different EAP methods can be used in this context, the authors propose the use
of EAP Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS). After successful authentication the PaC
starts an IKE connection with the MR yielding an IPsec tunnel to secure the user
traffic. Note that MCs may either be wirelessly connected to a MR directly or to a
MR via multiple hops of routing MCs.
Analysis
The authors focus on providing MC access control to the WMN while it is not
considered for infrastructure nodes. Authentication and key establishment between
MCs and MRs are supported and their communication is protected with the help
of an IPsec tunnel. As opposed to this, protecting the communication patterns
MC↔MG, MR↔MR, MR↔MG and MC↔MC is not addressed. Although multiple
operators are not explicitly addressed in the proposal the use of EAP in combination
with a hierarchy of AAA servers could allow for the support of roaming MCs.
Infrastructure sharing is not addressed in the PANA-based approach.
With respect to supporting routing MCs, the PANA-based approach seems to
consider it. However, from the description provided in the paper it remains unclear
how routing MCs are supported.
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3.6.5 Other Specialized Security Proposals
Some previous WMN security proposals address a single challenge rather than
designing a more comprehensive security architecture. We briefly discuss these in
this section.
Ren et al. proposed to use a matrix-based key pre-distribution for enterprise
WMNs [RL08] that allows two neighboring nodes to establish a pairwise key with-
out exchanging messages. The suggested approach is similar to the multi-map
proposal of Gong and Wheeler [GW90]. However, it additionally assumes a mecha-
nism to securely discover locations. The proposal allows for keying material to be
established between MCs, and MRs.
Islam et al. set out to secure the routing protocol proposed for IEEE
802.11s [IYHH08]. Their proposal uses hash trees to provide integrity protection
for the mutable fields of the routing header. The added value in contrast to simple
hop-based hashes is questionable. Other security requirements such as confiden-
tiality and privacy are not addressed, but rather referred to as covered by the IEEE
802.11s standard itself.
Kandikattu et al. propose an IBC-based Mobile IPv6 security protocol to enable
secure roaming between different trust domains [KJ08]. The secure binding between
entities and identifiers is set aside, as well as the roaming between trust domains
with different IBC domain parameters. Confidentiality and integrity are achieved
by using IPsec between the network nodes. Privacy issues are covered with respect
to the location of the home domain.
Hamid et al. [HIH08] propose using modified group signatures developed
by Boneh [BF01] to achieve revocability. Users are private within a group, i.e.,
clients associated with a specific MR. Authentication to a group should be based
on in-person contact. They only consider MC↔MR and MC↔MC communication
with respect to access control and do not address the other security requirements
mentioned in Section 3.5.
As for IBC approaches He et al. [HA10] propose to use IBC for authentica-
tion and key establishment on single-hop link layer connections. This effectively
competes with the standardized IEEE 4-way handshake [IEE04a] that is already suc-
cessfully used today in the IEEE 802.11i amendment [IEE04a]. The work in [ZF06]
attempts to map IBC in WMNs in a setup similar to that of the credit card ecosystem
by involving brokers, which are similar to a CA in a PKI-based system. Operators
trust common brokers, which enables clients subscribed to brokers to roam differ-
ent networks. Wang et al. [WMLW11] propose to unify identity based encryption
and certificate-less signatures in a single public key context. They focus on MCs
and MRs intra-domain and inter-domain authentication by leveraging trust be-
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Confidentiality Integrity & Access Privacy
Replay Protection Control MCs
[IEE11] MC↔MC MC↔MC MCs -
MC↔MR MC↔MR MRs
MC↔MG MC↔MG MGs
MR↔MR MR↔MR
MR↔MG MR↔MG
[ZF06] MC↔MC MC↔MR MCs +
[MPC08] MC↔MR - MCs -
MR↔MR - MRs
[CLMC06] MC↔MR MC↔MR MCs -
[HA10] - MC↔MC MCs -
MC↔MR
MR↔MR
[WMLW11] - MC↔MR MC +
MC↔MC
[SZZF11] - MCs↔MR MCs +
Table 3.2: A summary of the characteristics & the security requirements of the com-
pared architectures.
tween operators of different domains. The work of Sun et al. [SZZF11] leverages
the ideas of [ZF06] in a combination with hierarchical IBC to allow inter-domain
authentication (roaming) of clients in FNs.
3.6.6 Discussion
Table 3.2 summarizes the characteristics and high-level security requirements sup-
ported by the four previously suggested approaches [HDM+10, CLMC06, MPC08,
ZF06]. Note that the summary only shows characteristics and requirements that are
met by at least one of the approaches such that some characteristics and security
requirements are not included in the table. In particular these are: support of het-
erogeneous wireless links, mechanisms to enforce fairness, availability protection,
and non-repudiation.
From the table it is clearly visible that all the more comprehensive proposals
we evaluated in more detail in this section support more than one of the features,
while none of them provides a comprehensive security architecture that supports
all requirements, not even for a simple single operator WMN. It is important to
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Clients Infrastructure
[IEE11] - -
[ZF06] + -
[MPC08] - +
[CLMC06] - -
[HA10] - -
[WMLW11] + -
[SZZF11] + -
Table 3.3: The mobility functionalities of the compared architectures.
note that such a comprehensive security architecture needs to be carefully designed
while keeping the possible communication patterns of WMNs in mind.
With respect to protecting the communication between the nodes in WMNs,
IEEE 802.11s currently supports all the necessary communication patterns. How-
ever, governing the initial network access control by a password makes the standard
inflexible, of questionable security, and not suited to support MC roaming or in-
frastructure sharing (cf. Table 3.3). The ARSA security architecture is focused on
first-hop network access, and therefore places much emphasis on the MC↔MR
communication pattern. ARSA, however, is the only one of the discussed proposals,
which explicitly considers multiple operators and roaming MCs with additional
identity privacy. MobiSEC also considers the backbone communication of WMNs,
namely that of MRs, and MGs. The authors’ focus is on securing the first-hop com-
munication which also involves access control. Besides controlling MC network
access, they also restrict access to the backbone for MRs. MRs have to carry out a
secondary authentication after having gained network access with the same mech-
anism as MCs. The PANA-based security architecture also focuses on network
access control and securing the first-hop communication between MC and MR.
Nonetheless the first hop is secured by IPsec, the transferral of key material is not
secured since other communication patterns such as MR↔MR are not considered.
3.7 Summary & Conclusion
This chapter presented an analysis of WMNs characteristics, security requirements,
and possible communication patterns that are affected by these. By stepping back
we achieved a broad overview over the security issues WMNs impose as a whole
which can differ depending on the different characteristics of the network in ques-
3.7. Summary & Conclusion 69
tion. After describing WMNs on an abstract level, and defining the attacker model,
we detailed single-operator and multi-operator scenarios whereas the latter is of par-
ticular importance (cf. Chapter 6). Also, we defined the most basic communication
patterns of WMNs that will be secured by the single operator security architecture
proposed in Chapter 5. Additionally, we shortly discussed the concept of mobility
for end-users and parts of the network infrastructure. Handover as a mechanism to
facilitate seamless mobility will be addressed in Chapter 7. We used our findings
of characteristics and requirements to analyze recent security concepts for WMNs.
Our analysis shows that the proposed architectures tend to solve only a subset of
the problems that we identified.
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Testbed
In recent years many testbeds for Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) have been im-
plemented to test and evaluate different aspects of WMNs such as the behavior of
routing protocols or the performance of Transport Control Protocol (TCP) over multi-
ple wireless hops [ZGW+07, LRBR+12]. None of these is designed with testing and
evaluating security mechanisms for WMNs in mind. At the same time, security pro-
tocols have been proposed that aim at protecting WMNs [BSH06, CLMC06, ZF06,
IYHH08, MPC08, RL08, HIH08, KJ08, BD09, RYLZ10, HA10, WMLW11, SZZF11],
covering different aspects of WMN security. However, none of these have been
evaluated in a real-world testbed, which makes it very hard to assess the practical
use of these proposals let alone to fairly compare them with each other.
We dedicated our new testbed to testing and evaluating security protocols
in a realistic setting. This chapter contributes to closing this gap by sharing our
experience in designing a testbed dedicated to testing and evaluating security
protocols in a realistic setting. In particular, we detail the hardware and software
setup of our testbed, describe the management tools we developed to facilitate
maintenance of our testbed, and describe several pitfalls we encountered during
the setup of our testbed. We also include a general evaluation of throughput, packet
loss, and round trip time in the testbed.
Parts of this chapter have been published in [EHJM13].
Outline: This chapter introduces the IT Security Wireless Mesh Network Testbed. For
the purpose of implementing and evaluating the key management solutions pre-
sented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, as well as the handover mechanism (Chapter 7),
we designed and created a WMN testbed at the IT Security Research institute.
4.1 ITsec Testbed
This section introduces our WMN testbed, the ITsec Testbed. First, we elaborate on
why we chose to build a new custom setup instead of building on the work of
others, e.g., the UMIC-Mesh or KAUMesh (cf. Section 4.4.1). Next, Section 4.1.4
details the system image and additional software components used in our testbed.
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4.1.1 General Design Considerations
We analyzed a variety of existing testbeds which have been used in non-security
specific publicized research (cf. Section 4.4) as there are no security specific WMN
testbeds, yet. All of these have been created for specific purposes, e.g., researching
routing algorithms, or increasing the performance of transport protocols. As such,
they have specific setup and a range of tools and functionalities. For us, the primary
requirements were the following: We need to be able to fully control the network
topology and the respective routing protocols. This is particularly important for
researching handover protocols. For instance, the routing protocol B.A.T.M.A.N.1
now includes extensions to signal handover from one Access Point (AP) to the next.
Other routing protocols without this feature would therefore negatively impact the
performance of handover protocols as the network layer session cannot be resumed.
Full control over the mode IEEE 802.11 Wireless LAN (WLAN) is operating in, i.e.,
devices being in station and master mode as opposed to all nodes running in ad-hoc
mode. This has significant advantages as the full potential of the 802.11i security
mechanisms (cf. Section 2.3) can be leveraged.
We also derived secondary requirements for our testbed: Complete physical
control over the nodes in an easy manner. Thus, sharing a testbed with other
researchers across countries was not an attractive concept, especially when crashing
the nodes. No scheduling of slots for using the testbed. This would otherwise
create a lot of unnecessary overhead while limiting the pace of process, e.g., when
evaluating the performance of network based mechanisms. This has proven to be of
great relevance, especially for students working towards their Bachelor or Master
theses. As other testbeds, using Linux on the nodes is superior to any other choice,
as it allows the necessary software to be written in most common programming
languages.
Hardware components are also similar in all testbeds we analyzed. Most devices
are equipped with Atheros chips for wireless connections and have sufficient RAM
and computation capacity. A manual installation of the operating systems on each
node is obviously not efficient. A comfortable approach to flash multiple nodes with
system images is a combination of a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) [Sol92]
server and a DHCP server. Before booting from the hard disk, the nodes try to
get a DHCP lease from the Ethernet interface and load a small system image into
their RAM from the TFTP server. This temporary system contains tools to mount a
network share containing the desired node system image and to flash it onto the
nodes’ persistent storage. Nodes should easily be able to chose whether to boot
from a hard disk or their network interface. After the process of flashing the node,
1http://www.open-mesh.org/projects/open-mesh/wiki
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Figure 4.1: The exemplary setup of the ITsec testbed.
some settings as setting IP addresses and routing information must be changed to
make it work with the testbed.
Hostapd2 and wpa_supplicant3 are the standard software for wireless connec-
tions and are used in all analyzed testbeds with infrastructure mode. Remotely
managing configurations and controlling these daemons is a necessity and should
be possible in a convenient way. It also has to be considered that the nodes may
differ in hardware. Different hostapd and wpa_supplicant configuration files must
be applicable to different interfaces on various nodes.
We also need to be able to manage the Remote Dial-in User Service (RADIUS)
server of hostapd as it is required for authentication of all nodes. As opposed the
de-facto standard RADIUS server, freeRADIUS4 does not provide a management
interface, yet. Different nodes in a WMN testbed often have similar configurations
and only differ in small details, e.g. wireless authentication credentials. We need
to be able to provide node-profiles or similar functionality to assign settings to
multiple nodes.
4.1.2 Architecture
A simplified view of the testbed architecture is shown in Figure 4.1. The network
consists of Mesh Routers (MRs), Mesh Clients (MCs), Mesh Gateways (MGs), and a cen-
tral management server (meshctrl). The mesh router and clients are interconnected
2http://hostap.epitest.fi/hostapd/
3http://hostap.epitest.fi/wpa_supplicant/
4http://freeradius.org/
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Figure 4.2: An exemplary view of the internals of an ALIX.3D3 board.
using infrastructure mode. MGs are responsible for routing the traffic to other do-
mains, e.g., the Internet, using a wired backbone. Since each node is authenticated
based on Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), an Authentication, Authorization
and Accounting (AAA) server is necessary. The meshctrl server is connected to the
mesh network by wire and implements the RADIUS server included in hostapd to
authenticate MRs, MCs and MGs. Also, the management web interface of pwrmesh
(cf. Section 4.1.5) is hosted on this server.
4.1.3 Hardware
All nodes run on the PC Engines ALIX.3D35 (cf. Figure 4.2) boards which are
equipped with a 500 MHz AMD Geode LX800 CPU, an on-chip 128 bit AES Se-
curity Block, and 256 MB DDR DRAM. Persistent storage is realized by using 16 GB
Compact Flash cards which can be plugged into a CF card slot. The boards also
provide two USB ports, a serial port and VGA output. Thus, convenient debugging
of the nodes is even possible in case of network failure.
An on-board Ethernet interface with POE capability allows to run the node with
a single cable plugged in and with a 100 Mbit Ethernet connection. Two miniPCI
sockets are used with two Atheros AR5008 WLAN Cards. Multiple Input Multiple
Output (MIMO) technology can be achieved by adding three antennas to each card.
The authentication server and all MGs are connected over a Gigabit Ethernet switch.
5http://www.pcengines.ch/
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4.1.4 System Image and Software
Voyage Linux6 is running as an operating system on all nodes, except for the
meshctrl server which runs vanilla Debian 6.0. Voyage is a modified Debian Linux
with optimizations for wireless drivers, the CF card and other hardware related
issues. CF cards have very limited numbers of read and write cycles. Hence, the
read and write actions must be reduced as much as possible. Voyage implements a
temporary file system which writes each change to the file system into the RAM
instead of the CF card. Only defined paths and files are written to the RAM. All
other files are mounted read-only. This ensures an increased lifetime of the CF cards
and thus also for the devices.
The routers are currently running a 3.2.9 Linux kernel. Important enabled kernel
modules are B.A.T.M.A.N. and the i2C module which allows to read values from
the on-board temperature sensors. B.A.T.M.A.N. is a proactive routing protocol and
is used on all nodes. Communication with the kernel module is possible via the tool
batctl. It allows to retrieve routing information, e.g., detected gateways, neighbors.
All interfaces that use B.A.T.M.A.N. for routing are bridged to a bat-device. Batctl
can also specify whether a device collects or sends visualization data.
Hostapd and wpa_supplicant are used for setting up the access points and the
wireless connections to the mesh network. In a regular configuration of a node
one of the WLAN cards is always connecting to another MR with wpa_supplicant
and the other is offering an entry access point for other MRs by running a hostapd
daemon. Hostapd can offer multiple virtual interfaces on one physical device. This
allows to use one WLAN card not only as an entry point for other MRs, but also for
MCs at the same time.
The two Atheros WLAN cards in each node are used with the ath9k7 driver. For
higher data rates and less interference with other wireless access points the testbed
uses the 5 GHz band. Legacy access for 802.11b/g clients is possible too, but the
mesh network traffic is sent using 802.11a.
4.1.5 Node Management
The process of running, maintaining, and configuring the ITsec testbed initially
required a lot of manual effort. Additionally, monitoring the testbed was not possible
at the time, rendering efficient maintenance even more difficult. In an evolving
process, we developed a tailored tool called pwrmesh, which uses pwrcall8 [Sch11],
a lightweight, secure bidirectional remote procedure call framework as a basis. The
6http://linux.voyage.hk/
7http://linuxwireless.org/en/users/Drivers/ath9k
8https://github.com/rep/pwrcall
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Figure 4.3: An overview on the architecture of the pwrmesh software.
initial capability to which can be accessed by the meshctrl is sent to the MRs during
their EAP authentication using the Attribute Value Pairs (AVPs) of the EAP-Tunneled
Transport Layer Security (EAP-TTLS) method.
For management purposes we require to be able to change WiFi settings, switch
regular nodes to gateway modus, reset/reboot nodes, configure networks settings
(IP, iptables, . . . ), and add/remove users. Querying information about the nodes is
important to be able to debug and restructure the testbed. Therefore, we obtain the
node’s network state, e.g., IP, MAC, connected STAs, and its connectivity. Lastly,
we generate the network map using the batmand visualization and merge the infor-
mation with our local static network topology map. Respective node maintenance
we are able to flash new system images, run checks on the CF card and the node’s
memory, and reconfigure the PXE-Boot parameters.
We integrated all the above features using an agent-like setup. Figure 4.3 shows
the pwrmesh architecture. Each node runs the pwrnode which implements specific
functions. All nodes are centrally managed by the pwrserver which is hosted on
the meshctrl host. We created a Django9 based web interface for controlling the
pwrserver. Besides automatically rendering the information obtained from each
pwrnode, we can also manually trigger commands on the nodes, e.g., rebooting from
another PXE-Boot image, or setting up different wireless connections. Figure 4.4
shows an excerpt of the Node View which for instance provides information about
the current IP, heartbeat and location. Deploying patches for the most important
software, i.e., hostapd, wpa_supplicant, and pwrnode, can also conveniently be
9https://www.djangoproject.com/
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Figure 4.4: An excerpt of the node view of pwrmesh showing the details of meshrouter16
along with a map.
done using our web interface (cf. Figure 4.5).
Our management, maintenance, and monitoring is implemented as general as
possible such that it can easily be applied to testbed setups different from ours. It
can also be extended in a straightforward manner by implementing functionality
on the nodes and the respective wrapper on the pwrserver, i.e., its web interface.
4.2 Pitfalls
In this section we elaborate on the pitfalls we encountered while developing the
ITsec testbed.
In the process of using the wpa_wired driver of wpa_supplicant we encountered
issues with Cisco’s Catalyst 4500 network switch. The MGs of our testbed send
EAP requests using the wired driver of wpa_supplicant as multicast packets to the
authentication server. However, the switch drops theses packets, even though no
filtering whatsoever is employed. Replacing the Cisco hardware with a simple
off-the-shelf 1000 Mbit switch resolved this issue.
Additional modifications have been applied to the operating system of the
nodes. The directory /var/log/ is specified as writable to allow accessing the log files.
When log files become too large, the RAM of the devices tends to be completely
used for the temporary file system. Hence, we added a script to ensure that no log
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Figure 4.5: An example of the deploy view of pwrmesh showing a selection of func-
tionalities.
file becomes too large.
Also, there exist issues related to time synchronization of the hardware and
the system clock on Voyage. The real time clock cannot be accessed by default,
which results in an incorrect system time on startup. This leads to unsuccessful
authentications as a correct system time is required for certificate validation of the
authentication server. In order to fix this problem the parameter directisa needs be
added to each hwclock function call and the kernel module rtc must be loaded at
boot time. Another challenge was the time skew between the node’s clocks which
was already too high after a few minutes for any meaningful evaluation. Regularly
executing Network Time Protocol (NTP) before each measurement is required.
As to the wireless drivers, some limitations exist when applying multiple virtual
interfaces. It is, for instance, not possible to assign different channels for each virtual
interface, yet. Hostapd may also cause problems if the daemon is attached to a
device with a specific type of MAC address. In order to distinguish virtual interfaces
from the physical device, new MAC addresses need to be assigned. Therefore,
hostapd chooses the original MAC address as a mask and each virtual interface
is configured with this mask increased by its index. The configuration fails if the
result of new_mac & mask is not equal to the new_mac.
When we executed experiments which induced high throughput, hostapd
tended to terminate the connection resulting in a “deauth” debug message. The
station cannot reconnect until hostapd is restarted.
Also, there may occur problems to set 5GHz channels on the Atheros cards
since most WLAN chipsets have a fixed regional setting. In order to use all legal
channels, we patched the ath9k driver source code and the regulatory domain
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Figure 4.6: The packet loss ratio in the ITsec testbed
settings. Furthermore, the wireless drivers are far from stable10. If the network traffic
is too high over a period of time, or a node loses its connection and then repeatedly
scanned for another MR, the driver crashes with a Direct Memory Access (DMA)
error. Switching to Voyage Linux 0.9 reduced the DMA errors.
Compiling and building an application using Linux is straightforward. There
are several tools which assist developers in the process. However, compiling and
installing freeRADIUS is not as easy as one might expect. It is important to use the
correct version of libtool11. For us, this means completely removing the installed
libtool version and use the one which is included in freeRADIUS. Unfortunately
freeRADIUS does not provide a de-installation script. Therefore, we wrote a custom
removal script for freeRADIUS such that we could make sure that only the current
version was used.
4.3 Performance Evaluation
This section presents the network related performance metrics.
4.3.1 Network Performance
In order to obtain the most important performance metrics of the ITsec testbed, we
carried out measurements for packet loss, Round Trip Time (RTT), and throughput.
All the measurements have been done using iperf and have been repeated a signifi-
cant amount of times to obtain stable results. The parameter n refers to the number
of repetitions and t refers to the duration of a specific test instance.
10http://wireless.kernel.org/en/users/Drivers/ath9k/bugs
11http://www.gnu.org/software/libtool/
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Figure 4.8: The average throughput of the ITsec testbed.
Figure 4.6 shows the average packet loss of User Datagram Protocol (UDP) trans-
missions. We have used an additional 5 MBit UDP noise stream on the same path,
however, it only slightly influences the average packet loss.
In terms of RTT, we compared a close to optimal Line of Sight (LOS) setup with
a setup in which the routers were regularly distributed throughout our institute.
Figure 4.7 shows that the difference between both scenarios is almost negligible.
Obviously, RTTs increase as the overall distance increases.
For the purpose of determining the throughput we ran a 20 seconds test using
TCP, i.e., measuring the available bandwidth using a constant stream for 20 seconds.
Figure 4.8 shows the comparison of the two scenarios as discussed before. However,
the optimal LOS setup produces a significantly larger throughput.
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4.4 Related Work
This section summarizes the most relevant set of related testbeds which we con-
sidered during our work. We focused on these non-security specific testbeds, as
there are no security specific WMN testbeds, yet. A comparison respective testbed
features and usage is also given in Table 4.1.
4.4.1 UMIC-Mesh
The UMIC-Mesh [ZGW+07] is a hybrid testbed which consists of physical devices
and virtualized nodes. Each node is connected to a wired backbone network that
is used for configuration and booting. This functionality is supported by a config-
uration server which is also connected to the wired backbone. The mesh internal
traffic is routed over wireless connections. The physical devices are running on
ALIX.2C2/3C2 boards from PC Engines. Atheros AR5213 XR WLAN cards are used
for wireless communication. One card is dedicated to router-to-router communica-
tion whereas the other is dedicated to router-to-client communication. The routers
are connected in 802.11 ad-hoc mode using OLSR [CJ03] as the default routing
protocol. The UMIC-Mesh is configurable and monitored using the web-based tool
MeshConf which is based on SNMP [Pre02]. Each node being connected to the
wired backbone makes it easy to configure, however, it also renders the deployment
scenario less close to real world mesh networks. The main research focus of the
UMIC-Mesh is multi-hop performance of transport protocols such as TCP.
4.4.2 KAUMesh
KAUMesh12 is a testbed developed at the Karlstad University in Sweden. Similar to
the UMIC-Mesh, all nodes are connected to a management and monitoring server
by wire, while wireless connections are established using 802.11 ad-hoc mode. The
nodes are built using the Cambria GW2358-4 network computer with Intel IXP435
667 MHz CPUs and 128 Megabyte DDR2 SDRAM running the Linux operating
system. Nodes operate up to three Atheros wireless interfaces. Monitoring the nodes
is based on Nagios13 using Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP). Each node
retrieves its system image via Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) [Sol92]. There is
no configuration tool to configure the nodes directly as the necessary configuration
is done at boot time. Three different routing protocols are available in the testbed:
AODV-UU [PBRD03], B.A.T.M.A.N., and OLSR [CJ03]. Each node is equipped with
12https://www.kau.se/en/kaumesh
13http://www.nagios.org/
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several monitoring tools to retrieve data, e.g., iperf, tcpdump, mgen. The KAUMesh
is used for performance and QoS studies.
4.4.3 UCSB MeshNet
The UCSB MeshNet [LRBR+12] is a testbed developed at the University of Califor-
nia, Santa Barbara. It consists of 30 nodes deployed in a single building connected
in ad-hoc mode. Each node consists of two Linksys WRT54G wireless devices which
are connected via Ethernet. One WRT54G is responsible for the mesh traffic. The
other device tries to connect to other access points in order to get an Internet con-
nection or another connection that is available to a testbed operator. The gateways
of the networks are Intel Celeron based PCs which connect via IEEE 802.11b to
the mesh network and provide Internet access via Ethernet. Both node types are
running Linux based operating systems, i.e., the Linksys nodes are running Open-
Wrt14. The testbed uses Ad-hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV) [PBRD03] for
routing and the researchers developed their own control software for it but there is
no detailed description or source code available. The UCSB MeshNet is used for
routing and QoS research.
4.4.4 DES-Testbed
The Distributed Embedded Systems Testbed15 is developed by the Freie Universtät
Berlin. It is a hybrid mesh testbed containing 95 nodes. Each node takes part
in the wireless mesh network and also in a wireless sensor network. Some of
the nodes are connected to the wired backbone of the network. A controlling
testbed server is also connected to this wired backbone. The nodes are based on
PC Engines ALIX.2C2/2D2/3D2 system boards with three or more 802.11a/b/g
Atheros wireless network cards communicating in IEEE 802.11 ad-hoc mode and
one sensor node. These system boards are capable of running Linux operating
systems. The testbed is managed by a custom tool called DES-TBMS and used for
routing and localization studies.
4.4.5 Freifunk
Freifunk16 networks are private non-commercially deployed mesh networks. Par-
ticipants can share their Internet connection with other Freifunk members or can
enlarge the mesh by connecting to an existing node while acting as a forwarder. In
14https://openwrt.org/
15http://www.des-testbed.net/
16http://start.freifunk.net/
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order to participate in the Freifunk network, a special firmware based on OpenWrt
exists for the routers which can be deployed on a variety of off-the-shelf hardware.
The firmware provides OLSR and B.A.T.M.A.N. as routing protocols. Wireless
connections between nodes are established in ad-hoc mode. Freifunk networks are
community networks which do not have a specific academic research focus.
4.5 Summary & Conclusion
In this chapter we presented the ITsec Testbed as an experimentation platform for
WMN research. We detailed the initial construction and our specific requirements
towards a testbed for security research. The security architecture which is presented
in the following chapter is the cornerstone of the research that follows. Also, the
subsequent Chapter 5-Chapter 6 show research that has been sparked by the simple
fact of a testbed being available. For instance, handover protocols for WMNs, have
to the best of our knowledge not been implemented and evaluated using a WMN
testbed, yet. Our approach to a testbed shows that using off-the-shelf components
facilitates building a testbed which enables researchers and students to obtain real
world practical results.
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Part III
A Comprehensive Security
Architecture for Multi-Operator
WMNs



C H A P T E R 5
Framework for Sequential
Deployment
This chapter proposes a comprehensive framework for securing wireless mesh
networks that is fully compatible to the IEEE (IEEE) 802.11s standard [IEE11]. The
framework enables the efficient establishment of all security associations required
for end-to-end protection of the different traffic types in the Wireless Mesh Network
(WMN).
As any wireless network, WMNs are particularly vulnerable to external attack-
ers trying to eavesdrop on or manipulate traffic sent over the wireless links. They
might also try to gain unauthorized network access. However, the multi-hop nature
of WMNs combined with the potentially exposed placement of Mesh Routers (MRs)
and with the fact that Mesh Clients (MCs) may route traffic for other MCs, induces
additional security challenges for WMNs. Specifically, compromised MRs and cu-
rious or even malicious MCs have to be taken into account. Such MRs or MCs
may try to eavesdrop on and manipulate any type of traffic flowing through them.
Thus, end-to-end protection of all traffic types in the WMN must be ensured. Once
malicious devices have been identified, there needs to be a mechanism to remove
them from the network.
Other previous approaches (e.g., [MPC08] or those we discussed in Chapter 3)
support the establishment of some of the required security associations. How-
ever, none of these approaches adequately protects against compromised MRs
and routing MCs. In addition, most prior approaches are not compatible to the
IEEE 802.11s [IEE11] standard and therefore only stand a slight chance of get-
ting widely used within a commercial context. Another weakness of previously
suggested key management frameworks as well as industrial solutions such as MO-
TOMESH [Mot06] is that they are based on proprietary or at least non-standardized
protocols.
In this chapter, we address the WMN specific security challenges described
above by proposing a comprehensive security framework which
(1) allows for mutual authentication between any node and the AAA server
based on any desired type of AAA credentials;
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(2) supports the removal of any network node (e.g., a compromised MR);
(3) solves the problem of bootstrapping security associations required for the
end-to-end protection of the different traffic types within a WMN in a highly
efficient way;
(4) supports end-to-end protection with the help of standardized, already well-
scrutinized protocols, namely EAP for node authentication, 802.11i CCMP for
link layer protection and IPsec ESP for network layer multi-hop traffic;
(5) supports secure proactive handover of moving MCs (or MRs) from one point
of network attachment to another.
Our proposed framework is fully compatible to the IEEE 802.11s [IEE11] amend-
ment and can be realized with commercially available OTS devices. We imple-
mented the framework in our live WMN testbed described in Chapter 4 and evalu-
ated the performance of its components.
Parts of the work presented in this chapter have also been published in [EFM12].
Outline: We start by introducing a three party protocol in Section 5.1 which we
use as an idea for our own three party protocol. Next, in Section 5.2 we detail
our framework, including the network assumptions, security requirements, key
derivation and multi-operator considerations, a three party handshake protocol,
and the network deployment phases. After that, we introduce the FSASD Authen-
ticator (FAU) in Section 5.3 as a logical component that is used to speed up our
key management protocols by leveraging the hierarchical structure of WMNs. We
follow with a comprehensive security analysis of all the framework components.
Before concluding this chapter in Section 5.6, we present a performance analysis of
our framework in Section 5.5.
5.1 Preliminaries
In this section we briefly describe a 3-party key transport protocol of Marin-Lopez
et al. [LPGBHGS10]. It allows two parties A and B, that already share a secret key
with a third party S, to establish a shared secret key with each other. We chose this
protocol as a basis for the three party handshake protocol presented in Section 5.2
as it is already embedded into the context of wireless networks using Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP). The protocol consists of the following messages:
Starting withM1, A initiates the protocol with B.M1 includes its identifier A
and a token encrypted by A for S with the symmetric key KauthAS shared between A
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SA B
(M1) A, {NA, SEQAS, B}KauthAS
(M2) B, {NB, Ahash}KauthBS ,
A, {NA, SEQAS, B}KauthAS
(M3) {NA, NB, NS, A, B}KauthAS ,
{NA, NB, NS, A, B, KAB}KauthBS
(M4) {NA, NB, NS, A, B}KauthAS
Figure 5.1: The messag flow of the 3PFH protocol.
and S. The token contains a nonce NA, a sequence number SEQAS and the identity
of B.
B relays this message as part of M2 to S appending its own identity and a
token encrypted with the symmetric key KauthBS shared between B and S. B’s token
contains a nonce NB and a hash of the identity of A.
In M3, S sends a token for A (encrypted with KauthAS ) and a token for B (en-
crypted with KauthBS ) to B. A’s token contains the identities of both A and B, as well
as the nonces NA,NB, and NS. The token for B additionally contains the key KAB,
which is the key to be shared between A and B. InM4, B relays S’s token for A to
A. As the key KAB is derived from a key KderivAS shared between A and S and the
nonces NA, NB, and NS, the initiator A can derive KAB once it received message
M4.
For our framework we propose a new variant of this three-party protocol (Sec-
tion 5.2.5). We chose this protocol for two main reasons: First, it has been proposed
in the context of handover in Wireless LANs (WLANs) in which devices are au-
thenticated using EAP. This perfectly fits the rest of our framework, which is also
EAP-based. Second, the security of the protocol has been formally evaluated using
Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) [Vig06], a
widely accepted formal tool for protocol verification. As will be shown in Section 5.4,
our variant of the protocol still positively passes the evaluation with AVISPA.
Note that we explicitly decided not to use 802.11r [IEE08] for two reasons: First,
802.11r assumes that access points already share security associations, however,
without defining how these are to be established. Second, 802.11r assumes a 802.11
MAC layer for wireless connections, and Ethernet for wired connections. Therefore,
WMNs using heterogeneous wireless access technologies cannot be supported. Our
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solutions presented in this thesis are PHY and MAC layer agnostic, thus supporting
a wide range of technologies.
5.2 Framework for Establishing Security Associations in
Sequential Deployment
In this section we detail the Framework for establishing Security Associations for Sequen-
tially Deployed WMN (FSASD) security framework. We start by discussing what the
framework assumes as the network model. After that, we introduce the security
requirements that FSASD aims to fulfill, and which technical means and protocols
are used.
5.2.1 Network Assumptions
We assume that the WMN (i.e., all MRs and Mesh Gateways (MGs)) is operated by a
single operator who sets up the WMN one node after another. MRs may be placed
in easily accessible (public) areas. Furthermore, we assume that there is at least
one Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) server present in the WMN.
This AAA server may, but does not have to be, co-located with a MG. Each MG,
MR, and MC shares authentication credentials, e.g., user name and password, with
the AAA server. Within the WMN, nodes communicate with each other directly on
the link layer, as well as on higher layers over several wireless hops for network
management, routing, or application purposes. In addition, authentication traffic
for newly joining nodes is routed to the AAA server, typically over several wireless
hops. The same holds true for user traffic routed through the WMN to and from
the Internet.
5.2.2 Security Requirements
In Chapter 3 we introduced general security requirements for WMNs which we
used to evaluate different security architectures for WMNs and wireless ad-hoc
networks.
This section instantiates these requirements in the context of a comprehensive
security architecture for WMNs. The framework presented in this chapter intends
to fulfill these derived requirements.
Due to their multi-hop nature, WMNs are particularly vulnerable to active and
passive external attackers on the wireless links. They may try to gain unautho-
rized network access or may try to eavesdrop on or manipulate the traffic in the
WMN. Moreover, MRs may be placed in easily accessible areas and can therefore be
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compromised. Routing MCs can also not fully be trusted. Compromised MRs and
routing MCs may try to eavesdrop on and manipulate the traffic flowing through
them. As a consequence, the MC’s traffic to and from the MG has to be protected
against compromised MRs and routing MCs. Similarly, authentication traffic be-
tween a Network Access Server (NAS) and the AAA server is at risk. Thus, it has to
be protected against compromised MRs and routing MCs.
In accordance with the analysis presented Chapter 3 we derive the following
security requirements:
R1 Prevent unauthorized nodes from joining the network
R2 Allow for convenient revocation of compromised nodes
R3 Confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection of each direct (single-hop)
wireless link & local broadcast
R4 Confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection between NAS and AAA
R5 Confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection between MC and MG
R6 Confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection between any two nodes in the
WMN wishing to communicate with each other
R7 Fast and secure re-authentication during handover
In order to meet R1 and R2, a protocol for mutual authentication between join-
ing nodes and the AAA server is required, as well as a mechanism to exclude
compromised nodes from the network. In order to meet the requirements R3-R7
mechanisms to establish security associations between the respective communicat-
ing parties have to be bootstrapped.
5.2.3 Overview
Our framework meets all the requirements listed in Section 5.2.2 and in particu-
lar solves the problem of bootstrapping the necessary security associations. Our
proposal is fully compatible with the IEEE 802.11s standard, PHY and MAC layer
agnostic, and can easily be implemented on off-the-shelf hardware.
To address R1, we propose to use a key-generating EAP-method for mutual
authentication between any joining nodeN1 and the AAA server. Revoking compro-
mised nodes (R2) can easily be achieved by revoking the respective AAA credentials.
During the EAP authentication two keys are generated at the AAA server and the
client, the Master Session Key (MSK) and the Extended Master Session Key (EMSK). As
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EMSK
rTK
TEK TIK
rKDK
MSK-L1
rPAK
PAKID
Figure 5.2: The FSASD key hiearchy derived from the EMSK.
in 802.11i, the MSK is used to establish a security association between N1 and its
NAS for (multicast) link layer protection with CCMP (supported by 802.11s devices).
In addition, N1 and its NAS establish a Group Master Session Key (GMSK) to protect
link layer broadcasts. As a consequence, broadcast messages sent through the entire
network are hop-by-hop protected on the link layer based on the consecutive keys
on each wireless link.
The second key - the EMSK - is used as root in a hierarchy of keys illustrated
in Figure 5.2. From the EMSK we derive the Root Traffic Key (rTK) from which an
Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) security association (containing a Traffic Encryption
Key (TEK) and a Traffic Integrity Key (TIK)) is derived. If later N1 acts as NAS, these
keys are used to protect the authentication traffic between N1 and the AAA server
by using IPsec (R4).
The two remaining keys Root Peer Authentication Key (rPAK) and Root Key Derive
Key (rKDK) of the key hierarchy are used for authentication and key derivation dur-
ing bootstrapping the security associations required to meet R5, R6, and R7. For this
bootstrapping we propose the 3-Party Handshake for Sequential Deployment (3PHSD)
as detailed in Section 5.2.5. During the 3PHSD protocol any already authenticated
nodeA can initiate the establishment of a security association with any other already
authenticated node B. The nodeA and the AAA server derive the key MSK-L1 from
the shared rKDK and the AAA server securely transfers this key to node B by
leveraging the IPsec security association that has been bootstrapped during its
authentication.
Note that our framework concentrates on protecting the communication within
the WMN. Protecting traffic that leaves the WMN via a MG and is destined to
the Internet or other networks is out of scope of our framework. The MG that is
used for Internet connectivity can also listen on outgoing communication if the
traffic is not secured otherwise, e.g., by Transport Layer Security (TLS) to a host
on the Internet. This is not a severe restriction, since MRs and MGs are devices
of the network operator, which are expected to behave correctly. Of course, this
assumption becomes obsolete if such a device is captured or compromised by an
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attacker.
5.2.4 Key Derivation
The root of the key hierarchy is the EMSK, a key of at least 64 bytes in length
which must be exported by any key-generating EAP method [ASE08]. The keys
that are subsequently derived from the EMSK are cryptographically separated. In
the following we describe the key derivation process and length of the derived keys
(cf. Table 5.1).
We use the Key Derivation Function (KDF) PRF+ specified in RFC 5996 [Kau10],
which can be based on any keyed cryptographic hash function. In our framework
we use HMAC-SHA-256 as default. In addition to the EMSK, PRF+ takes a string
indicating the key type, a salt, and the length of the output as input and gener-
ates cryptographically independent key material of the desired length (cf. Equa-
tion 5.1). This KDF suits our goal of key derivation from the EMSK best, since it
generates 8160 bytes of cryptographically independent key material. It is efficiently
computable and can be implemented for use with different cryptographic hash
functions. Moreover, it is possible to use additional input and salt in addition to the
EMSK.
KEY = PRF(EMSK||Name||0x00||Salt||Length) (5.1)
If the required key length is unknown at the time of key derivation, the length
of the key can be set equal to the length of the EMSK. The TEK and TIK are both
256 bits long. The rPAK, the rKDK and the MSK-L1 are all 64 bytes long.
All keys in the key hierarchy can be configured with a lifetime. The lifetime of
each key is ultimately limited by the lifetime of the key it has been derived from, i.e.,
TEK, TIK, rKDK, and PAK must be replaced if the EMSK is refreshed. The EMSK is
refreshed only during a full EAP authentication. As the MSK-L1 is derived from
the rKDK, it may have a lifetime shorter than the lifetime of the EMSK if rKDK’s
lifetime is shorter.
PAKID
We now introduce the so-called Peer Authentication Key ID (PAKID). It is a temporary
identifier linked to the rPAK of a node and it is used by our protocols, e.g., 3PHSD.
The purpose of the PAKID is to preserve the identity privacy of MCs. Instead of
using the MAC address or other long-term identifiers, we use the PAKID.
It is used by the AAA server to map a specific rPAK to the respective node.
This mapping is necessary since the AAA server needs to select the correct rPAK to
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Key Type Key Length Key Purpose
Extended Master Session
Key (EMSK)
>64 bytes The root of the key hierarchy
is exported by key-generating
EAP methods and is only
available at the EAP server
and EAP peer.
Root Traffic Key (rPAK) 64 bytes Derives traffic protection
keys.
Traffic Encryption Key
(TEK)
>128 bits, default
256 bits for AES-
CBC
Bootstraps confidentiality be-
tween future NAS devices
and authentication server.
Traffic Integrity Key
(TIK)
>256 bits, de-
fault 256 bits for
HMAC-SHA-256
Bootstraps integrity and au-
thentication between future
NAS devices and authentica-
tion server.
Root Peer Authentication
Key (rPAK)
64 bytes Authenticates the token of a
peer in a three-party protocol.
Key Derive Key (rKDK) 64 bytes Derives fresh keys for the EAP
client and the new authentica-
tor.
Master Session Key Level
1 (MSK-L1)
64 bytes Provides a fresh MSK to the
parties in 3PHSD.
Table 5.1: The various key types, key lengths & purposes used in FSASD.
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authenticate and en-/decrypt protocols messages.
PAKID = HMAC-SHA1-256(rPAK, “PAK Name“||User-Name||“auth“) (5.2)
Equation 5.2 defines the generation of the PAKID. The rPAK shared between
any node and the AAA server is used to key the SHA1-based Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication Code (HMAC). Additionally, a label is supplied along with the long
term user name of the node and the use case of the ID. As such, the PAKID serves as
a temporary Unique Identifier (UID) during the protocol runs of 3PHSD in single- and
multi-operator scenarios. Thus, intermediate, possibly untrusted or compromised
nodes cannot deduce long term identities of other nodes by overhearing the PAKID.
The lifetime of the PAKID is limited by the lifetime of the rPAK.
Multi-Operator Considerations
The introduction of the generic key hierarchy easily allows to include a multi-
operator concept. Keys that are generated in a specific WMN or a sub-domain, are
Domain Specific Root Keys (DSRKs) according to RFC 5295 [SDNN08]. They must
only be used in a specific domain of either a network or a specific operator. To
support roaming and authentication delegation a Domain Specific Key Hierarchy may
be used. In this case, so called Domain Specific Usage Specific Root Keys (DSUSRKs) are
derived from a DSRK. How we extend the FSASD concept to a scenario supporting
multiple operators will be shown in detail in Chapter 6.
5.2.5 3-Party Handshake for Sequential Deployment
This section describes the 3PHSD protocol. The goal of 3PHSD is to allow any
two already authenticated nodes A and B participating in the WMN to establish a
security association with each other (R6). In particular, 3PHSD can be used to set
up an IPsec Security Association (SA) between MC and MG (to meet R5).
The performance evaluation of the protocol can be found in Section 5.5.3.
In accordance to Section 5.2.3 we use the following notations:
. A,B,S : Identity of Peer A, Peer B, and AAA Server S
. rPAKAS : Peer Authentication Key between A and S
. MSK-L1 : Resulting pairwise key between A and B
. {x}k : x encrypted by key k
. NA, NB, NS : Nonce of A, B, and S
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SA B
(M1) PAKIDA, {NA, tA, B}rPAKAS
(M2) PAKIDA, {NA, tA, B}rPAKAS , NB
Derive MSK-L1
(M3) {NA, NB, NS, A, B}rPAKAS , MSK-L1
(M4) {NA, NB, NS, A, B}rPAKAS
Derive MSK-L1
Figure 5.3: The message flow of the 3PHSD protocol.
. tA : Timestamp of A
. PAKID : Temporary ID (cf. Section 5.2.4)
. {NA, tA,B}PAKAS : Token 1
. {NA,NB,NS,A,B}PAKAS : Token 2
A 3PHSD protocol run consists of four messages shown in Figure 5.3. Message
M1 contains the identity of Peer A and Token 1 authenticated and encrypted by
the rPAKAS shared between Peer A and S. Token 1 contains a nonce of Peer A,
a timestamp, and the identity of Peer B. In Message M2, Peer B sends M1 and a
nonce NB to S. As B is already authenticated, the communication between B and
S is protected by IPsec (cf. Section 5.2.6). Server S can authenticate and decrypt
Token 1 based on rPAKAS. Using a key derivation function with the rKDK shared
between Peer A and S as key input and the nonces and identities of Peers A and B
as salt, S now derives the MSK-L1, which will be the shared secret of Peer A and B
(cf. Equation 5.3).
MSK-L1 = HMAC-SHA1-256(rKDK, “3PHSD“||NA||NB||NS) (5.3)
In Message M3, S directly sends the MSK-L1 to Peer B, along with Token 2
authenticated and encrypted by rPAKAS. Peer B is now in possession of the MSK-
L1. The MSK-L1 is not sent in plain, but protected by the IPsec connection between
Peer B and Server S. Message M4 is sent from Peer B to Peer A and contains Token
2 which B has received in MessageM3. Peer A can now authenticate and decrypt
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Token 2 and use its contents to generate the MSK-L1 using the rKDK as key input
and the nonces and a key label as salt.
After both Peer A and Peer B are in possession of the MSK-L1, they can use it as
a basis to establish a security association.
Differences to 3PFH. Relying on FSASD, i.e., the key hierarchy and the IPsec
SAs that are automatically bootstrapped during network deployment, our protocol
cannot only be used for handover as originally proposed, but also in a more general
sense, i.e., bootstrap a pairwise key between arbitrary authenticated nodes with the
help of our key hierarchy.
3PHSD only uses encrypted tokens for the messages that are sent between
the initiating peer and the AAA-server. Other messages, i.e., Remote Dial-in User
Service (RADIUS) messages, are encrypted and integrity protected by the IPsec SA
that is already in place (cf. Section 5.2.3). The token of the first peer and the RADIUS
message are bound together by the integrity algorithm of IPsec. EAP messages in
3PHSD are not limited to the 802.11 MAC layer as in the original proposal by Marin-
Lopez et al. [MLOPG10], but may also be sent on top of an IP protocol representing
an alternative EAP lower layer, e.g., Transport Control Protocol (TCP), stream control
transport Protocol (SCTP), or User Datagram Protocol (UDP).
We envision two ways 3PHSD can be initiated, the first one being at the time
of wireless association of a new device, e.g., MC or MR. The second way is to send
3PHSD messages via an alternative EAP lower layer to another peer, which becomes
necessary if the participants are not in direct radio range. For this purpose we im-
plemented two alternative EAP lower layers on UDP and SCTP (cf. Section 5.5).
This is of particular relevance in bootstrapping security associations between MCs
and MGs. Since traffic of MCs will typically leave the WMN via the MG, the traffic
traversing multiple hops has to be sufficiently secured from attacks of intermediate
nodes. Therefore, 3PHSD is used to bootstrap a shared symmetric key between
a MC and a MG, which can be used by IPsec. This makes an additional Internet
Key Exchange Protocol (IKE) handshake obsolete, as the key can be directly used
after 3PHSD completes. It is possible to use 3PHSD as the MG must be authen-
ticated before it can act as such, thus yielding the proposed key hierarchy. MCs
running 3PHSD with the MG are also already authenticated, thus the MCs are also
in possession of the proposed key hierarchy.
In addition, using 3PHSD along with FSASD conveniently enables to dynami-
cally integrate more MGs into the WMN. MCs are only required to discover newly
added MGs in the WMN, however, this is out of scope of this work.
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5.2.6 Network Deployment
Our framework assumes a sequentially deployed WMN, i.e., nodes are dynamically
added to the network while some are already present. In this section we describe
how the different types of nodes are deployed. This section elaborates on the
resulting network deployment phases that have been divided into three phases:
Gateway-, Mesh Router-, and Mesh Client-Phase.
Mesh Gateway Deployment
In the gateway deployment phase, the AAA server and the MG are set up. We
differentiate two scenarios, namely the MG being co-located with the AAA server
and the opposite case. In the first case, setting up security associations between the
MG and the AAA server is obsolete as they are co-located. In the second case, the
MG is authenticated using EAP, thus generating the key hierarchy of FSASD. In
particular, this bootstraps an IPsec security association between the MG and the
AAA server.
Mesh Router Deployment
A newly deployed MR connects to the WMN via some already deployed NAS, and
is authenticated to the network using EAP. Once the new MR, in the followingMR1,
is authenticated, the keys defined in our key hierarchy (cf. Section 5.2.3) are present
at bothMR1 and the AAA server. In particular,MSKMR1 is generated at bothMR1
and the AAA, and EMSKMR1 along with the derived keys, i.e., TEKMR1 , TIKMR1 ,
rTKMR1 , rPAKMR1 , and rKDKMR1 . The PMK derived from theMSKMR1 is used in
the 802.11i 4-way handshake betweenMR1 and the NAS it is associating to. Once
the IEEE 802.11 4-way handshake succeeded, link layer encryption and integrity
protection CCMP are enabled between MR1 and the NAS. Next, the multi-hop
connection from MR1 to the AAA server is secured by bootstrapping IPsec with
the TEKMR1 and the TIKMR1 for encryption and integrity protection. Any other
device (MR2 or some MC) connecting toMR1 acting as NAS will benefit from this
IPsec connection, as the authentication traffic generated by EAP will be secured
over multiple wireless hops fromMR1 to AAA.
Mesh Client Deployment
The client deployment is similar to that of routers, as clients authenticate to the
network using EAP as well. The NAS which the client connects to is already con-
nected to the network and therefore IPsec between the NAS and the AAA server, is
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already enabled. As a result, EAP traffic of the client connecting to the network will
be protected between the NAS and the AAA server. After the client has successfully
associated to the network, it generates the key hierarchy based on the EMSK.
Using 3PHSD, MCs can now bootstrap a security association for an IPsec tunnel
connection to the MG. Thereby, all traffic generated by the MC and destined to the
Internet and other networks is protected throughout the WMN and cannot even be
deciphered or manipulated by corrupted MRs in the WMN. Note that an additional
IKE handshake is not necessary as 3PHSD (cf. Section 5.2.5) yields a shared secret
key that can directly be used on the IPsec tunnel connection.
5.3 FSASD-Authenticator
As the performance evaluation in Section 5.5 shows, the distance between the join-
ing node and the node which is responsible for authentication and authorization
is the decisive performance factor. In the case of EAP-Tunneled Transport Layer Se-
curity (EAP-TTLS), this is the distance between Peer and AAA server. Considering
3PHSD, we refer to the distance between Peer A and Server S. While performance
optimization is not of immediate importance for 3PHSD when being used to estab-
lish security association between an MC and the MG, it matters significantly in the
handover scenarios. If the distance between the MC and the AAA server can be
reduced, the overall runtime of the protocol will decrease.
For this purpose we propose the so called FAU. It is a new logical component
whose purpose it is to reduce the distance between the parties of the protocols
and the AAA server. The FAU has similar capabilities as the AAA server, i.e., it
can generate and distribute keys for specific use cases. In a WMN with an inherent
hierarchical structure several FAUs may exist, thus, dividing the network into logical
sub-domains.
As Figure 5.4 shows, the AAA server represents the top level of the hierarchy
of FAUs. The other FAUs are co-located with MRs. It must be ensured that such an
MR provides the same security properties as the AAA server since it stores keying
material for many nodes. A FAU has two tasks:
(1) Storing duplicates of the keys of the FSASD key hierarchy
(2) distributing subsequently derived keys, e.g., Pairwise Master Keys (PMKs) in a
handover context, to the corresponding target node.
FAUs may be in possession of keys that were generated by the AAA server. If
a FAU is co-located with an MR it needs to obtain the keys from the AAA server
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Figure 5.4: Dividing a WMN into logical FAU Sub-Domains using the AAA server as
the top level controller.
over the network to the FAUMR in a secure fashion. Recall that each node in the
network was authenticated using an EAP method which derived the FSASD key
hierarchy (cf. Figure 5.2). Thus, the communication between the FAUMR and the
AAA server is secured by IPsec using the TIK and the TEK. The rPAK shared
between the FAUMR and the AAA sever could also be used to securely transport
messages between both. Based on this security association, secure key distribution
to the FAUMR is possible.
Each FAUMR manages only the keys needed by the nodes in its sub-domain. If
the FAUMR is currently not in possession of a required key, it forwards the request
to the AAA server which possesses the necessary keys. Thus, it is possible to define
a minimal set of keys necessary at the FAU to enable specific services.
5.3.1 FAU Key Hierarchy Extension
In order to fully exploit the potential of the extensible key hierarchy of FSASD, we
now extend it to enable FAU support. Figure 5.5 shows the extended key hierarchy.
As previously explained, the EMSK is the root of the hierarchy. Since introducing
the FAUs effectively splits the WMN into several logical sub-domains, we create
keys bound to a specific FAU domain.
This means that the SAs a node shares with the AAA server are based on the
root keys, i.e., those on the first and second level of the key hierarchy (red). The
root Traffic Key (rTK) is used to derive the TIK and TEK for the IPsec SA between
the node and the AAA server. Next, the root Key Derive Key (rKDK) is used to
derive further keys, i.e., the FAU Domain Root Keys (FDRKs) which is specific to a
FAU domain. The root Peer Authentication Key (rPAK) is used for bootstrapping of
further security association which involves the node and the AAA server.
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Figure 5.5: The FSASD key hierarchy extended such that FAU support is enabled.
FDRKi = KDF(rKDK, key_label||fau_id||IPFAUi) (5.4)
Each FDRK represents the root of a key hierarchy which is specific to the current
FAU domain such that FDRKi 6= FDRKj for different FAUs i 6= j. Its key derivation
is shown in Equation 5.4. In order to bind the FDRK to a specific FAU during key
derivation, we use the fau_id which corresponds to a Network Access Identifier (NAI)
and its IP address as other devices need to be able to address the FAU. The FDRK is
unique for each (FAU,$node) tuple as each node has a unique rKDK.
MRs need to be to able to bootstrap an IPsec SA to the FAU of the domain they
are located in. After their authentication with the AAA server they generate the key
hierarchy and derive the corresponding FDRK. Using this key they subsequently
derive the root Traffic Key for this FAU domain, rTKFDi , and the respective traffic
keys to be used with IPsec (blue). Thus, key transport between FAU and MRs is
secured in the same way as key transport between the AAA server and the MRs.
The PMKDKFDi (black) is a key which is used to derive further PMKs.
The PAKFDi (green) is the Peer Authentication Key (PAK) to be used in FAU
domain i for the same purposes as the rPAK is used in the super-domain, i.e., to
bootstrap SAs during which the FAU is involved, or to encrypt and authenticate
protocol messages.
5.3.2 FAU Bootstrapping & Mobility
We now show how nodes can bootstrap a FAU. This involves determining the
current FAU which is responsible for the region the node currently resides in, and
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Figure 5.6: The security associations in a FAU-enabled WMN. The colors used corre-
spond to Figure 5.5.
to generate the respective key according to the key hierarchy shown in Section 5.3.1.
Nodes can determine the responsible FAU by overhearing the beacon (cf. Sec-
tion 2.3) of the MR they currently connect to. Once a node has determined the
FAU-ID and the FAU IP address of FAUi, it can generate the FDRKi (cf. Equa-
tion 5.4). Additionally, relevant keys can now be derived according to the key
hierarchy shown in Section 5.3.1.
FDRKs are pushed to the FAUs by the AAA server once the EAP authentication
of a node finishes and also whenever a EAP session times out or is refreshed. The
FAU can now derive further keys according to Equation 5.1 by replacing the EMSK
with the FDRK. Now the FAUs are ready to bootstrap additional SAs with other
nodes using 3PHSD. Depending on the deployment setup, an authenticating node
may indicate the responsible FAU to the AAA server during its EAP authentication,
e.g., using EAP-TTLS Attribute Value Pairs (AVPs). After that, the AAA server pushes
the requested FDRK to the corresponding FAU.
Changing the FAU domain is just as simple as its bootstrapping process. If
at some point it becomes necessary for a node to change from the domain of
FAUi to that of FAUj, the node needs to bootstrap the FAU of the new domain.
The responsible FAU of the other FAU-domain can be recognized by parsing the
wireless beacons, the node can simply generate the corresponding FDRKj used in
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the new domain.
5.4 Security Analysis
This section presents a security analysis of our proposed framework FSASD. We
discuss the security requirements and the overall achieved goals, i.e., confidential-
ity, integrity, authenticity, availability, and replay protection. As Marin-Lopez et
al. [LPGBHGS10] we also use AVISPA [Vig06] to formally evaluate the security of
the 3-Party Handshake for Sequential Deployment (3PHSD).
We also cross check the recommendations of Request For Comments (RFC)
4962 [HA07] “Guidance for AAA Key Management” against our security archi-
tecture and our newly proposed protocols. It thus fits very well to the context of our
protocols. The RFC belongs to the “Best Current Practices” category and describes
conditions that a AAA protocol or a collection of protocols from which one of them
is an AAA protocol should satisfy.
5.4.1 Key Management
Table 5.2 summarizes the security features and mechanisms FSASD provides and
how these relate to the security requirements R3-R7 (see below). Recall that R1
(mutual authentication between any joining node and the AAA server) is met by
using an adequate EAP method. R2 (revocation of compromised nodes) is enabled
by revoking the AAA credentials of a node.
Note that FSASD (while not using FAUs) never reveals any keying material to
any MR or routing MC except the keys deployed by these nodes themselves. In par-
ticular, FSASD does not leak any keys to compromised MRs or curious/malicious
routing MCs. All keys transported from the AAA server to a node in the WMN (e.g.
MSK-L1 in 3PHSD and PMK during EAP authentication) are protected by IPsec.
R1 Prevent unauthorized nodes from joining the network
R2 Allow for convenient revocation of compromised nodes
R3 Confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection of each direct (single-hop)
wireless link & local broadcast
R4 Confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection between NAS and AAA
R5 Confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection between MC and MG
R6 Confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection between any two nodes in the
WMN wishing to communicate with each other
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R7 Fast and secure re-authentication during handover
A compromise of session keys does not compromise any longer-term keys. All
lower-level keys in the proposed key hierarchy, are derived from a higher-level
key with the help of a cryptographic hash function (HMAC-SHA-256). Therefore it
is not possible to compute any higher-level key from a compromised lower-level
key [RS04].
Compromise of session keys does also not compromise future or past session
keys (forward secrecy). This is due to the fact that upon any EAP authentication a
fresh EMSK is generated such that all keys generated from the EMSK are also fresh.
5.4.2 FSASD Authenticator
In this section we discuss the security consideration of the FAU nodes.
A FAU can be considered special in the sense that it does store key material not
only for itself, but also for other nodes. Thus, the FAU is a mixture between an AAA
server and a MR. As we consider the AAA server to be secure and thus, sufficiently
hard to compromise, but the MR untrusted and more easy to compromise, the FAU
requires a careful analysis.
First of all, we require the FAU to be installed in areas which make it hard to
physically compromise the node, especially in contrast to regular MR which may
for instance be installed on street lights. The system security of a node acting as a
FAU should also be of better quality than that of regular MRs.
The keys stored by FAUs are of short term nature, i.e., they time out and will
be refreshed no later than the time out of the EAP session of a node. At this point,
the AAA pushes new FDRKs to the FAUs. Key transport between AAA server and
FAU is secured by an IPsec SA, which according to the FSASD deployment, has
previously been bootstrapped after the authentication of the FAU node itself.
In contrast to the AAA server, important long term identifiers, i.e., user names
and passwords used during the EAP authentication are not stored on the FAU.
Compromising a FAU affects only its specific domain as only FAU-domain
specific keys are stored.
For instance, impersonation of nodes which are currently requesting a handover
is possible, which, however, is the same as for the AAA server. Consider a FAU
attempting to impersonate a node that has just requested a handover. For successful
impersonation, the FAU needs to change its MAC address to the nodes it attempts
to impersonate and use the corresponding PMK during the 4-way handshake
with the handover target. However, eavesdropping and subsequently breaking
confidentiality on the link layer is impossible, since the established handover keys
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are explicitly confirmed during the 4-way handshake which in turn establishes new
transient session keys to be used on the link layer. For a successful attack, also the
4-way handshake needs to be captured by the attacker.
5.4.3 3-Party Handshake
In this section we discuss the security properties of 3PHSD.
When the MSK-L1 is sent from the AAA server to B its confidentiality and
integrity is protected by the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) connection
between the AAA server and B. M2 and M3 are replay protected by IPsec in the
same way. The AAA server S can detect a replay of Token 1 (cf. Figure 5.3) based
on tA. A can detect replay of Token 2 based on the previously committed nonce
NA. During 3PHSD A and B are authenticated by the AAA server S: B indirectly
via the IPsec connection and A by rPAKAS. Bwill always receive the same MSK-L1
from the AAA server Swhich Awill compute, since they are both generated from
the same nonces and identities. A compromise of the MSK-L1 does not allow to
compute any other shared keys, since it is derived from the rKDK. Thus, 3PHSD
meets the same security goals as the 3-party protocol originally proposed by Marin-
Lopez et al. [LPGBHGS10] with one exception: token replay can only be detected
by the party for which the token is destined and not by the party that forwards it to
its intended destination. This, however, only slightly delays the detection of replay
as it is shifted to another host.
We also performed a formal analysis of 3PHSD using AVISPA [Vig06], a auto-
matic protocol verification tool. It proves that the following specified security goals
are achieved:
. confidentiality of the sent MSK-L1;
. authentication of the messages between A and S, as well as B and S;
. Swill only send the MSK-L1 to B if B and A are correctly authenticated;
. Token 1 (destined for S) is replay protected, Token 2 (destined for A) is replay
protected;
. and bothM2 andM3 are replay protected as well.
Note that 3PHSD differs from the original protocol of Marin-
Lopez [LPGBHGS10] in the following way: The sequence numbers are replaced
by timestamps as we assume loose time synchronization between all network
nodes. In M2 of the original protocol, Peer B sends its nonce NB and a hash of
Peer A’s identity in an authenticated token to S. In our 3PHSD this encryption and
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Comm. Pattern SA bootstrapped by Secured by
single-hop (R3) EAP based on CCMP using keys
MR↔MC, MG, MR AAA credentials derived from MSK
single/multi-hop (R4) EAP based on IPsec using
NAS↔AAA AAA credentials TEK and TIK
multi-hop (R5,R6) 3PHSD based IPsec using keys
MC↔MC, MG, MR on rPAK derived from MSK-L1,
derived from rKDK
Broadcast (R3) EAP based on CCMP using GMSK
MC, MG, MR→* AAA credentials derived from MSK
handover (R7) 3PHSD based CCMP using keys
MC↔new NAS on rPAK derived from MSK-L1,
derived from rKDK
Table 5.2: Protected communication patterns in a WMN secured by FSASD.
the hash are not necessary as the connection between B and S is encrypted and
authenticated by IPsec. Similarly, the transfer of the key MSK-L1 from server S to
Peer B in message M3 of our 3PHSD does not have to be explicitly encrypted as the
communication between Peer B and S is protected by IPsec. In addition to reducing
the overall message size, we thus reduced the number of cryptographic operations,
i.e., one less hash operation and two less encryptions in 3PHSD without sacrificing
security.
5.4.4 Summary
In terms of RFC 4962 [HA07], “Guidance for AAA Key Management”, we draw the
following conclusion:
. Cryptographic algorithm independence is achieved as we rely on EAP and
only require the EAP method to be key generating, which does not depend on
specific cryptographic algorithms. This is also true for the IPsec connections
between MRs/MGs and the AAA server. Algorithm independence can also
be achieved for 3PHSD by replacing encryption and hashing mechanisms.
. Strong fresh session keys are provided by EAP and specifically by our exten-
sible key hierarchy. The keys are bound to the lifetime of the EAP session and
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are cryptographically separated. Brute force attacks on any key generated by
the hierarchy or 3PHSD are infeasible as all keys are of sufficient length.
. Key scope is defined for all generated keys, either those generated by EAP, as
well as all keys generated by our extensions. For instance, the rTK is specif-
ically used to generate the rTEK and rTIK used for the IPsec connections
between MRs/MGs and the AAA server.
. Replay protection for key delivery is achieved by EAP itself, as well as by
IPsec.
. Authentication and authorization of all parties is based on the EAP method.
As for establishing the IPsec connections, the involved parties are implicitly
authenticated by the key used on this connection. Non-authenticated parties
cannot send valid packets. After authentication, all involved parties are implic-
itly authorized by key possession. In 3PHSD, the communication parties are
implicitly authenticated based on the keys using for computing the ciphertext
of the sent packets. Also, key confirmation is implicitly achieved after the
protocol finishes.
. Confidentiality and integrity protection of key material is ensured by the
secure key transport via IPsec between MRs/MGs/MCs and the AAA server.
. Confirming ciphersuits is implicitly built into EAP and IPsec. 3PHSD does
currently not support ciphersuite negotiation.
. Uniquely named keys are achieved for all keys in our key hierarchy.
. Prevention of the domino effect is relevant for the FAUs introduced in Sec-
tion 5.3. Compromising the AAA server obviously compromises all keys. If a
FAU is compromised, the impact is localized to the managed sub-domain of
the FAU. The key in question can only be misused for the lifetime of the EAP
session. Only temporary key material is stored on the FAU, but no long term
credentials. Thus, compromising one FAU neither compromises other FAUs,
nor does it compromise the AAA-server.
. Binding the keys to their context is provided in our key hierarchy by using
a specific key label during key generation.
As can be seen by the security analysis, FSASD offers comprehensive security
and satisfies important goals for AAA based key management solutions. Table 5.2
summarizes the security features of our framework.
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Figure 5.7: EAP-TTLS/PAP runtime with respect to wireless hops and IPsec usage
between the MC and the AAA server.
5.5 Implementation & Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the performance of our implementation of FSASD.
In particular, we evaluate the overhead introduced by FSASD by using IPsec to
protect the RADIUS communication between a NAS and the AAA server during
EAP authentication of a newly joining MR or MC. In addition, we evaluate the
performance of 3PHSD using two different EAP lower layers, namely UDP [Pos80]
and SCTP [OY02].
5.5.1 Implementation
Our proposed security framework is implemented using our testbed described in
Chapter 4. The necessary key derivation functionality has been implemented as a
patch to the freeRADIUS AAA server. Client side changes to derive the FSASD key
hierarchy and subsequently using them for, e.g., IPsec and 3PHSD are integrated
into the de-facto standard WLAN Station (STA) and Access Point (AP) software
wpa_supplicant and hostapd.
5.5.2 Performance of EAP Authentication
Figure 5.7 shows the time required for EAP authentication for different numbers of
hops between the NAS and the AAA server. We measured the authentication time
with IPsec between NAS and AAA server enabled (red) and disabled (blue). The
boxes in the figure represent the lower and upper quartile. The median is marked
by a black bar. Each measurement is labeled with the median and minimum and
maximum are marked by whisker-bars.
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Our experimental results confirm that the duration of an EAP authentication
increases with the distance between NAS and AAA server. In addition, it is impor-
tant to note that protecting the authentication traffic between NAS and AAA server
by IPsec does not significantly increase the overall authentication time.
5.5.3 Performance of 3PHSD
We measured the time required for 3PHSD dependent on the number of hops
between the 3PHSD peers and the AAA server. We implemented 3PHSD as an
EAP method using two different lower layers: SCTP and UDP to transport EAP
messages. Both protocols are simple packet-oriented rather than stream-oriented
as TCP. This allows us to efficiently encapsulate 3PHSD messages into SCTP or
UDP messages. The time was measured by the peer initiating the 3PHSD starting
from sending of the first message, computing and displaying the new MSK until
receiving the fourth message.
The tuples on the horizontal axis of Figure 5.8 represent the distances between
Peer A and Peer B, as well as the distances between Peer B and the Server S. For
instance, 2-3 refers to the distance between Peer A and Peer B being two hops, and
the distance between Peer B and the AAA server being three hops.
The different variations in distance have been chosen to realistically map the
usage scenarios of 3PHSD, i.e., establishing security associations between MC and
MG. In the first scenario, Peer A represents an MC that wants to initiate a handover
to another NAS, Peer B. The distance from the MC to the destination NAS during
the handover can be expected to be less than the distance from the NAS to the
Server S.
In the second scenario (2), Peer A represents an MC that wants to bootstrap a
security association for an IPsec tunnel from MC to MG, i.e., Peer B is equivalent
to the MG. The distance from the MC to the MG can be expected to be longer than
the distance between MG and the AAA server. MCs will typically connect from the
edge of the network. This best corresponds to the tuple 5-2, i.e., 5 hops from the MC
to the MG and 2 hops from the MG to the AAA server.
It can be seen that the overall distance from Peer A via Peer B to Server S has the
biggest impact on the duration of a 3PHSD protocol run. However, larger distances
between Peer A and Peer B have a greater impact on the duration than the distance
between Peer B and Server S. Using 3PHSD with UDP is faster due to the fact that
UDP does not implement a handshake as SCTP does. Also, UDP does not address
reliable delivery of messages.
Compared to the EAP authentication time measured in the testbed, 3PHSD is
faster regardless of using UDP or SCTP as a lower layer for the EAP messages.
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Figure 5.8: 3PHSD runtime using SCTP (red) and UDP (blue).
Using it along with the SCTP lower layer and two hops requires about 85% less
time than a full EAP-TTLS/PAP authentication run.
As seen in this section, EAP-TTLS/PAP authentication requires about 600 ms.
With a distance of five hops between Peer A and Peer B, and Peer B and Server S,
3PHSD still requires 82% less time then a full EAP-TTLS/PAP authentication run.
Using UDP as a lower layer for 3PHSD outperforms EAP-TTLS/PAP by more than
91%, and even still 89% for the five hop scenario.
5.6 Summary & Conclusion
In this chapter we presented FSASD, a novel comprehensive framework for es-
tablishing security associations in sequentially deployed WMNs. Our proposal
overcomes the bootstrapping problem of many other key management proposals
for WMNs including the current standard IEEE 802.11s. As opposed to the standard,
our proposal reduces the influence of compromised MRs on the overall security of
the network to a minimum and protects MCs from curious and malicious routing
MCs. In addition, our framework enables secure and efficient handover of MCs
and MRs based on the new 3PHSD protocol. This protocol is later (cf. Chapter 7)
used to develop and extend our architecture to enable an even more efficient and
practical handover solution. By using the concept of FAUs we are able to lever-
age the hierarchical structure of WMNs, thereby, improving the key management
capabilities especially for handover purposes. Our framework complies to IEEE
802.11s amendment and it is based on well-scrutinized security protocols for link
layer and network layer protection as well as authentication during network access.
Our performance analysis shows that the performance penalty for the added se-
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curity features our framework provides is negligible and that framework is thus
well-suited for direct practical use.
120 Chapter 5. Framework for Sequential Deployment
5.6. Summary & Conclusion 121

C H A P T E R 6
Multi-Operator Extensions
WMNs are often considered to be operated by a single operator which owns the
complete infrastructure nodes and offers connectivity to MCs that are registered
with it. There are, however, a variety of application scenarios that profit from or even
require multi-operator support. The most obvious is the support of roaming clients
as known from mobile telephony networks. Here an MC is not only able to use the
WMN operated by his Home Operator (HO), i.e., the operator it registered with, but
also the WMN of any other Foreign Operator (FO) that has a roaming agreement
with its HO. In addition, there are application scenarios in which the infrastructure
nodes, namely the MRs and MGs, forming the WMN are operated by different
operators. An example for such an application is building automation using WMN
technology in which different companies may be responsible for specific parts or
functions of the building. Also, community networks in which users contribute
their own network equipment require this form of multi-operator support. Finally,
disaster recovery scenarios can highly profit from multi-operator support using a
common mixed infrastructure formed by the network equipment of different first
responder units.
Roaming security in WMNs is quite similar to other wireless networks and
mainly involves the support of authentication and key agreement across different
operators. Adequately protecting mixed infrastructure networks is, however, quite
challenging. In particular, it requires procedures for the secure deployment of
infrastructure nodes across different operators. In addition, mixed infrastructure
networks imply that nodes deployed in the same WMN can differ greatly with
respect to their resilience against attacks. In particular, MRs and routing MCs should
not be considered uncompromisable and trustworthy.
In this chapter we propose a comprehensive security architecture for multi-
operator WMNs supporting roaming clients as well as mixed infrastructures. Our
proposal is a generalization of the single-operator solution proposed in Chapter 5.
However, we considerably extend this proposal to securely support roaming MCs
and secure the deployment of infrastructure nodes across different operators. Our
solution is based on open standards and protects traffic generated by MCs from
insider attackers such as compromised MRs, MRs operated by malicious operators,
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and curious or malicious routing MCs.
The work presented in this chapter has also been published in [EM13].
Outline: After summarizing the related work on multi-operator concepts in Sec-
tion 6.1, we continue in Section 6.2 by discussing our network architecture, security
requirements, and the necessary foundations. After introducing our approach in
Section 6.3 and evaluating its security in Section 6.4, we follow with a performance
discussion in Section 6.5 and conclude in Section 6.6.
6.1 Related Work
Research with specific focus on multi-operator WMNs is rare. In general we can
observe two distinct trends. Identity-based Cryptography (IBC) [BF01] on the one
hand has been a popular concept that is used by many researchers [ZF06, HA10,
SZZF11, WMW12] mostly leveraging the fact of self-authenticating public keys. On
the other hand research [ASE08, BD09] is more focused on multi-domain networks
using standardized protocols.
As for IBC approaches, He et al. [HA10] propose to use IBC for authentica-
tion and key establishment on single hop link layer connections. This effectively
competes with the standardized IEEE 4-way handshake [IEE04a] that is already
successfully used today in IEEE 802.11i [IEE04a]. The authors argue that running
EAP [ASE08] between an MC and the AAA server is too complex and has too much
communication overhead for fast session refresh or handover. The author’s simula-
tions result in a “constant small value” for the distance of a single wireless hop which
is of course also true for the IEEE 4-way handshake. The work in [ZF06] attempts
to map IBC in WMNs in a setup similar to that of the credit card ecosystem by
involving brokers, which are similar to a Certification Authority (CA) in a Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI)-based system. Operators trust common brokers, which enables
clients subscribed to brokers to roam different networks. Wang et al. [WMLW11]
propose to unify identity based encryption and certificate-less signatures in a single
public key context. They focus on MCs and MRs intra-domain and inter-domain
authentication by leveraging trust between operators of different domains. The
work of Sun et al. [SZZF11] leverages the ideas of [ZF06] in a combination with
hierarchical IBC to allow inter-domain authentication (roaming) of clients in Foreign
Networks (FNs).
One of the most prominent approaches addressing multi-operator WMNs using
standardized mechanisms and protocols is the work of Buttyán et al. [BD09]. The
authors focus on MC re-authentication, i.e., a subsequent authentication process
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after a full-fledged authentication run, by delegating the authentication from the
AAA server to the APs. Considering non-trusted MRs, or those placed in physically
insecure locations, authentication delegation can create serious threats for network
operators. Their evaluation shows that running the protocol and its variants on
the single hop connection between MC and AP is obviously faster than a full EAP
authentication run as no interaction with the AAA server is required. On the other
hand our prior work presented in Chapter 5 provides the groundwork for the
research put forth in this chapter. It does so by building on top of the medium
independent EAP protocol suite and by leveraging mechanisms such as IPsec.
In general, the IBC-based mechanisms suffer form the inherent problems of
IBC such as key expiration, non-revocable public keys, the challenge of secure
private key generation and key distribution. As such, securely initializing the
various domains and in turn delivering the parameters to the network devices
remains an unsolved problem. Thus, [ZF06, HA10, SZZF11] and [WMW12] inherit
a bootstrapping-problem.
We solely rely on EAP for all devices, thus, there is no explicit differentiation
between MCs, MRs, and MGs during authentication. We use well scrutinized secu-
rity protocols which are available in current OTS hardware today. Using our WMN
testbed [EHJM13] proves that the often voiced communication overhead is less than
expected, even for complex EAP methods such as EAP-TTLS. By leveraging EAP
our architecture does not suffer from the bootstrapping problem, as all generated
domain specific keys have the purpose to be used to bootstrap additional SAs,
which would otherwise suffer from this very problem. Any devices can be authenti-
cated via other previously authenticated devices, regardless of them belonging to
the same management domain or them being of another operator. Even handover
for MCs as well as for infrastructure components such as MRs is possible while
roaming in an FN.
6.2 System Model and Foundations
This section discusses the network assumptions and model. We also introduce the
necessary key management and key derivation concepts, i.e., domain specific keys,
which are required to understand our proposal.
6.2.1 Network Model
In the following we distinguish two multi-operator scenarios, namely classic separate
networks as in most roaming scenarios. Additionally, we consider mixed networks
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which are a novel concept that has to the best of our knowledge not been considered
thus far in any prior research in this area.
Separated Networks
In multi-operator networks which are fully separate, a single network consists
strictly of infrastructure devices of one specific operator. More specifically, infras-
tructure devices such as MRs, MGs, the AAA server of each network are not neces-
sarily the property of the operator. Additionally, in both of the scenarios MGs, MRs,
and MCs may serve as the point of network attachment, i.e., NAS, for newly joining
MCs or MRs. Figure 6.1 shows an example on the left side. The network is operated
by the operator Red which maintains the MRs, MGs and the AAA server which
may be co-located with a MG. A MC of the operator Blue is currently roaming in
this network.
Mixed Networks
In so-called mixed networks, devices of one operator may not only connect to
devices of the same operator, but also to devices of other operators. We assume a
network consisting of infrastructure devices of multiple operators, either private
and/or commercial. Each operator is assumed to be running his own AAA server,
e.g., at its Home Network (HN). While considering mixed networks, the notions of
HN and FN become somewhat fuzzy. In contrast to a HN which is maintained by
the MC’s home operator, the FN is maintained by a different operator. Therefore,
we define a HN of a device as the network in which its AAA is operated in, even
though the network itself may consist of devices from multiple operators. Thus, for
an infrastructure device being in a FN means being connected to a network where
the local AAA server is not operated by its HO.
Furthermore, we assume MGs not to be co-located with the AAA server, except
for MGs of the local domain. Deploying a AAA server in a FN is not considered as
they store sensitive user data and credentials onto which operators typically enforce
restrictive policies. Figure 6.1 depicts an example of a mixed multi-operator scenario
on the right side. Devices of different operators (Green, Red) are connected to each
other while the blue operator is responsible for running the local AAA server.
6.2.2 Multi-Operator Security Requirements
The wireless multi-hop nature makes WMNs particularly vulnerable to active
and passive external attackers on the wireless links. Attackers may try to gain
unauthorized network access or may try to eavesdrop on or manipulate the traffic
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Figure 6.1: An abstraction of the multi-operator network model used in this thesis.
in the WMNs (cf. Section 3.3). Moreover, we consider MRs and MCs, which may also
route traffic, to be untrusted. These devices may be placed in easily accessible areas
and can therefore be compromised. Consequently, these compromised MRs and
routing MCs may try to eavesdrop on and manipulate the traffic passing through
them. Therefore, MC traffic to and from MGs must be end-to-end protected.
In order to secure multi-hop traffic of MCs (e.g., towards the Internet), an IPsec
security association can be bootstrapped with a MG. Securing multi-hop client traffic
in roaming scenarios in networks with multiple operators can be differentiated into
two sub-scenarios. Securing the traffic between the roaming MC and the MG of
its HN (cf. Section 6.3.2), and securing the traffic between the MC and the MG of
the currently visited FN (cf. Section 6.3.2). Nonetheless, insider threats are relevant
for both scenarios, mixed networks still pose an increased threat as devices from
different operators may not be equally trustworthy. It may for instance be desirable
to secure MC traffic by a VPN-like setup to the MC’s HN instead of using the MG
of the FN if it is not fully trusted.
The same holds true for authentication traffic between a NAS and the AAA
server. It is especially important for MCs that MRs which relay their authentication
traffic to the AAA server have a secure connection. Also, once the MC or MR has
been authenticated, a secure multi-hop connection must be established as the MC
may not trust the local operator, especially not the MRs which may be placed in
physically insecure locations.
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Besides secure authentication and access control for all devices (MRs, MGs and
MCs), hop-by-hop link layer security is required to prevent outside attacks such as
eavesdropping and traffic manipulation. This leads to the security requirements as
presented in Section 5.2.2
To meet R1 and R2 a protocol for mutual authentication between joining nodes
and the AAA server is required (e.g., EAP), as well as a mechanism to exclude
compromised nodes from the network. In order to meet the requirements R3-R7
security associations between the communicating parties must be bootstrapped.
As we will see in this chapter, all these security requirements can be achieved by
extending our single-operator security architecture, which we presented in Chap-
ter 5.
6.2.3 Domain Specific Keys
Domain Specific Keys are an important concept when discussing EAP-based multi-
operator networks. These keys are specific to a domain, i.e., they are generated to
be used in a specific network domain. When an explicit usage for a key is specified,
e.g., to derive a handover key, it is referred to as a Usage Specific Root Key (USRK)
according to RFC 5295 [SDNN08]. They must only be used in the mesh network in
the domain of a specific operator. To support roaming and authentication delegation
in other domains, a so-called Domain Specific Key Hierarchy can be used. In this
case, Domain Specific Usage Specific Root Key (DSUSRK) are derived from a Domain
Specific Root Key (DSRK). RFC 5295 discusses how to derive these keys from the
EMSK.
According to the document, DSRKs or DSUSRKs can “be made available to and
used within specific key management domains” [SDNN08], i.e., from the AAA server
of one domain to the AAA server of another domain. However, the (secure) key
transport between AAA servers (e.g., RADIUS) has not been specified, yet. Recently
Hoeper et al. [HNO10] proposed a method to transport keys used by the EAP re-
Authentication Protocol (ERP) [ZHZ12] (which are DSUSRKs) between different key
management domains. The authors discuss message transport and that it needs
to be secure (confidential, authentic, and integrity protected), however, how the
respective security mechanism are to be bootstrapped is not specified.
Depending on the trust relationship between the domains, the exporting domain
may also chose only to export the DSUSRKs. This effectively limits the allowed
applications of these keys in the FN. However, in the following we assume that a
full domain specific key hierarchy is exported to the FN. This theoretically enables
the FN to generate additional DSUSRKs for specific application scenarios in its
network. As such, the trade-off between flexibility and trust needs to be carefully
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Figure 6.2: The domain specific FSASD key hierarchy for the Operators pi and ψ.
evaluated for each bilateral service agreement between administrative domains.
Note that our proposed security architecture presented in the following sec-
tions is fully functional regardless of the full key hierarchy being exported or only
selective DSUSRKs being exported.
6.3 Approach
Now, we introduce our multi-operator key hierarchy extension allowing secure
deployment of all infrastructure nodes as well as secure and efficient roaming of
MCs. The key hierarchy introduced in Chapter 5 can be extended such that multi-
operator scenarios are supported without sacrificing the original security properties.
In the following we use 〈device〉allegiancelocation to express operator allegiance of a
device and its current location. For instance, MRψpi refers to a MR that belongs to
Operator ψ and is currently located in the network of Operator pi. 〈key〉x refers to a
domain specific key to be used in the Domain x, e.g., rPAKpi refers to the rPAK of a
device that can be used in the Domain pi.
6.3.1 Multi-Operator Key Hierarchy Extension
In Framework for establishing Security Associations for Sequentially Deployed WMN
(FSASD) (cf. Chapter 5) the EMSK is a Root Key. Subsequently derived USRKs such
as the rPAK are used to bootstrap other security mechanisms. As such, the EMSK is
also an USRK, as its sole purpose is to derive the keys on the next level in the key
hierarchy which themselves have a specific purpose.
If we now extend this notion from one single domain to multiple domains, we
need to introduce so-called Domain Specific Keys. As introduced in Section 6.2.3, these
keys are used and valid only in domains specific to their definition. For instance,
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when the key hierarchy is generated for the domain of Operatorψ, a so-called DSRK
needs to be derived from the EMSK. TheDSRKψ (cf. Figure 6.2) now represents the
root of the FSASD key hierarchy for domain ψ. Subsequently derived keys using
DSRKψ are defined for a specific usage and the domain ψ, i.e, they are so-called
DSUSRKs.
The FSASD key hierarchy has been generated by the AAA server of a domain
the authenticating device belongs to. It can for instance export DSRKψ to Operator
ψ, and DSRKpi to Operator pi. In their respective domains, these operators are now
able to generate the Domain Specific Usage Specific Root Keys (DSUSRKs) for their key
management domain (cf. Figure 6.2). The mechanisms that we now propose in the
following assume that the full domain specific key hierarchy is exported to the FN.
6.3.2 Operator-separated Networks
In the following we assume that the network of each operator is deployed accord-
ing to the FSASD security architecture as introduced in Chapter 5. Therefore, all
authentication traffic in each network is confidential, authenticated and integrity
protected. Operators must have a bilateral service agreement in order to allow for
roaming of clients from different operators in their own network. In the next section
we discuss the use case of a client roaming from its HO ψ to a FO pi. Deploying
MCs, MRs and MGs of the same operator works according to the single-operator
FSASD approach presented in Chapter 5.
Client Roaming
A client in allegiance to Operator ψ, MCψ, is roaming in a FN of Operator pi. We
denote such a client as MCψpi . When the client first connects to a NAS (the MR it
associates to) of the foreign domain it initiates a regular EAP authentication. Recall
that we assume the network of both domains ψ and pi to be deployed using FSASD,
i.e., most importantly the authentication traffic is secured by IPsec from the NAS to
the AAA server.
A client of Operator ψ connecting in the FN pi, i.e.,MCψpi involves the following
steps (cf. Figure 6.3):
(1) MCψpi associates to NASpipi which relays the authentication requests to the
RADIUS server, AAApipi.
(2) AAApipi recognizes the request being a roaming device of Operator ψ and
proxies the message [RRSW97] to AAAψψ in the MC’s HN.
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Figure 6.3: Authentication ofMCψpi which is roaming in the FN of Operator pi.
(3) AAAψψ authenticatesMC
ψ
pi , derives FSASD domain specific keys and relays
the response to AAApipi. This also includes exporting the DSRKpi of MC
ψ
pi to
AAApipi.
(5) AAApipi relays the response to NASpipi enabling its mutual authentication be-
tweenMCψpi and NASpipi based on the IEEE 802.11i 4-way handshake.
As the connecting device does not belong to the local domain, the AAA server
of Operator pi will proxy the EAP authentication request to the devices’ Home
Network (HN), i.e., the AAA server of Operator ψ. The decision to which domain
the request needs to be forwarded is based on the NAI [ABE05]. Forwarding the
request from the AAA of one domain to the AAA of another domain must use a
secure connection.
The key transport between RADIUS servers has not been specified, yet. We sug-
gest to use the message specification of Hoeper et al. [HNO10] as neither [RRSW97],
nor [SDNN08] elaborates on secure key transport other than stating that it must be
secure. If the bilateral service agreement between operators includes securing the
connection between their AAA servers (e.g., by using IPsec), we consider this issue
as resolved. However, if this is not the case, we propose that the MGs of cooperating
operators are authenticated by the respective AAA of the other operators in the
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Figure 6.4: Bootstrapping an IPsec SA between the roaming MCψpi and MGψψ of the
MC’s HN.
context of FSASD. As a consequence, the MG of Operator ψ would be able to boot-
strap an IPsec connection with the AAA server of Operator pi based on the TEKpi,
and TIKpi (cf. Figure 6.2) and vice versa. This would resolve the issue of secure
communication between the AAA servers of different operators. The MG is either
assumed to be co-located with a local AAA server, or having been authenticated by
the AAA server and thus having a secure channel to it.
Depending on the trust relationship between the domains, the home AAA server
can choose whether to export the complete domain specific key hierarchy to the
AAA of the other domain, or only export DSUSRKs such as the rPAK. As a result of
this process,MCψpi has been authenticated in cooperation between Operator ψ and
pi. All keys were transported securely whether using wired or wireless technology,
and the link layer security betweenMCψpi and NASpipi has been enabled.
Securing MC Multi-Hop Traffic:MCψpi ↔MGψψ
Suppose the HN is controlled by Operatorψ and a clientMCψpi is currently roaming
in the FN of Operator pi. After the client has successfully been deployed using the
mechanism described in Section 6.3.2,MCψpi can start 3PHSD (cf. Section 5.2.5) with
the MG of its HO, i.e.,MGψψ. Recall that each device the WMN of Operator ψ has
been authenticated using our security framework FSASD and is in possession of
the FSASD key hierarchy.
Also, we rely on the PAKID (cf. Section 5.2.4) as a temporary identifier to allow
the AAA server to identify the messages and to avoid sending long term identifiers
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across the network. This is especially relevant when roaming in an FN.
The message exchange is depicted in Figure 6.4.
M1: PAKIDψMC, {NMCψpi , tMCψpi , MG
ψ
ψ}rPAKψ
M2: M1||MGψψ, NMGψψ
M3: {NMCψpi , NAAAψψ
, NMGψψ
, MGψψ, AAA
ψ
ψ}rPAKψ ,K
M4: {NMCψpi , NAAAψψ
, NMGψψ
, MGψψ, AAA
ψ
ψ}rPAKψ
The first message M1 sent fromMCψpi toMG
ψ
ψ contains a nonce and a timestamp
of the client and the identity of MGψψ. This message is encrypted and integrity
protected by rPAKpi which is a DSUSRK for domain pi and shared betweenMCψpi
and AAAψψ. When MG
ψ
ψ receives M1, it generates and appends a nonce and its
identity and transfers it via the secure connection to AAAψψ as message M2. Recall
that the MG is either co-located with the AAA, or has been authenticated by the
AAA, thus having bootstrapped an IPsec connection based on the FSASD key
hierarchy. The AAAψψ now generates the key K (cf. Equation 6.1), appends it to
the parameters for MCψpi , i.e., the nonces of MC
ψ
pi , AAA
ψ
ψ and MG
ψ
ψ, which are
encrypted and integrity protected by rPAKpi and sends it as message M3 toMGψψ.
It now relays the secured message to MCψpi which can now generate K using the
contents of message M4.
K = HMAC-SHA1-128(rKDKψ, “Home MG“||NMCψpi ||NAAAψψ
||NMGψψ
) (6.1)
This key can now be used to set up a secure multi-hop connection (e.g., an IPsec
tunnel) betweenMCψpi in the network of Operator pi andMG
ψ
ψ of its HO. The result
of the protocol is a VPN-like IPsec connection fromMCψpi residing in the network
of Operator pi, to theMGψψ in its home network of Operator ψ. The MC’s traffic is
kept confidential from all intermediaries in the FN and between both networks.
Securing MC Multi-Hop Traffic:MCψpi ↔MGpipi
Roaming MCs can also use the MG of the FN which they are currently roaming in
(cf. Figure 6.5).
The message flow is similar to the case discussed in Section 6.3.2. Recall that
once MCψpi has been authenticated by the network of Operator pi, the DSRKpi of
MC
ψ
pi is transferred from AAA
ψ
ψ to AAA
pi
pi. As a result, the roaming client now
shares a key with the local AAApipi of the FN, namely rPAKpi. This key enables the
134 Chapter 6. Multi-Operator Extensions
AAApipi
3: Initiate Key Delivery
2: Complete 3PHSD Init
MGpipi NAS
?
pi
4: Complete 3PHSD
1: Init 3PHSD
MC?pi
DSRKpi DSRKpi
Figure 6.5: Bootstrapping an IPsec connection from the roamingMCψpi to an MG of the
FN.
execution of 3PHSD with the gateway MGpipi of the FN. The first message M1 is
secured by encrypting and integrity protecting it using the key rPAKpi which is a
DSUSRK for the Domain pi. M2 betweenMGpipi and AAApipi is secured by the IPsec
security association which has been bootstrapped during the FSASD deployment
(if they are not co-located).
M1: PAKIDpiMC, {NMCψpi , tMCψpi , MG
pi
pi}rPAKpi
M2: M1||MGpipi, NMGpipi
M3: {NMCψpi , NAAApipi , NMGpipi , MG
pi
pi, AAA
pi
pi}rPAKpi ,K
M4: {NMCψpi , NAAApipi , NMGpipi , MG
pi
pi, AAA
pi
pi}rPAKpi
Message M3 is sent after AAApipi has generated K (cf. Equation 6.2). It sends it to
MGpipi along with the encrypted and integrity protected parameters forMC
ψ
pi . Once
MC
ψ
pi has received the parameters in message M4 and has generated the key K, an
IPsec connection securing the multi-hop traffic between MCψpi and MGpipi can be
bootstrapped based on K.
K = HMAC-SHA1-128(rKDKpi, “Foreign MG“ | NMCψpi | NAAApipi | NMGpipi) (6.2)
6.3.3 Mixed-Infrastructure Networks
In the following we assume a FSASD-deployed network of devices of multiple
operators. We now discuss the cases of different devices of the domain of Operator
ψ connecting to the network.
Connecting Mesh Routers
When an infrastructure device connects to a mixed network, it either associates
to a NAS of a different operator, or to one of the same operator. In any case, the
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Figure 6.6: AuthenticatingMRψpi in the domain of Operator pi.
NAS has already been authenticated before, i.e., FSASD security associations can be
assumed, especially those securing authentication traffic between NAS and AAA.
However, to which operator the NAS in question belongs to is relevant. Each
MR serving as a NAS has an IPsec connection to its HO AAA server securing
authentication traffic. For instance, ifMRψpi has an IPsec connection toAAA
ψ
ψ, while
being connected in the FN domain of Operator pi, authentication traffic for devices
belonging to a different operator (e.g., the local Operator pi) must always be relayed
through AAAψψ. As a result, the authentication traffic of a deviceMR
pi
pi is delayed
by the indirection MRψpi → AAAψψ → AAApipi. We therefore argue that any device,
irrelevant of operator allegiance, should bootstrap the IPsec connection securing
the authentication traffic with the local AAA server (in the following AAApipi) of the
present network. Figure 6.6 shows the steps involved to authenticateMRψpi in the
local domain of Operator pi.
On the one hand, authentication requests of devices not belonging to the domain
of Operator ψ have to be proxied by AAApipi to their HO and AAA
ψ
ψ anyway. On
the other hand, authentication requests of devices of Operator pi are thereby not
delayed by traversing through a AAA server of a different operator. In addition, this
behavior is standard compliant to RADIUS which only proxies request of devices
belonging to domains different from its own domain.
Bootstrapping the IPsec security association is based on the DSRKpi (and the
derived keys TEKpi and TIKpi (cf. Figure 6.2)) which AAAψψ exports to AAA
pi
pi for a
connecting deviceMRψpi .
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Connecting Mesh Gateways
Adding more gateways to a WMN increases the overall bandwidth. Particularly
devices for which the hop distance to a possible new gateway is less than the
distance to other gateways profit from decreased latency and increased bandwidth.
The deployment of a new gateway to a mixed network is very similar to the router
deployment discussed in the previous section. For instance, once a gateway, e.g.,
MG
ψ
pi , has been authenticated in the mixed network of the local domain of Operator
pi by the mechanism described in Section 6.3.3, it can easily be integrated. As such,
MGs can bootstrap an IPsec connection based on the DSUSRKs with the local AAA
server; just as MRs do.
Recall that DSRKs are transferred from the gateway’s HN to the local FN. MCs,
irrelevant of operator allegiance, can thus bootstrap an IPsec connection toMGψpi in
operator domain pi. For instance, 3PHSD messages betweenMCψpi and AAApipi can
be secured using their shared key rPAKpi. The messages between MGψpi and AAApipi
are secured by their IPsec connection.
Connecting Mesh Clients
An MC connecting to a mixed network is essentially the same as in the case of
separately operated networks. During association it is irrelevant to which operator
the NAS has its allegiance to, as the NAS will have an IPsec connection to the AAA
server of the local domain. The MC’s authentication traffic is therefore either proxied
by the local AAA to its home domain, or the MC belongs to the local domain and its
authentication traffic is destined for the local AAA anyway. In either case, the MC
generates the FSASD key hierarchy specific to the domain it is currently connected
to. If it is a foreign domain, the DSRKs are exported from the MC’s home AAA to
the local AAA.
Bootstrapping IPsec to a gateway is achieved by running 3PHSD. As discussed
in Section 6.3.3, gateways are authenticated using FSASD and DSRK may be ex-
ported from home to local AAA servers. As the connection between MG and AAA
servers is assumed to be secure in both co-located and non co-located scenarios,
MCs can simply run 3PHSD with MGs regardless of the MG’s operator allegiance.
For instance, in the local domain of Operator pimessages betweenMCχpi and AAApipi
can be encrypted and authenticated based on the shared rPAKpi and messages
betweenMGµpi and AAApipi based on their IPsec connection.
Figure 6.7 shows the authentication of arbitrary devices in a mixed network
scenario in the local domain of Operator pi. All but the requests of devices of
Operator pi have to be proxied to the AAA of the HN of the device.
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Figure 6.7: Authenticating arbitrary devices in the domain of Operator pi.
6.4 Security Considerations
Three important security aspects have to be considered: Deriving and exporting do-
main specific keys, security of separated networks, and security of mixed networks.
The derivation of the DSRKs should be done as defined in [SDNN08] which also
states that DSRKs should not be exported to domains with uncertain authorization,
i.e., rather DSUSRKs should be exported selectively.
Regarding transport from one domain to another requires confidential and au-
thentic key transport. In [HNO10] the so-called Key Distribution Exchange (KDE) is
proposed which aims to specify the transport of domain specific keys in context of
ERP [ZHZ12]. We assume the AAA server and a MG to be either co-located or both
being individual entities. To make use of the key hierarchy that is created during de-
vice authentication, a device, such as a gateway or the AAA server would have to be
authenticated by the operator requiring key transport. The connection MG↔AAA
is secured either by both being co-located, or by the gateway having been authen-
ticated by the AAA server. Thus, we achieve authentic, integrity protected and
confidential key transport from one domain to another.
In the setting of separated networks we only need to consider roaming MCs,
e.g.,MCψpi associating toMRpipi. Authentication traffic from NAS to the local AAA
server is secured by their bilateral IPsec connection. Proxying the MC’s request to
the AAA server of its HN is secured by the secure connection between the two
operator networks.
Once the DSRK, or selected DSUSRKs have been securely exported to the AAA
server of the FN, additional security mechanisms can be bootstrapped. For instance,
the MCψpi can choose to either bootstrap an IPsec connection to a MG of its HN,
or to a local gateway MGpipi of the FN. Compared to using the MG of the HN a
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performance increase will be the result as the traffic does not need to be home-
routed as known from some Mobile-IP scenarios [Per10]. However, the MC multi-
hop connection to a local MG in an FN primarily safeguards the intermediate hops
of the FN, i.e., from insider attackers such as routers and possible other clients of
arbitrary operators. Traffic of MCψpi leaving the gateway of the FN is vulnerable
to eavesdropping by the FO if no additional security measures such as TLS are
used on higher layers. It is thus a trade-off between trust and performance. Link
layer communication between MCψpi and NASpipi is authentic, integrity protected
and confidential based on keys derived during the EAP authentication.
In the mixed-network scenario, export of domain specific key material is se-
cured by the same mechanisms as in separated networks. Authentication traffic
of MCs, MRs, or MGs with allegiance to arbitrary operators in the local domain of
another operator is secured by IPsec between the local AAA server and the NAS
the device is connecting from. The operator allegiance of the NAS is irrelevant to
the authentication process as well as to the connecting device, as each NAS has an
IPsec connection to the local AAA server instead of to the AAA server of the home
operator. Traffic initiated by MCs is secured against untrustworthy intermediaries
by using IPsec to either the MG of the MCs HO, or the MG operated by the local
operator.
6.4.1 Summary
As for the initial single-operator FSASD introduced in Chapter 5, we evaluate our
multi-operator solution in terms of RFC4962 [HA07]:
. Cryptographic algorithm independence remains the same as in single-
operator FSASD. We do not require specific cryptographic algorithms, thus,
they can be replaced if needed.
. Strong fresh session keys are provided by EAP and specifically our extensible
key hierarchy. This is also true for the extension using the concept of DSRKs.
. Key scope is defined for all generated keys, either those generated by EAP, as
well as all keys generated by our extensions. For instance, the scope of keys is
limited to a specific domain and usage (DSUSRKs).
. Replay protection for key delivery is achieved by EAP itself, as well as by
IPsec.
. Authentication and authorization of all parties is based on the EAP method
which is used during roaming, mixed and separated networks. No further
differences to the single-operator FSASD exist.
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. Confidential and integrity protection of key material is ensured by the secure
key transport via IPsec between MRs/MGs/MCs and the AAA server as in
single-operator FSASD, even across domains. Inside a specific domain, the
key transport is equivalently secured as in single-operator FSASD.
. Confirming ciphersuits is implicitly built into EAP and IPsec. 3PHSD does
currently not support ciphersuite negotiation.
. Uniquely named keys are achieved for all keys in our key hierarchy. Keys
being valid in a specific domain are named accordingly.
. Prevention of the domino effect is relevant for the FAUs introduced in Sec-
tion 5.3. Compromising the AAA server obviously compromises all keys. If a
FAU is compromised, the impact is localized to the managed sub-domain of
the FAU. The keys in question can only be misused for the lifetime of the EAP
session. Only temporary key material is stored on the FAU, but no long term
credentials.
. Binding the keys to their context is provided in our key hierarchy by us-
ing a specific key label during key generation. Also a context is created by
introducing the concept of DSRKs.
6.5 Performance Considerations
The performance of FSASD as originally proposed is only minimally affected by
generalizing it to a multi-operator concept. In Section 5.5 we evaluated the EAP
authentication performance in our real-world IEEE 802.11 testbed (cf. Chapter 4)
which included an impact evaluation of using IPsec between the NAS and the AAA
server. Using EAP-TTLS over 1-5 hops from the NAS and the AAA server ranges
roughly from 380ms to 450ms.
In the infrastructure-separated networks (cf. Section 6.3.2) a delay respective to
the latency between the networks of both operators will be added onto the duration
of the first full authentication of a roaming client. As Clancy et al. [BD09], we assume
the added (possibly intercontinental) latency to be roughly 100-300ms [LGS07].
Communication originating in a FN and destined to the HN of the device will
be affected by the increased latency. In particular bootstrapping IPsec between a
roaming MC and the HN. Mechanisms relying on DSRKs exported from HN to
FN, e.g., IPsec from MCs to MGs, or handovers in FN, do not suffer from increased
latency, but will rather profit since communication with the HN is not necessary
after the initial authentication.
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6.6 Summary & Conclusion
In this chapter we proposed the first security architecture for WMNs that provides
comprehensive multi-operator support in commercial as well as in community sce-
narios. Our multi-operator architecture extends our security architecture introduced
in Chapter 5 and supports the secure deployment of all components in a WMN, i.e.,
MRs, MGs, and MCs. These components may be operated by a single operator or
shared by different operators in order to achieve better network coverage and ser-
vice quality. In addition, our architecture enables secure roaming of MCs between
WMNs (with potentially mixed infrastructure). The deployment and management
of network devices is based on EAP, RADIUS, IPsec, and a three party protocol
allowing authenticated devices to bootstrap security associations with other de-
vices, even when roaming to a FN. Compared to a single-operator architecture, our
generalized proposal inflicts only a minimal performance penalty, which is due to
the latency between networks of different operators across the Internet.
For practical purposes it is required to set up a key transport protocol between
AAA domains. Today, the only keys that are transported form a device’s HN to the
NAS of the FN are the PMKs used during the 4-way handshake. As such, the AAA
server must support additional protocols, storage, and management tools to fully
support a multi-operator architecture as proposed in this chapter.
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C H A P T E R 7
Handover Extensions
Mesh Clients (MCs) in a Wireless Mesh Network (WMN) are typically mobile devices
and as such can move from the coverage area of one Mesh Router (MR) to the
next during an ongoing connection such as a Voice over IP (VoIP) call. A handover
procedure ensures that the MC can move from its Current Mesh Router (CMR) to the
Target Mesh Router (TMR) without any disruption of its ongoing connections. The
security challenge of a handover procedure is to ensure that the connection between
MC and TMR can be adequately secured while keeping the delay constraints.
In particular, the keying material required to protect the connection has to be
efficiently established. Running a full authentication (e.g., Extensible Authentication
Protocol (EAP)) via the TMR during handover for this purpose is typically too time
consuming.
While there is no prior work on handover security targeted for WMNs, this
topic has been extensively studied in infrastructure Wireless LAN (WLAN) [Cla08,
CNND08, HNO10, MLOPG10]. However, these approaches share a major short-
coming that renders them hard to deploy to WMNs. They typically transfer keying
material over a wired backbone to the TMR. In a WMN where all connections are
wireless such an approach would obviously leak the transferred keying material
easily, unless the connection between CMR and TMR is protected. The approaches
above assume that keys can be distributed securely.
Two approaches are possible for handover, a proactive and a reactive approach.
In a proactive handover procedure the keying material is allocated to a TMR prior
to the actual handover procedure. In a reactive handover procedure the keying
material is established right after the handover.
In this chapter, we propose three complementary secure, efficient and practi-
cal handover protocols for WMNs. The EAP-TTLS Neighborhood Pre-Authentication
(ENPA), allows to proactively supply candidate TMRs with keying material as part
of the initial EAP authentication of an MC joining the WMN. The other two proto-
cols 3-Party Handshake for Handover (3PHSH) and Neighborhood Pre-Authentication
(NPA) can be run at any point in time after successful authentication of the MC. The
second of these protocols allows several TMRs to be proactively supplied with key-
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ing material but the MC cannot be sure that these TMRs have already received the
keying material at the end of the protocol run. The second protocol has the advan-
tage that an MC initiating the protocol can be sure that the one TMR supplied with
keying material has received it when the protocol terminates. We implemented and
evaluated the three newly proposed protocols in our live WMN testbed (cf. Chap-
ter 4) and integrated them into the de-facto standard WLAN software hostapd and
wpa_supplicant. The results of our extensive performance evaluation are presented
as part of this chapter.
Our handover protocols also easily function in a multi-operator WMN as de-
scribed in Chapter 6. The only requirement is that involved devices, i.e., MC, CMR,
TMR and the Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) server, have a secu-
rity association based on the respective Domain Specific Root Key (DSRK). The details
on handover in multi-operator environments are explained in Section 7.3.5.
The work presented in this chapter has also been published in [EHM13].
Outline: In Section 7.1 we briefly discuss related work on handover security in
infrastructure WLAN and WMNs. Section 7.2 introduces handover related prelimi-
naries. Next, Section 7.3 introduces our handover protocols, while their performance
is evaluated in Section 7.4. After analyzing their security in Section 7.5, we conclude
this chapter with a discussion in Section 7.3.4.
7.1 Related Work
In this section we briefly discuss the most prominent handover mechanisms for
infrastructure WLAN.
Configuration And Provisioning for Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP) [OCK05] was
designed to simplify deployment and management of enterprise WLAN infras-
tructures. The functionality of an Access Point (AP) is split into two components,
i.e., Wireless Termination Point (WTP) and the Access Controller (AC). A WTP im-
plements the Physical Layer (PHY) layer and lower portions of the Medium Access
Control (MAC) layer functionalities. Note, that this includes that a Station (STA) is
able to secure the communication with a WTP on the link layer using standard
IEEE 802.11i [IEE04a] mechanisms. The second component is the AC which imple-
ments the upper portions of the MAC layer, including authentication and access
control features. When a STA moves to another WTP it executes the 4-way hand-
shake [IEE04a] with the AC instead of a full EAP authentication. Subsequently,
the required keys are sent from the AC to the WTP reducing the communication
between the STA and the AAA server which is typically further away. Therefore,
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the ability to perform fast handover in CAPWAP is a side effect of moving the
authentication process to a central component nearby. However, splitting the AP
functionality makes it hard to deploy to standardized devices. Additionally, the
secure key transport between WTPs, ACs and AAA server is not considered for
WMNs where untrusted intermediaries may be present. In CAPWAP several ACs
may exist which control a set of WTPs each. If a STA moves to a WTP belonging to
different ACs, a full EAP authentication is still required. Therefore, CAPWAP does
not necessarily prevent long handover delays.
The EAP re-Authentication Protocol (ERP) [ZHZ12] is a proposed standard of the
IETF. Its purpose is to avoid a full EAP authentication when a STA re-authenticates.
Depending on the EAP-method, multiple round-trips between the AAA server and
the peer may be required. For example, the standard EAP-MD5 [BV98] method
requires at least two round/trips. ERP supports intra- and inter/domain handover.
ERP aims to reduce the handover disconnection time when a STA roams to another
domain and after its first authentication in that domain. However, if deployed
directly in a WMN, the transport of the re-authentication keys is not sufficiently pro-
tected against intermediaries as it is sent in a Remote Dial-in User Service (RADIUS)
message (cf. Section 2.2) which is only protected by MD5 [RRSW97]. Therefore, it
is possible for intermediate, untrustworthy nodes in a WMN to compromise the
handover keys.
The IEEE 802.11r standard [IEE08] delivers a key to the AP to which the STA has
first connected to. On handover this AP derives further keys and distributes them
to the target AP to which the client is moving to. This approach cannot be used
in WMNs since each APs may easily be compromised. In addition, the standard
assumes pairwise keys between the APs to securely transport the handover keys
without specifying how these keys are to be established and distributed.
In [MHSA04] Mi-Ho et al. propose a proactive key distribution to reduce the
re-authentication delay. Keying material is distributed to neighboring APs of the
serving AP. It is assumed that if the STA moves to another AP, it is likely to be one
of the neighboring APs of the serving AP. Note that the AAA server is responsible
for deriving and delivering the keys to the handover destinations. In a WMN the
path from the AAA server to the TMR may contain untrustworthy nodes such that
again this approach cannot be applied to WMNs directly. Also, the authors do not
specify how the AAA server gains knowledge of the movement of the STA from
one AP to another.
The above shows that most handover protocols proposed for infrastructure
WLAN are of reactive nature and are thus only able to achieve a hard handover
which tends to break ongoing sessions. In addition, secure key transport to the
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handover destinations is either not addressed, or not completely solved in prior
approaches. We address these shortcomings by introducing secure, efficient and
practical proactive handover protocols achieving a soft handover.
7.2 Preliminaries
This section discusses handover related preliminaries that are important in this
context. We start by introducing the network assumptions and the key distribution
model. Additionally, we detail the IEEE 802.11 mechanisms that we leverage in
order to create our handover protocols.
7.2.1 Network Assumptions
We assume the network to be operated by a single operator. WMN devices have
been deployed according to Framework for establishing Security Associations for Sequen-
tially Deployed WMN (FSASD), thus sharing the key hierarchy with the AAA server
(cf. Chapter 5). As a result, the AAA server shares an Internet Protocol Security (IPsec)
connection with each MR in the network. This represents a confidential, integrity
protected, and authentic channel. As also the MC shares the key hierarchy with the
AAA server, a secure channel can be established.
7.2.2 Key Distribution
Our proposed handover protocols assume one or more key distribution components
to be present which are responsible for generating the handover key and distribute
them to the requested TMRs of the MC. In coherence with the EAP security model,
all handover keys are generated by the AAA server and the MC. In particular, the
Extended Master Session Key (EMSK) never leaves the AAA server. Confidential,
integrity protected, and authentic key transport from AAA to the TMRs is ensured
using IPsec in all our proposed protocols. The required security association between
the AAA server and the TMR is established when the TMR joins the WMN accord-
ing to the FSASD mechanisms as detailed in Chapter 5. Note that transporting
key material from a AAA server to Network Access Server (NAS) is covered by the
standard use of EAP over RADIUS. However, pro-actively delivering handover
keys to TMRs is not yet addressed by any standard.
We therefore designed and implemented a key transport protocol between the
AAA server and the TMRs, which is used in our new protocols. In this protocol,
the TMRs listen for incoming key deliveries from the AAA server. The IPsec
Security Association (SA) which was created upon the initial authentication of the
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TMR ensures that only authenticated and integrity protected key deliveries can be
received on this connection. Confidential, integrity protected and authentic delivery
of the parameters necessary to generate the handover keys at the MC is ensured by
using the Root Peer Authentication Key (rPAK) of the FSASD key hierarchy.
As the distance between the key distribution component, the TMRs, and the MC
is essential for the performance of the handover protocols, we propose to use the
FSASD Authenticator (FAU) (cf. Section 5.3). The FAU is responsible for generating
and distributing the handover keys to the respective TMRs, just as a AAA server
would. However, as a component it can either be co-located with the AAA server, or
be deployed to multiple MRs of the WMN, e.g., closer to the MCs. If it is co-located
with the AAA server, secure communication between both components is trivial
as it is the same physical entity. Otherwise, secure communication is ensured by
an IPsec SA between the FAU (i.e., the MR it is running on) and the AAA server
which has been bootstrapped during the MR’s authentication (cf. Chapter 5).
Based on the concept of Usage Specific Root Keys (USRKs) [SDNN08] only a
subset instead of the full FSASD key hierarchy is exported by the AAA server to the
FAUs. USRKs are keys that are bound to a specific use, e.g., for the sole purpose of
generating handover keys for MCs. Thus, FAUs could be placed near the networks’
edge, i.e., close to MCs requiring handover services.
7.2.3 IEEE 802.11i PMKSA-Cache
The Pairwise Master Key Security Association (PMKSA) describes a security association
between STA and AP. The Pairwise Master Key (PMK) is used between STA and AP
to carry out the IEEE 802.11i 4-way handshake (cf. Figure 2.5) which generates keys
that are subsequently used to secure the link layer traffic between both parties. The
PMK is stored with context information such as the AP MAC address, the lifetime of
the PMK, and a unique ID called Pairwise Master Key ID (PMKID) (cf. Equation 7.2).
If a STA and AP share a PMKSA, e.g., because the STA was connected to the AP
before, both can use the cached PMK in the 4-way handshake directly [IEE04a]
instead of running EAP to establish a fresh PMK. For this purpose the STA retrieves
the MAC address of the AP from its beacons and sends a (Re-)Association Request
to the STA including the PMKID in the Robust Security Network (RSN) Information
Element (IE) of the request. If the AP determines that it has cached the respective
PMK for the PMKID, it directly starts the 4-way handshake with the STA. Otherwise,
the STA has to run a full EAP authentication which takes significantly longer.
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7.2.4 Vendor Specific Information Element
For implementation purposes we extended the IEEE 802.11 wireless beacon using
a vendor specific IE containing the Internet Protocol (IP) address of the TMR. The
MC can obtain the IP address from the beacon to initiate communication with the
TMR on the network layer. If our protocol would be run in a network environment
in which multi-hop communication on the MAC layer is possible, advertising
the TMR’s IP in the beacons would not be necessary. Instead, the wireless frame
transporting the protocol messages would simply be forwarded by the intermediate
hops to the destination.
Section 2.3 described the IEEE 802.11 wireless beacons and its vendor specific
IE. We use the beacon to define and transport our own IE containing the IP address
of the MR broadcasting its beacon. By retrieving the IPs from the beacon, the MCs
is able to obtain information how to address the MRs on the network layer. In order
to transport the IP address we specify an Organizationally Unique Identifier (OUI)
and include the IP as the content. Note, that this procedure is in compliance with
the IEEE 802.11 standard.
As Section 2.3 has also shown, the standardization efforts of the IEEE have
realized that some services, e.g., handover, STAs in a pre-association state, can profit
by obtaining meta-information of the surrounding stations.
7.3 Handover Protocols
In this section we present our three novel proactive handover protocols for WMNs
with different features, namely the 3PHSH, NPA, and ENPA. We build onto the EAP-
based network deployment strategy introduced in Chapter 5 and the respective
security associations (e.g., IPsec between MRs and the AAA server).
The goal of the protocols is to establish PMKs as known from IEEE 802.11i
(cf. Section 2.3) between the MC and the handover destination TMRs. Once the
MC decides to associate with one of the available TMRs, both can simply use the
established PMK to carry out the 4-way handshake instead of running a full EAP
authentication. Thus, the re-association delay (or handover delay) when moving
from one MR to another can be greatly reduced. Even though our protocols operate
in an EAP-based network deployment, topology management by the AAA server
is not required.
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AAA
CMR
TMR
MC
WMN
Deliver PMKTMR
Augment Request
Request TMR
PMKTMR
Figure 7.1: The general idea of the 3PHSH protocol.
AAATMR1MC CMR
(M1) PAKIDMC||{MACMC, NMC, MACTMR, TS}rPAKMC
||MAC
(M2) M1||NTMR
(M3) M4||MACMC||PMKTMR
(M4){NAAA, NTMR, TS}rPAKMC ||MAC
Figure 7.2: The 3PHSH protocol message flow.
7.3.1 3-Party Handshake Protocol for Handover (3PHSH)
3PHSH is an extension of the three party protocol proposed in Section 5.2.5. In the
context of handover, we adapted the original proposal such that the three parties
are an MC, an MR as the handover target, and the AAA server which is involved
in the handover key generation (cf. Figure 7.2). We assume that both, the MC and
the TMR have been authenticated using EAP according to FSASD (cf. Chapter 5),
i.e., they share a specific set of cryptographic keys with the AAA server which are
essential to securing the key derivation and the key transport.
An MC can initiate the protocol with a specific TMR. 3PHSH consists of the
messages shown in Figure 7.1. Message M1 contains the PAKID which is used by
the AAA server to map a rPAK to a specific MC, as it needs to be able to decrypt
parts of the message. The content is encrypted using the rPAK shared between the
MC and the AAA server. Once the TMR receives M1, it appends a nonce (NTMR)
to the message and relays it to the AAA server via a secure channel, i.e., the IPsec
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PMKTMRn
Request TMR1 , TMRn
Figure 7.3: The general idea of the NPA protocol.
connection established between the TMR and the AAA server, as message M2. After
receiving M2, the AAA server generates the PMK to be shared between the MC
and the TMR (cf. Equation 7.1).
PMKTMR = KDF(rKDK, key_label||NTMR||NAAA
||NMC||MACMC||MACTMR)
(7.1)
The key derivation function (cf. Equation 7.1) is keyed with the rKDKMC,AAA
shared between the MC and the AAA server according to the FSASD key hierarchy
(cf. Figure 5.2). Additionally, a key label is required, as was well as random nonces
of the three parties, and the MAC addresses of the MC and the TMR.
Now the AAA server delivers the encrypted contents needed by the MC for
generating the PMK to the TMR as Message M3. It also appends the PMK and the
MAC address of the MC. The MAC address is used by the TMR as an input to
generate the PMKID (cf. Equation 7.2) which is used to identify the MC and the
PMK to be used during the 4-way handshake. Finally, the TMR only forwards the
encrypted parameters to the MC as Message M4. Now the MC is able to generate
and insert the PMK into its PMKSA-cache [IEE04a]. Based on the PMK and the
corresponding PMKID, the MC can now initiate the 4-way handshake with the
TMR.
PMKID = HMAC-SHA1-128(PMK, key_label||MACTMR||MACMC) (7.2)
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AAA TMR1MC CMR TMRn
PAKIDMC||{MACMC, NMC, TS, IPC, IPTMR1 , IPTMRn }rPAKMC
||MAC
MACMC, PMKTMR1
MACMC, PMKTMRn
{NAAA, TS}rPAKMC ||MAC
Figure 7.4: The NPA protocol message flow.
7.3.2 Neighborhood Pre-Authentication (NPA)
The so-called Neighborhood Pre-Authentication (NPA) protocol is similar to 3PHSH. It
can be triggered anytime by an MC after its authentication. As opposed to 3PHSH,
NPA is able to initialize multiple handover TMRs in a single protocol run. Addition-
ally, the message overhead is reduced by two messages due to directly communi-
cating with the AAA server instead using of the TMR as an intermediary.
Figure 7.3 depicts a protocol run of NPA. In this example the MC’s goal is to
establish PMKs with TMR1 and TMRn which can potentially be used for handover.
An NPA protocol run consists of the messages shown in Figure 7.4. In Message
M1 the MC requests PMKs to be generated by the AAA server for a set of potential
handover TMRs. It includes the relevant parameters to generate the PMKs, i.e.,
the MC’s MAC address, a random nonce and a timestamp of the MC, and most
importantly, the list of IP addresses identifying the TMRs. Those are necessary as
the AAA server needs to be able to address the TMRs for the purpose of delivering
the handover keys. The mentioned parameters are encrypted using the rPAKMC
which is shared with the AAA server. The PAKID is used to map the MC’s identity
at the AAA server.
Once the MC has received Message M2 from the AAA server, it can derive the
PMKs using the provided inputs, as well as the IP address of the respective TMR
(cf. Equation 7.3). Again, as in 3PHSH, the IP addresses of possible handover TMRs
are obtained using the vendor specific IE of the IEEE 802.11 beacon.
PMKTMRi = KDF(rKDK, key_label||MACMC||NMC||NAAA||IPTMRi) (7.3)
The AAA server also sends a message containing the MC’s MAC address and
the individually generated PMK to each TMR requested by the MC. Each TMR
can now generate the PMKID (cf. Equation 7.2) used to map the PMK and insert
152 Chapter 7. Handover Extensions
connecting
WMN
Key generated by EAP-TTLS:
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PMK1 PMK3
Figure 7.5: The general idea of the ENPA protocol.
it into its PMKSA-cache. The MC is now able to use the established PMK during
handover to an initialized TMR by sending the respective PMKID in an association
request. If a mapping is found both can directly start the 4-way handshake. The MC
determines the MAC address of the TMR from its 802.11 beacon.
7.3.3 EAP-TTLS Neighborhood Pre-Authentication (ENPA)
3PHSH (cf. Section 7.3.1) and NPA (cf. Section 7.3.2) are suitable to be run after an
initial authentication of the MC. Thus, we propose another mechanism to initialize
multiple TMRs for handover directly during the initial authentication. Additionally,
ENPA can be run automatically whenever a full EAP authentication becomes neces-
sary, e.g., when the EAP session times out, or the device has connected to another
MR without using a handover mechanism. Figure 7.5 shows the general idea of
ENPA.
ENPA is currently realized as an extension of the EAP-TTLS [PF08] authenti-
cation method. However, it can easily be applied to any other EAP method that
allows the transport of Diameter Attribute Value Pairs (AVPs) [PJE+03]. The AVPs
used by EAP-TTLS and Diameter are syntactically equivalent. Figure 7.7 shows the
AVP format used by ENPA. As in the protocols described in the previous sections,
the MC itself is responsible for specifying for which TMRs handover keys should
be established.
When an MC associates with the network it scans its surrounding and acquires a
number of available TMRs. It also retrieves their IP addresses from the IEEE 802.11
beacon. The MC embeds the IP addresses of the TMRs it chose to prepare for a
potential handover along with its own MAC address. The MC’s MAC address must
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EAP-TTLS Init/AVP: [MACMC||IPMR1 , IPMR2 , IPMRn ]
Derive PMKs
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EAP-TTLS Success: [MR1, MR2, MRn]
Derive PMKs
MACMC||PMKMC,MR2
MACMC||PMKMC,MRn
Figure 7.6: The ENPA protocol message flow.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
AVP Code
VM r r r r r r AVP Length
Vendor/ID (opt)
MC MAC Address . . .
. . . IP Version . . .
. . . IP Address (4 or 16 bytes) . . .
Figure 7.7: The attribute format used by the ENPA protocol.
be used, as it is required by TMRs to generate the PMKID (cf. Equation 7.2) to map
the handover PMK to an associating MC. See Figure 7.6 for the message flow of
ENPA.
PMKTMRi = KDF(rKDK, key_label||IPTMRi ||
tls_client_random||tls_server_random)
(7.4)
The AAA server generates distinct PMKs for each of the embedded IP addresses
received from the MC in the AVP. The key derivation uses the rKDK of the FSASD
key hierarchy, a key label, and the individual IP address of the respective TMR
(cf. Equation 7.4). Additionally, tls_client_random and tls_server_random of the
EAP-TTLS session are used as salt values similar to the nonces in 3PHSH and
NPA. We use these values as they have been exchanged during the Transport Layer
Security (TLS) handshake of the EAP method anyway. Also, it allows us to bind the
key generation to a specific TLS session.
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
MC MAC Address . . .
. . . PMKMRi (256 bit) . . .
Figure 7.8: The PMK format used by the ENPA protocol.
Once the AAA server has generated the PMKs it sends the key, along with
the MC’s MAC address to the TMRs. Note that this particular key transport is
encrypted and integrity protected by an IPsec security association between the
AAA server and the TMR according to FSASD (cf. Chapter 5).
The AAA server sends the necessary key derivation parameters to the MC in an
AVP of the RADIUS-Access-Accept message which marks the end of a successful
EAP authentication. The MC can now derive the PMKs, generate PMKIDs and
insert them into its PMKSA-cache.
Once a handover becomes necessary, the MC simply selects a corresponding
PMK and queries the TMR with the according PMKID used in the association
request. MC and TMR can then carry out the 4-way handshake based on the PMK.
7.3.4 Discussion
The proposed protocols 3PHSH, NPA, and ENPA are each proactive and can be
used at different epochs of a MC’s network connection. Each is able to proactively,
i.e., before it is actually necessary, establish fresh PMKs with TMRs that enable the
MC a fast and efficient association and authentication based on the 802.11 4-way
handshake. ENPA is used at the very beginning of a connection, and can be used
anytime the EAP session is refreshed. 3PHSH and NPA are both post-authentication
protocols, i.e., they are to be used after an initial network association and EAP-
authentication. NPA being more efficient in terms of the communication overhead
allows to prepare multiple TMRs for fast handover of MCs, whereas each 3PHSH
protocol run bootstraps a single handover destination while offering TMR consent.
The message overhead of 3PHSH is 4 × n, and 2 + n respectively for NPA
where n is the number of TMRs for which PMKs are requested. Using ENPA is
not considered to be time critical, as MCs will associate with the CMR after EAP
authentication rather than directly handover. Its message overhead is n+m where
m is the number of messages of the EAP method. Using EAP-TTLS results inm > 4.
Thus, the protocols can be used alongside each other; ENPA whenever a full EAP-
authentication becomes necessary, and 3PHSH or NPA as the MC moves through
the WMN.
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3PHSH NPA ENPA
Protocol initiation anytime anytime EAP auth.
# TMRs per run 1 n > 1 n > 1
PMK reception guaranteed opportunistic opportunistic
IP connectivity yes yes no
# Messages
(n=TMRs 4 2 + n n + m
m=EAP messages)
Standard compliant
√ √ √
Table 7.1: This table summarizes the protocol properties of 3PHSH, NPA, and ENPA.
7.3.5 Handover in Multi-Operator Scenarios
In Chapter 6 we described how our comprehensive security architecture (presented
in Chapter 5) can be used in multi-operator scenarios. The handover protocols
proposed in this chapter are obviously also relevant to these scenarios. We will now
elaborate on this issue assuming aMCpiψ that is currently roaming in the domain ψ
using the same notation as in Chapter 6.
Section 6.3 introduced the concept of so-called DSRKs which enable services
in specified domains. These services may also resemble handover. As such, the
protocols and keys generated in this chapter will differ only in the selection of keys
that are used.
3PHSH
This protocol can be used in a FN, e.g., domain ψ, as the local AAAψψ will be in
possession of the DSRKψ of a roaming deviceMCpiψ. Figure 7.9 depicts a snippet of
the domain specific key hierarchy introduced in Section 6.3. To achieve message
authentication and confidentiality to AAAψψ, theMC
pi
ψ now uses rPAK
ψ which is
valid to be used in the domain ψ. The CMR?ψ (regardless of operator allegiance - cf.
Section 6.3.3) relays this message via a secure IPsec connection to the AAAψψ. It is
secured by the domain specific keys of the CMR?ψ, TIK
ψ and TEKψ.
MCpiψ and TMR
?
ψ agree upon PMK
ψ
TMRi
which is generated using the key deriva-
tion show in Equation 7.1 keyed with rKDKψ ofMCpiψ.
3PHSH can also leverage the concept of the FAU (cf. Section 5.3) while roaming
in a FN. Now, instead of using the rPAKψ with the local AAA server, the node uses
the PAKψFDi with the responsible FAU
?
ψ. As such, also the key used during the PMK
derivation will differ and use the PMKDKψFDi (cf. Figure 7.9).
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EMSK
DSRKpi DSRKψ
rTKψ
TIKψ TEKψ
rKDKψ
PMKψn FDRK
ψ
i
PMKψTMRi PMKDK
ψ
FDi
PMKψi ...
PAKψFDi
PAKIDψFDi
rPAKψ
PAKIDψ
Figure 7.9: A snippet of the domain specific FSASD key hierarchy including keys used
by the logical FAU domains.
NPA
NPA will be equally useful in a multi-operator setting as 3PHSH. The necessary do-
mains specific keys are exchanged in the same fashion as in the previous paragraph.
That is, MCpiψ either uses rPAK
ψ or PAKψFDi to secure its message with either the
local AAA server or a FAU of the current roaming domain ψ. The derivation of
PMK is either based on the rKDKψ if the AAA server is involved, or based on the
PMKDK
ψ
FDi
if done by a FAU.
ENPA
As the two previous protocols, ENPA can easily be used in a multi-operator scenario.
This authentication of the roaming MCpiψ using the home AAA
pi
pi is carried out as
described in Section 6.3.2. Recall, that the AAApipi sends the DSRKψ of the MC to
AAA
ψ
ψ after its authentication. In order to generate the PMKs the rKDK
ψ is used
by the AAAψψ in a modified key derivation (cf. Equation 7.5) without the random
values of the TLS session. The vanilla ENPA uses these values to increase the length
of the salt used during the key derivation.
PMKTMRi = KDF(rKDK
ψ, key_label||IPTMRi) (7.5)
Note that in the domain ψ each infrastructure device bootstraps a security
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association to the local AAA server, i.e., AAAψψ (cf. Section 6.3.3). As such, AAA
ψ
ψ
can send the generated PMKs to the TMRs requested byMCpiψ.
In order to prevent intermediate nodes from tracking possible handover desti-
nations of MCs, the IPs of the TMRs are encapsulated in the TLS session. As only
the home AAA server can extract them, it is necessary to relay these IPs back to the
foreign AAA server as they are needed for the key derivation.
Similarly, the vanilla-ENPA, the multi-operator version cannot profit from the
FAUs deployed in the WMN.
7.4 Performance Evaluation
This section presents the performance evaluation of our proactive handover pro-
tocols 3PHSH, NPA and ENPA using our live WMN testbed. The measurements
compare the protocols running on top of the two most popular transport protocols
TCP and UDP. Additionally, implicitly relevant factors for handover, i.e., the IEEE
802.11i 4-way handshake and the wireless scanning process are measured.
7.4.1 Theoretical Handover Performance
As practical evaluation and comparison of the related handover mechanisms for
infrastructure WLAN (cf. Section 7.1) is not possible, due to either specialized hard-
ware that is unavailable and missing implementations, we compare the protocols
on an analytical level.
We use the analytical method and definitions proposed in [Cla08]. Here we
specifically analyze the runtime of handover-specific protocols. This does not in-
clude the 4-way handshake as it is not specific to a handover protocol but needs to
be run in a regular wireless association of STA and AP.
Let
. Ne be the number of round trips for a specific EAP method;
. Tw the transmission latency between STA and AP;
. Tc the latency between any two relatively close devices;
. Ta be the latency between infrastructure components and the AAA server;
. Ths = 4 · Tw be the duration of the 802.11i 4-way handshake.
Thus, the initial IEEE 802.11i transition, which actually corresponds to a full
EAP authentication, requires 2 ·Ne · (Tw + Ta) + Ta. For CAPWAP one can obtain
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4 · (Tw + Tc) + Tc, for HOKEY 2 · (Tw + Ta), and 2 · Tw + 2 · Tc + 2 · Tw for the IEEE
802.11r [Cla08].
Assuming the round trips and latencies of our testbed (cf. Chapter 4) as:Ne = 4,
Tw = 1.86 ms, Tc = 3.57 ms, and a four hop distance to the AAA server with
Ta = 7.02 ms, yields the estimated handover performance depicted in Table 7.2.
As we will see in the following, the individual runtimes of our three handover
protocols can match the theoretical performance computed analytically. Thus, we
can show that our protocols are competitive to the other approaches even though
they operate on a wireless instead of a wired backbone.
The analytical runtime of our protocols are:
. 3PHSH: 2 · (Tw + Tc) + 2 · Ta, MC-AAA round trip; latencies MC-CMR/TMR
. NPA: 2 · Ta + 1 · Ta, MC-AAA round trip; unicast to one AAA-TMR
. ENPA: 2 ·Ne · (Tw + Ta) + Ta, as IEEE 802.11i, using one TMR.
Also note that as opposed to our handover protocols, all related approaches
compared in this section are only applicable to a single handover destination. But
both NPA and ENPA are capable to prepare multiple handover destinations at once
while only requiring an additional unicast from the AAA server to the TMR. For
the purpose of a fair comparison, we assumed both to be run for a single TMR.
The runtime of NPA for multiple TMRs is in the worst case bound by the key
delivery time to either a requested TMR, or to the MC itself (cf. Section 7.4.4). A
handover can only be successfully be initiated if both the TMR and the MC are
in possession of the handover key. The same holds true for ENPA which delivers
the key to the MC inside of the EAP method and uses a single unicast message to
deliver the keys to the TMRs.
This means that the theoretical protocol runtime (cf. Table 7.2) for bootstrapping
one TMR cannot be used directly to estimate the runtime for bootstrapping multiple
TMRs in a scalar manner.
7.4.2 Methodology
After discussing the handover performance of our protocols on a theoretical level,
we now continue with the methodology that we used to evaluate the protocols in
our real world testbed.
All measurements of 3PHSH, NPA, ENPA, the 4-way handshake, and the IEEE
802.11 scanning process have been repeated 100 times in each run to obtain suffi-
ciently stable results. The results depicted in the figures represent median values,
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Protocol Theoretical Runtime (ms) for one TMR TMRs
802.11i [IEE04a] 85.5 1
802.11r [IEE08] 14.85 1
HOKEY [Cla08] 25.2 1
CAPWAP [OCK05] 25.29 1
3PHSH 24.9 1
NPA 21.06 > 1
ENPA 85.5 > 1
Table 7.2: A comparison of the theoretical handover duration for bootstrapping a single
handover destination. Note that only NPA and ENPA are capable of bootstrapping
multiple handover destinations in one protocol run.
AAA
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MR2
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MR6
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Figure 7.10: The general purpose evaluation topology that is used for 3PHSH, NPA,
and ENPA.
their respective quartiles, and standard deviations. They show the runtime of the
individual protocols. A complete handover process also includes the IEEE 802.11i
4-way handshake.
For each protocol we created specific network topologies to be able to hand-tune
the relevant factors, such as the distance between the involved network components.
7.4.3 3PHSH Evaluation
Figure 7.10 shows the topology that has been used to evaluate the performance of
3PHSH. The purpose of this specific network topology is to increase the number of
wireless hops between the MC requesting handover and the AAA server generating
and distributing the handover keys by one in each test run. In the i-th test run, the
MC is connected to MRi (CMR) which is i hops from the AAA server. Now the MC
requests a handover key for MR(i+1) (TMR).
During the evaluation, the distance from MC to the AAA server proved to be
most relevant for the protocol’s runtime. Figure 7.11 shows the runtime of 3PHSH
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Figure 7.11: Runtime of 3PHSH comparing TCP and UDP over various distances.
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Figure 7.12: The NPA evaluation topology allowing distance variations to the TMRs.
using TCP and UDP. In order to make a qualitative statement about the link quality
of the communication path, we additionally included the latency between the
MC and the TMR. UDP is roughly 50% faster (average) than TCP which can be
accounted for by the absence of a handshaking mechanism. However, both are
obviously influenced by the current link quality. The maximum message size of
3PHSH is 107 byte, which is far less than the Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) of
the testbed (1528 byte). Thus, this result supports the conclusion that the runtime of
the protocol is directly proportional to the cumulative link latencies between MC
and the AAA server, as well as between TMR and the AAA server.
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Figure 7.13: The NPA star topology focussing on the amount of requested TMRs.
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Figure 7.14: This figure shows the duration after NPA message M2 containing the PMK
is received at the TMRs for various distances using TCP and UDP.
7.4.4 NPA Evaluation
NPA has been evaluated using the topologies shown in Figure 7.10, Figure 7.12,
and a star topology in which the distance between all TMR and the MC is one
(cf. Figure 7.13). Additionally, we evaluated how the number of TMRs included in
the MC’s request influences the protocol runtime. Again, both UDP and TCP were
compared as alternative transport protocols.
At first, the topology shown in Figure 7.12 was used. Each TMR was at least two
hops from the AAA server. The CMR to which the MC is connected remains MR1
in each run. In our measurements we iteratively increased the maximum distance
between the requested TMRs and the AAA server by one hop. Additionally, we
increased the amount of requested TMRs by one. In the last run the MC requests
PMKs for MR3, MR4, MR5, MR6, and MR7 which is four wireless hops from the
AAA server.
162 Chapter 7. Handover Extensions
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
MR3 (2) MR4 (2) MR5 (2) MR6 (3) MR7 (4)
mi
llis
eco
nd
s (
ms
)
MR (# wireless hops MR-AAA)
TMRs received M2
TCPUDPlatency
Figure 7.15: This shows the runtime of NPA until the last TMR has received the PMK.
To determine the relevant runtime we computed two values: ∆tMC which is
the time the MC receives the final message from the AAA server enabling it to
derive the PMKs. And ∆tTMRi marks the time the TMRs receive the respective
PMK from the AAA server. For the MC to make a successful handover it must
possess the handover key, but also the TMRs must possess the handover key. In any
cases, whichever key delivery path takes longer marks the end of a protocol run, as
otherwise a handover will be unsuccessful.
Figure 7.14 shows the result of the last run in which PMKs for all TMRs are
requested. The values on the x-axis denote the specific TMRs. The respective y-axis
shows the time it took till M2 is received at the TMR. As expected, sequentially
delivering the PMKs using TCP has a linear effect on the runtime. Delivering a total
of five PMKs to MR3-MR7 takes approximately 50 ms using TCP, and 10 ms using
UDP.
Figure 7.15 shows the duration until the PMKs are received at the TMRs for both
TCP and UDP. Again, UDP is approximately proportional to the latency between
the AAA server, TMR, and MC.
Additional measurements using a star topology (cf. Figure 7.13) revealed that
the distance to the AAA server is the decisive factor rather than the number of
requested TMRs. When using TCP to deliver the PMKs to the TMRs, its handshake
plays into the overall runtime. Parallelization of PMK delivery is likely to reduce
the runtime down to approximately the time it takes to deliver a PMK to a single
TMR in the best case.
Using the topology shown in Figure 7.10 we varied the distance between the
MC and the AAA server in the same way as for the evaluation of 3PHSH. We
observed that the distance between MC and AAA server has very similar effects on
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Figure 7.16: This figure shows the runtime of NPA with regards to the distance between
the TMR and the AAA server. Here only one TMR is requested by the MC.
the runtime (cf. Figure 7.16). The communication performance to the AAA server is
proportional to the current latency on the path. Again UDP outperformed TCP.
7.4.5 ENPA Evaluation
By considering the analysis results of 3PHSH and NPA, and also prior results shown
in Section 5.5, it becomes evident that the number of wireless hops (MC and TMRs)
to the key distribution component, i.e., the AAA server, is the decisive factor for the
protocols’ runtime. Thus, we used the topology shown in Figure 7.10 in order to
evaluate both vanilla EAP-TTLS and our extension, ENPA. The runtime of vanilla
EAP-TTLS can be seen in Figure 5.7.
In Figure 7.17 the results for ENPA are shown. Because the results for EAP-TTLS
as shown in Figure 5.7 already revealed the effects of varying distance between the
MC and the AAA server, we fixed the number of wireless hops between the MC
and the AAA server to one. Instead we varied the number of IP addresses included
in the EAP-TTLS AVP as this is the only difference in communication between the
MC and the AAA server. Considering the variability of the wireless spectrum, we
can conclude that increasing the payload (6 MTU of the network) has an almost
negligible effect on the runtime. This is due to the fact that ENPA uses the same
mechanism (UDP) to deliver the PMKs to the TMRs.
The runtime for EAP-TTLS increases roughly about 20 ms per wireless hop,
whereas adding an IPv4 address increases the duration about 7 ms. Considering
that ENPA is envisioned to be used during initial authentication, and possibly
when the EAP session times out, this increase in the protocol runtime is negligible.
The other runtime component, i.e., the unicast message from the AAA server to
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Figure 7.17: This figures shows the effect of including varying numbers of IP addresses
in the ENPA messages received a the MC.
the TMRs, does not influence the runtime of the protocol negatively. It is roughly
proportional to the latency between the AAA server and the TMR and it is thus
very likely less than the runtime measured at the MC.
7.4.6 IEEE 802.11 Specifics
In addition to the performance of our protocols, we were also interested in the
runtime of scanning the wireless spectrum for access points, and the duration
of the 802.11i 4-way handshake. The scanning process is of practical relevance
as the MC needs to discover relevant TMRs. Current wireless drivers and the
wpa_supplicant implementation have slightly contradicting Basic Service Set Identi-
fier (BSSID) caching policies such that it may happen that the driver forgot a BSSID,
even though it should still be available. This forces current implementations to
re-initiate a costly scan of the spectrum. However, this can be done periodically
without interfering with the current connection. Figure 7.18 shows the duration
of the scanning process in relation to the number of frequencies. Each frequency
accounts for approximately 110 ms. On the other hand we also analyzed the runtime
of the 4-way handshake, which resulted in an average runtime of approximately
3.62 ms over 100 runs. It thus has a negligible effect for the cumulative handover
duration.
7.4.7 Evaluation Summary
This section presented an extensive performance evaluation of our three handover
protocols. Additionally, we also evaluated IEEE 802.11 specific metrics such as the
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Figure 7.18: This figure shows the duration of scanning each channel using IEEE
802.11a and IEEE 802.11b.
duration of the 4-way handshake and the process of scanning for available BSS’es.
We have seen that the handover protocols 3PHSH, NPA, and ENPA are highly
influenced by the distance of the involved nodes to the key distribution component,
e.g., the AAA-server. In Section 5.3 we proposed a key distribution component
(FAU) which can be placed somewhere on the path between the nodes and the
AAA-server. Thus, by using the FAU, the distance to the key distribution component
can be greatly reduced. This will positively impact the runtime of 3PHSH and NPA
as the latency to the key distribution component is a decisive factor. The ENPA
protocol cannot be optimized in the same manner as the FAU does not store any
user credentials. However, these credentials are necessary for authentication during
EAP-TTLS. Since ENPA is envisioned to be used either during initial authentication
of nodes, or anytime the EAP session times out, the runtime optimization would be
less effective anyway as the context is not as time critical.
In terms of the theoretical protocol runtime discussed in Section 7.4.1 we can
conclude that these values can be met for 3PHSH and NPA. The values for ENPA
deviate somewhat as the practical evaluation includes establishing a TCP connection
(3-way handshake) and a TLS handshake between the MC and the TLS server of
the AAA server.
Besides improving the runtime of the handover protocols, also the performance
of the IEEE 802.11 hardware and driver play an important role. We expect that the
hardware support and the scanning procedures could be optimized significantly
in future versions of the drivers. Also, handing information from the driver to the
wpa_supplicant in an efficient and reliable way would be a great improvement
from which handover protocols can benefit.
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7.5 Security Considerations
As for the original FSASD security architecture introduced in Chapter 5, we chose
to base our security analysis on RFC4962 [HA07] “Guidance for AAA Key Manage-
ment” as we rely on a AAA infrastructure. All our proposed protocols exploit the
security properties provided by an FSASD deployed WMN, especially the fact that
each MR has an IPsec channel to the AAA server.
Table 7.3 shows an overview of the results of security analysis. Each of our
protocols provides the same security properties required in RFC4962.
(1) Cryptographic algorithm independence is achieved by our proposals as they
use specific instances of cryptographic algorithms which can easily be replaced
by alternatives without affecting the protocols.
(2) Each protocol execution produces strong fresh session keys, i.e., the PMKs of
256 bits in length. The keys are generated using PRF+ which is recommended
and the current best practice [Kau10].
(3) The keys used to generate PMKs, as well as the handover keys themselves
have a clearly defined scope. rPAKs and rKDKs shared between a node and
the AAA are used to secure the protocol messages and generate handover
keys. The PMKs on the other hand are only used during the 4-way handshake.
(4) Replay protection related to PMK delivery from AAA to the TMRs is
achieved by their mutual IPsec SA. Protocol messages of 3PHSH and NPA
between the MC and AAA rely on time stamps to detect message replay.
Loose time synchronization is required.
(5) All parties are authenticated during network deployment by the AAA based
on their individual credentials. Message authenticity is ensured by IPsec
between AAA and the TMRs, and rPAK between MCs, AAA, and TMRs.
(6) The involved parties implicitly demonstrated possession of relevant keys in
each protocol. If a party does not possess the respective key, it is unable to
successfully send and receive messages that will be processed by the other
parties. This is either enforced by IPsec, or by MACs on the message content.
(7) Confidentiality of keying material is either ensured by IPsec between the
AAA server and the TRMs, or by encryption based on the rPAK. Keying
material transported from and to MCs is secured by the rPAK.
(8) As our protocols neither support ciphersuite negotiation, nor do they support
cipher suite confirmation.
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Requirement (1-11) 3PHSH NPA ENPA
1. Crypto-algorithm independent yes (no negotiation)
2. Strong fresh session keys yes yes yes
3. Limit key scope yes yes yes
4. Replay detection mechanism yes yes yes
5. Authenticate all parties yes yes yes
6. Peer and authenticator authorization indirect
7. Keying material and confidentiality yes yes yes
and integrity
8. Confirm cipher suite selection no (no negotiation)
9. Uniquely names keys yes yes yes
10. Prevent the Domino effect yes yes yes
11. Bind key to its context yes yes yes
Table 7.3: This table summarizes the security analysis respective to RFC4962.
(9) All keys are uniquely named by using a key label which is strongly related
to key usage.
(10) Authenticators, i.e., CMRs and TMRs only hold a limited amount of key
material with a specific lifetime. Compromise only allows to access current
and new keying material associated with this specific authenticator; others
are not directly affected. Thus, the domino effect is prevented.
(11) Key context is explicitly established during key generation using the key label
(e.g., cf. Equation 7.1).
7.6 Summary & Conclusion
In this chapter we proposed novel proactive handover protocols for WMNs which
are secure, efficient and practical. Table 7.1 summarizes their key properties. Con-
trasting to the highlighted proposals for infrastructure WLAN, our solutions do
not suffer from a bootstrapping problem. Using our protocols alongside the FSASD
architecture enables us to meet a comprehensive set of security requirements for
protocols in the context of AAA key management. 3PHSH, NPA, and ENPA are
envisioned to be used in an interplay allowing to proactively instantiate handover
candidates as the MC strides through different epochs of its network session. The
practical evaluation using a live WMN testbed allowed us to determine the per-
formance of the protocols, and additionally profile the related wireless properties
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of the 4-way handshake and scanning the spectrum. Altogether, the resulting per-
formance highlights the applicability of our protocols in a time critical context,
without negatively impacting ongoing sessions. Correctly deciding the point in
time a handover would be beneficial, as well as designing a service to announce
and discover handover candidates or key distribution components near to MCs
leaves room for further research.
7.6. Summary & Conclusion 169

Part IV
Synopsis



C H A P T E R 8
Conclusion
In this thesis we proposed a comprehensive security architecture for Wireless Mesh
Networks (WMNs) which copes with multi-operator scenarios and enables handover
services for end-users as well as for the network infrastructure.
Prior to introducing the architecture we thoroughly revisited the technical foun-
dations (cf. Chapter 2) we make use of, such as the IEEE 802.11i security model, the
Remote Dial-in User Service (RADIUS) protocol, the Internet Protocol Security (IPsec)
protocol suite, a bi-directional secure Remote Procedure Call (RPC) framework, and
the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) protocol.
After describing the necessary technical fundamentals, this thesis continued by
introducing WMNs on a general level to establish the baseline needed to derive
their security requirements (cf. Chapter 3). We specifically categorized the nodes
in operator-centric WMNs to be Mesh Clients (MCs), Mesh Routers (MRs), Mesh
Gateways (MGs), and Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) servers.
Each of them has a clearly defined purpose in the network. Considering the node
types and the resulting network topologies allowed us to define all the important
communication patterns in WMNs such as: MC↔MC, MC↔MR, MC↔MG, MR
↔MR, MR↔MG, and any communication involving the AAA server. To the best
of our knowledge we were the first to propose such an approach when designing a
security architecture for WMNs. The related work in this area usually focused on
security of a single specific communication pattern, rendering the other patterns
non-secured. Thus, a comprehensive and general approach did not exist so far.
We continued by defining an attacker model and studied the specific challenges
WMNs face. These include different operator models (single- and multi-operator)
where operators may even cooperate and share parts of their network infrastructure
to form a single network. We also discussed the possible heterogeneity for the
wireless links between devices, the challenges introduced by routing MCs, and
mobility in general, i.e., that of MCs, but also mobility of parts of the network
infrastructure. After that we used these assumptions to derive a set of general
security requirements for WMNs and evaluated them against related research that
aims at creating security architectures for WMNs. This study reveals a selection of
gaps that our comprehensive security should address.
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In Chapter 4 we presented the ITsec Testbed which has been designed in the pro-
cess of developing our security architecture. Its main goal was to demonstrate the
feasibility of our mechanisms and to provide a platform to evaluate the performance
of our security protocols on real hardware instead of relying on simulations. Our
testbed is based on Off-the-Shelf (OTS) hardware and comprised of about 20 nodes
running standard software such as a Linux operating system and its respective
wireless tools wpa_supplicant and hostapd. The testbed is modeled to represent
a WMN managed by an operator. For this purpose we introduced a central man-
agement server running a AAA server. We have used the testbed to implement and
evaluate our security architecture including the handover services (cf. Chapter 7).
Following the foundations lain out in the previous chapters Chapter 5 continues
by proposing the central element of this thesis. The Framework for establishing Secu-
rity Associations for Sequentially Deployed WMN (FSASD) is a comprehensive security
architecture for WMNs which addresses all the security requirements derived in
Chapter 3. We build on standard mechanisms such as EAP, IPsec, and the AAA pro-
tocol RADIUS. We use the EAP protocol and the Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)
as a basis to construct an extensible key hierarchy that is used to bootstrap security
associations between devices in the WMN. In FSASD each device is authenticated
using EAP, thus, each authenticated device shares the key hierarchy with the AAA
server. After connecting to the network, devices automatically bootstrap an IPsec
Security Association (SA) with the AAA server. This is necessary to secure RADIUS
traffic that is generated once another devices connects via the device. Also, MCs
use the key hierarchy to setup an IPsec connection to MGs in the network to secure
their multi-hop traffic. For this purpose we introduced the 3-Party Handshake for
Sequential Deployment (3PHSD) protocol. This protocol allows an authenticated key
agreement between two nodes that do not yet share a secret. We leverage the fact
that each node shares a personal instance of the key hierarchy with the AAA server.
As the AAA server is the main key distribution component, our security architec-
ture also proposes an optimization by introducing the FSASD Authenticator (FAU).
Not only does the FAU allow to segment the network into logical key distribution
domains, but it also allows to speed up the 3PHSD protocol, as well a the handover
protocols proposed in Chapter 7.
As the general design of our comprehensive security architecture implicitly
supports an operator-based approach to WMNs, Chapter 6 generalizes it such that
it enables multi-operator support and infrastructure sharing. In less complicated
scenarios, such as roaming, MCs can use other networks maintained by different
Foreign Operators (FOs) while being enrolled with their Home Operator (HO). By
using the concept Domain Specific Root Keys (DSRKs) all the security features of
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FSASD remain usable as a sub-level of the original FSASD key hierarchy is spawned
for specific networks. This for instance allows roaming MCs to setup an IPsec
tunnel connection to either a gateway of its HO (similar to a Virtual Private Network
(VPN)), or to use the same mechanism with a gateway of the FO but with domain
specific keys. In more complex scenarios the network is composed of devices from
multiple operator to form a mixed network. Here, devices are connected to each
other irrelevant of their individual operator allegiances. Still, based on the FSASD
key hierarchy generalization our approach holds up to the security requirements
proposed in Chapter 3.
While Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 laid out the architectural details, Chapter 7
presents three secure handover protocols as a significant application of the FSASD
security architecture. The handover protocols interface with the extensible key
hierarchy in single- and multi-operator scenarios. They enable secure proactive
handover services not only for the users of the WMN, but also for parts of the
network infrastructure. We proposed three protocols that can be used by devices at
different stages of their network usage, e.g., during the initial EAP authentication, or
any time after. The protocols Neighborhood Pre-Authentication (NPA) and EAP-TTLS
Neighborhood Pre-Authentication (ENPA) allow to bootstrap multiple Target Mesh
Router (TMR) at once, while the 3-Party Handshake for Handover (3PHSH) protocol
prepares exactly one TMR per protocol run. All protocols are compatible to the
FAU-concept, as well as the multi-operator generalization (cf. Chapter 6).
Concluding, this thesis proposed a comprehensive security architecture for
WMNs interfacing with standardized mechanisms such as IEEE 802.11i, EAP,
RADIUS, and IPsec. The core feature is an extensible key hierarchy that is used to
set up security associations between network nodes after they have been success-
fully authenticated. The key hierarchy can also be used in the context of multiple
operators, whether they cooperate in forming a mixed network, or maintain sep-
arate networks. We also proposed three proactive handover protocols for WMNs
that are secured with the help of the security associations bootstrapped using the
FSASD key hierarchy.

C H A P T E R 9
Future Research
In this section we shortly elaborate on open issues that require additional research
outside of the scope of this thesis. This includes communication between AAA
servers in multi-operator scenarios, handover decisions, and the testbed evolution.
Chapter 6 detailed the generalization of the FSASD security architecture to
support multiple operators including MC roaming. Most scenarios involving mul-
tiple operators require communication between their AAA servers, e.g., during
the authentication of roaming devices in a Foreign Network (FN). It should further
be investigated how the communication between AAA server, i.e., the key trans-
port from one domain to another, can be secured. Proposed mechanisms such
as [HNO10], [RRSW97] or [SDNN08] are not specific enough to allow a standard-
ized secure key transport, yet. In terms of the FSASD key hierarchy, it should be
considered whether further extensions may aid in this endeavor. It may for instance
be beneficial for operators to cross-authenticate their AAA servers or their MGs
representing the network perimeter based on the FSASD mechanisms.
As Chapter 7 has shown, a secure efficient and practical handover can be
achieved using the FSASD key hierarchy. The evaluation of our three handover
protocols has also shown (cf. Figure 7.18) that not only the protocols themselves
influence the overall handover time, but also driver related issues such as scanning
the spectrum. In our research we focused on secure key transport, however, the deci-
sion when to initiate a handover remains an open issue. It requires scenario-specific
research into wireless signal reception and most importantly movement prediction
of the device requiring handover. There is also much room for improvement on the
wireless device drivers of the Linux operating system which we used during our
evaluations.
Last, the ITsec testbed (cf. Chapter 4) as a platform to develop and evaluated
security protocols for WMNs should be evolved constantly. Besides keeping up
with the state of the art, more effort should be spent on further automating the
testbed. This includes our monitoring and management solution pwrmesh, but also
the means to automate tests and evaluations of new protocols.
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